

The Forum

SEPTEMBER, 1900.

ANTI-ENGLISH FEELING AMONG THE GERMANS AND ITS CAUSES.

It is well known how apt people are, after they have paid a visit to Paris or to the Rhine, to give us their opinion about the French or about the Germans, in general. They may have spoken to a dozen of each nationality, but their conversation with these few individuals was very likely to have been extremely scant and scrappy. Yet for all that they have formed their opinion, and whenever the subject turns up they are always ready to judge millions by the few they have seen. They will declare all Frenchmen to be untrustworthy, all Germans to be rude, or, on the contrary, all Frenchmen to be charming, and all Teutons to be very learned. Their opinion has been formed, and if anybody differs from them they have always one reply: "We have been to Paris," or "We have been to Cologne."

The citizens of the United States fare even worse. They are generally judged from what is seen of Americans spending their holidays in England, whether on a personally conducted tour or travelling with families and servants, whether hailing from Boston or from Chicago or elsewhere; and the result of this combined photograph may well be imagined. Yet it is curious to see how lasting these impressions are, and how constantly they come to the surface again in conversations and discussions, though, if pressed a little, the detractors as well as

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the panegyrists of the typical American have little more to say than,

“I do not (or I do) like you, Dr. Fell,
The reason why I cannot tell.”

All this was very different formerly. There was a time, no doubt, when every American, man, woman, or child, and everything American, was hated and ridiculed in England, and there are people still living who can remember this race hatred, which remained alive for a generation or two after the American Colonies had gained their independence. Victories and defeats will always leave behind such impressions; and the tone adopted by English writers, such as Charles Dickens and many others, was certainly by no means friendly or flattering toward the republicans of the United States. Nay, it was exasperating, inasmuch as ridicule is always more offensive than downright hostile criticism; and, unfortunately, it has not been entirely forgotten even to the present day, at least on the American side.

But, in all other respects, what a marvellous change has taken place during the last generation in the mutual feeling between England and the United States! The old feuds are almost entirely closed and forgotten, and it is felt that the Americans are far more useful to England as *bona-fide* rivals than as discontented fellow-subjects. And that rivalry extends not only to commerce, but to literature, art, science, and social culture in general, in all of which the United States may no longer fear any comparison with England. The fact is that England can no longer patronize, but has to respect, the citizens of the United States; and if she has not quite forgotten that she was the mother and the Americans her children, neither are the Americans unwilling to admit that in political, social, and scientific progress they owe much to England, and that the glorious past of Great Britain is their own in every sense of the word.

No one can fail to perceive this when he takes his American friends to the House of Commons or to the English universities. It is their old House of Commons, and Oxford and Cambridge are their old universities. They are very often much better informed in English history and antiquities, and in what they have to see, to study, and to admire, than the sightseers of England. Shakespeare is their own; Lord Bacon is their old philosopher; and if they criticise some acts of the present Lord Salisbury, are they not lost in admiration of Hatfield, the abode of the Cecils for so many generations? And how many American families are there who, after having made a large

fortune, or at all events, after having secured an independence for themselves and their children, come to England, to the old country, and stay there and feel at home, as if they had been born in it? These Anglo-Americans are outspoken enough, but do we hear from them any scurrilous abuse of things English? They are republicans at heart, no doubt, but do they wish for a better commonwealth than they find in England under the present Queen and Parliament?

And where are English of any distinction received with more generous and hearty hospitality than in the United States? Our best men of science are invited to lecture there; our theatre companies migrate to New York, and American actors fill their places in England. There are, no doubt, differences between English and Americans — each party knows them — but they are so difficult to define, particularly if they are to be made intelligible to strangers, that we are told of a recent proposal at the Exhibition in Paris to distinguish Americans by a visible badge, so that they might not be mistaken for English, who are not over-popular in the French capital just now. Could they not be recognized without such a badge? We ourselves can easily detect an American by his accent, though there is little of that accent in the Southern States.

Froude was praised in America for the excellent English of his lectures; but, as a newspaper remarked, he was sometimes hardly intelligible on account of his strong English accent. Why should not the Americans have their own accent, like the Scotch and the Irish, without in any way being ashamed of it. There was a well-known professor at Oxford who invariably dropped his h's. This is considered a great sin; but "Why should I pronounce all these h's?" said he. "In the county where I was born and bred they did not pronounce an *h* at the beginning of a word, just as we omit it in 'honor' and 'hour.' " And have not the English dropped the old *h* in such words as *which*, and *when*, thus confusing *which* and *witch*; likewise in *why*, though always pronouncing and writing the *h* in *how*. Such variations, though they startle us at first, may well be tolerated, and they exist more or less in all dialects.

But while in all these respects, in language, in science, in art, in political and ethical principles, and in religion also, the people of the United States and of England may be called one people, varying only slightly, like dialect varieties of one and the same language, one can hardly trust one's eyes in reading some of the English and American newspapers, which pour the most villainous abuse on each other,

and seem to have one object only — that of fanning the embers of enmity and war between the two countries. An answer can easily be given on the American side. Newspapers, we are told, are very much influenced there by Irish writers, and every Irishman in America is a mortal enemy to England. At the present moment, we are told that much, nay everything, depends on the Irish vote; and those who want to secure Irish voters must rant against old England. As England has committed no very heinous offence against Ireland of late, her behavior against the Boers of the Transvaal is taken hold of as a good election cry against her; and the President is given to understand that, in order to secure the Irish vote, if he does not actually send ships and soldiers to the Cape to fight for the Boers—that is, against England—he must, at all events, insist on England's submitting her case, and that of the Boers, to arbitration. This, however, would be tantamount to a declaration of war against England, an eventuality by no means unwelcome, it would seem, to a certain section of the Irish Party. When the Boers published their ultimatum, and challenged their suzerain and protecting power to the arbitrament of war, what could England do but defend her Colonial Empire? Had she submitted to arbitration, she would have simply conceded the point at issue between herself and Krüger. Krüger would have become *ipso facto* what he had so long desired, a sovereign among sovereigns, a president among presidents, and probably the richest president in the world. Unfortunately, at this very time, the German and the Scandinavian votes in the United States, which have often served as a counterweight to the Irish vote, are influenced by the same suspicion or hatred against England, so that it is by no means easy for an American statesman not to be influenced by these electioneering clamors.

It is said that the most respected, and, in the end, the most influential, statesmen in America fully understand the great difficulties of England. They remember that the North never would have consented to arbitration at the time of the secession of the Southern States, and that the concession of belligerent rights was all that could be granted at the time, and was granted by the North to the South with us, as by England to the Transvaal. But why should there be all this manœuvring for the good will, nay, for the neutrality, of the United States in a quarrel which they may certainly deplore as men, but which they could not possibly prevent without increasing the terrible miseries of war, and inducing a lasting hatred among the greatest nations of the world.

If the Germans had their own way at present, there is little doubt they would rush into war with England. Their newspapers have simply gone mad in their hatred of Great Britain. They would like to constitute themselves the defenders of humanity, though they could only add to the horrors of war. They received great credit for the display of their severely neutral, not to say complacent, attitude at the time of the Armenian massacres. They knew they could not have helped their fellow-Christians in Turkey; they could only have increased the horrible bloodshed so resignedly witnessed by them in Europe. Fortunately, Germany is an empire; Prussia is a monarchy; and the people know that the right of peace and war does not belong to them, but to their King and Emperor.

The United States is a Republic, and England may well be called a constitutional republic, under a monarch; but Germany is proud to be a real empire or monarchy, and may, indeed, be proud to follow such a guide as it has at present. Hence, it follows that the inflammatory cries uttered in Germany, whether in the chambers or in the newspapers, can do but little direct harm. Not a single Pomeranian will be sent to the Cape. Such powder magazines of eloquence may be fired with impunity in Germany, but not so in the United States, and not so in England. The right to declare war belongs, in England, also to the sovereign, but the sinews of war must be granted by Parliament; so that a war without Parliamentary sanction is not to be thought of in England. The same applies to the United States; and whatever power the Executive may sometimes claim, no war can be thought of without the sanction of the representatives of the people. In form it may be the same in Germany, but in fact the Germans know best whose word in those matters is law.

In this and in many other respects England and the United States are at one. They have reached the same degree in political education, and both possess all the necessary guarantees of freedom to the people and of the independence of the Executive. And that is the very reason why history hereafter will wonder that these two Anglo-Saxon powers should never have thought of making their united strength felt for good in the political controversies of the world. The two together, agreed as they are on what is possible in the self-government of the people, and on the rules that ought to regulate the free intercourse of all nations, might surely conclude such a treaty as binds France and Russia together. They might even form an Areopagus, to be joined hereafter by any nation agreeing with them

on the general principles of international morality. They speak the same language, they share in the same history, they are, in fact, of the same blood and bone. Why should they not make their character felt abroad, by combining their moral forces, by standing always together, where injustice is threatened or done, where slavery under one name or another is practised, where the true ideals of civilized and progressive humanity are trodden under foot?

Unfortunately, at present, as soon as there is the faintest indication of such an approach to a more intimate relation between these two nations, other nations begin to be afraid. They profess to see in every such attempt an intrigue directed against themselves, though it can be an intrigue only if there is anything to be intrigued against. Is there? Of course, commercial questions, which now occupy the principal place in international diplomacy, may be viewed in a different way by Germany, by the United States, and by England. But here, too, the views of England and the United States are not to be mistaken. England is committed to free trade, the United States to protection. It is a pity that it should be so; but the two nations, the American and the English, have come to a mutual understanding, and it is difficult to see why their undisguised rivalry should be poisoned by foreign whisperings. Surely what applies to individuals applies to states also. In private life also we know of whisperers and mischief-makers; and there is only one way of dealing with them, to ignore them—to live them down and trust that truth will prevail in the end. Why should diplomatists imagine that they are privileged, or that they can tell or suggest untruths with impunity?

Take the well-known reply of a Russian general who, when he was found to have told a diplomatic lie, exclaimed, with considerable warmth, “I am ready to die for my Emperor; should I be afraid to lie for him?” This is the old diplomacy. But one cannot even recommend the advice given more recently by Bismarck to a young diplomatist always to speak the truth, “since,” he said, “no one will believe what a diplomatist says.” What is required is real truthfulness in all communications between nations as between individuals. It may seem a low view to take of statesmen and diplomatists to look upon them as the solicitors of their nations. It is well known that Lord Salisbury once apologized to the solicitors of England for having compared them to Gladstone. But it is quite true that solicitors must be either honest and straightforward or nothing. Solicitors have certainly to stand up for the interests of their clients; but no respect-

able firm of lawyers would consider it right to tell an untruth for the benefit of their clients. They would do their best for them, but they would rather leave a case alone, if they were required to tell an untruth or to act fraudulently. And the same lesson has long been learned by our diplomatists. No one would suppose an ambassador to take the most unfavorable view of his own country's case; but of that those who act as counsel for other countries are fully aware, and they would at last arrive at a compromise, just as lawyers in a case of contested inheritance would recommend concessions on both sides till they should arrive at a settlement tolerable for one side and not intolerable for the other.

Much mischief is done in such contests by irresponsible outsiders, the same kind of mischief which in political matters is done by people who write anonymously in the newspapers. Newspapers vary considerably in character in different countries. Nobody would mistake a French newspaper for a German or an English one, even though it were translated into German or English. English newspapers are mostly commercial undertakings, and they make no secret of it. They live on their advertisements; and if they are to be bribed at all, it can only be done either by advertisements or by early information of important events. German newspapers profess to be more patriotic, but it will take a long time before they recover from the revelations made by Bismarck as to the Press Bureau and its ramifications. If the press was raised in Germany by Bismarck himself turning journalist, it received a most damaging blow by his disclosures as to the employment of the famous, or rather infamous, Reptile fund. It cannot be doubted that both the press and the Government are so ashamed of that Reptile period that nothing of the kind will be attempted again; but the mischief once done is not so easily undone.

Even over the Schleswig-Holstein troubles the tone adopted by the German papers against England has not been such as it ought to be between two great nations. England desired to be enlightened on the Schleswig-Holstein question, which even the "Times" professed itself unable to unravel. Nor can it be denied that at that time Germany had reason to complain of England. Palmerston's flippant foreign policy gave just offence to the patriots of Germany. The Treaty of London was really an insult to Germany; and when the Prussian minister was told that he might please himself, and that the treaty would be as good with or without the signature of Prussia, this was most offensive. But the minister was not deceived; and

when at last he was ordered by his own Government to sign the treaty, he prophesied, and prophesied truly, that the first cannon shot in Europe would tear that treaty to tatters.

It is not too much to say that Palmerston's, and, to a certain extent, Lord John Russell's, foreign policy served to unite Germany against an injustice felt by all; but it wrought permanent mischief in producing a feeling of suspicion and mistrust against England in the hearts of all German patriots, who did not know that the foreign policy of that period was also strongly disapproved of by the best among English statesmen, and that the English people were carried away by their enthusiasm for the Danish princess, and forgot at the time the political consequences of their inconsiderate behavior toward their old friend and ally. Such things will happen, but they are certainly to be regretted. If people, however, imagine that in the Austro-Prussian war also the undivided sympathy of England went toward Austria, they are greatly mistaken. There are, and there always will be, parties in England; yet the great mass of the people never flinched, but expressed their sympathies openly with the Prussian army and Prussian Government, as representing more legitimately than Austria the genuine Protestant element of Germany.

Then followed the Franco-German War. It was feared by some, and wished by others, that England should stand by France, which has always counted a large number of friends, particularly in aristocratic circles, where it is still counted as the highest distinction of a noble family to have come over from France with the Norman Conqueror. But the great mass of the people, and the Government also, in spite of the occasional waverings intelligible during a Gladstonian ministry, were decidedly German. No unfriendly act against Germany would have been sanctioned by Parliament; and all these stories so sedulously propagated by the German press were either false or futile. It was stated again and again that among the French arms carried off by the German army were many of English manufacture. That is very possible. These arms might have been bought long ago, or might have been smuggled in by merchants caring more for profits than for the risks they ran. Who does not remember the charge brought against Lord Palmerston at the time of the Prusso-Danish War, that arms actually stamped with his own name had been found? The name of the firm was Palmer & Son, and this, by Anglophobe patriots, had been read "Palmerston," as if the name of a Prime Minister were ever stamped on guns or cannons. But it should be re-

membered once for all that private enterprise in smuggling and selling arms and warlike munitions can never be altogether stopped ; and when, during the Indian Mutiny, many arms were found there even of English manufacture, there were not wanting people in England who declared it was better that such arms should have been bought from English than from French or German manufacturers.

It is curious that while these promiscuous charges were brought against England by the German press the German Government never complained, and accepted the official explanations which were given whenever it seemed necessary. During all that time the German newspapers never ceased from troubling. Facts which stared them in their faces were ignored or denied, and it was entirely forgotten that England owed something to France also. The French statesmen and officers had personal friends in England, comrades from the time of the Crimean War, during which Germany stood so severely neutral, and seemed not always displeased with Russian victories. What more could Germany expect from literary men in England than Carlyle's triumphant panegyric, and what more could she expect than the participation of the English public in the peace rejoicings of the German societies in London and the other large towns?

But nothing will convince German writers even now that the feeling in England was not anti-German ; that England is not full of envy at seeing the powerful development of Germany ; and that the commercial classes in particular are not frightened by the competition of the great German houses. Now, supposing all this were true, where would be the harm ? If one newspaper, for instance, formerly of small importance, suddenly rises into prominence and draws away advertisements from other papers, what do these other papers feel and, possibly, say, unless they were very discreet ? It is but human nature that they should try to hold their own, or, perhaps, outbid their rivals, and warn them against being too conceited. And what human nature is in private life, that it also is between nation and nation. Let there be rivalry, by all means, and let each country run as hard as it can in the race ; but, surely, this kind of *Concurrenz* does not mean envy, hatred, and malice. If England tries to hold her own, if she wants even to extend her influence and her commercial ramifications, don't let that be called intrigue. England, when looking at the returns of exports and imports, and of other commercial statistics, is not yet frightened. Even her far-from-successful military operations at the Cape need not perturb her. She has thrown

all her weight on her naval forces, and has not thought much of defence by land. Suddenly she is called on to throw a force of 230,000 men, with horses and other requirements of war, over six thousand miles of sea. She has done what no other country has ever done, or could have done; and yet there are still more than 200,000 men ready to embark and continue the war. There is, besides, the whole native army of India, which is burning to fight for England, particularly the Goorkhas and the Sikhs—no contemptible fighting material—whose aid, in case of real danger, would certainly not be refused by England. They would not disgrace their uniforms as others less dark have done.

England has now concentrated her military forces. She was abused at first for not having learned that simple strategic measure; and now that she has learned it, she is called cowardly for bringing overwhelming forces against the enemy. Certainly the present war, in spite of all its misfortune, may give some idea of the naval and military resources of England; and it will be well to weigh this seriously, instead of treating such an army as a *quantité négligée*.

But what is most extraordinary is to see the Germans in Germany and the Germans in America undisguisedly rejoicing over every mishap of the English army. Nothing can be more degrading to a nation than open *Schadenfreude* at the defeats even of its declared enemies. When Italy was defeated by Austria or Austria by Italy, did the Germans rub their hands or shout? They behaved as men ought to behave who witness so terrible a tragedy as war. It is curious, but it is true, nevertheless, that the Germans in America have kept aloof from the American amusement of twisting the tail of the British lion. That their present pronounced feeling of hostility against England should be due to the American war against Spain and the conquest of Cuba and the Philippine Islands is difficult to believe, though it is repeated again and again.

There is, no doubt, a strong party in the United States to whom these recent conquests are anything but welcome, and they have taken it into their head that England egged on America. True it is that during the war with Spain, England observed a very friendly neutrality toward the United States, and did not support the claims of Spain. But how does that affect the Germans, whether in Germany or in America? They have been asked, and they have not withheld their answer. They declare that during all that time the most disgraceful lies about German plans were cabled from England to Amer-

ica. We must believe it, but we ask by whom were they cabled? By the Government? By the newspapers? By financial speculators? No one could say. Certainly nothing of the kind has attracted public attention in England, or has risen to the level of Parliamentary notice. Did Germany wish to annex the Philippines, or any other islands? In that case, it is quite possible that England may have raised her voice, but why should she not? Why should England alone be excluded from bidding for the Philippine Islands, if she ever dreamed of such a thing? And why should the Germans in America call this a "sowing of distrust between America and Germany," and call upon the Germans of America to resent it? These are nothing but pure inventions, which can be scattered broadcast without influencing a single real friend of either America or Germany. How any man in his senses could hold England and the English Government responsible for such hallucination passes one's understanding. But let us even admit that these rumors were true, would they constitute such a heinous crime as the German papers in America make them out to be?

In these days of newspapers we must harden our hearts in unbelief against many statements published on the highest authority. We know as a matter of fact that the relations between the English and German Governments were perfectly friendly when the German papers blew the war-trumpet against England every morning. One trembles if one thinks what might have happened if there had not been an Emperor who knew that a man might be a very good German without cursing England. What splendid days they were when England went to Germany for her ideals, and Germany came to England for such practical improvements as railways, steamers, men-of-war, gas, electricity, and machines of every kind. Even now, with all the professed hatred of everything English, Germany is full of English games, English horses, English fashions, and even English Tauchnitz editions. It is quite true, and cannot be justified, that Englishmen travelling on the Continent are occasionally overbearing, often reserved or proud; but are not Germans in England occasionally insulting, and often self-asserting and regardless of the toes of their neighbors?

With all that there is as yet no hatred of Germany: Germans living in England have never been insulted, except they provoke retaliation. It might be easy enough to cull some anti-German sentiment from the newspapers, but there never was such an epidemic of political madness in England as there is at the present moment in

Germany. The German and English characters form complements of each other. Why not admire what is good in Germany and what is good in England? Why indulge in envy when each nation has so much to be proud of? If Germany, wherever she turns in her colonial expansion, finds the ground occupied by England, this is, no doubt, provoking, but it cannot be helped now. Property is property, and as little as England envies Germany her army should Germany boast that she will soon excel the navy of England. People do not know how much mischief may be done by a word at random spoken. Every individual German and Englishman ought to know that he may have the destinies of these two great nations in his hand, that he is, in fact, in a certain sense, the representative and ambassador of his country in his own small sphere; but this sphere is sometimes widening and spreading like a circle caused in a lake by the impact of a small stone. That personal responsibility seems to be far more truly felt by Russians and Americans than by either Englishmen or Germans.

It is not so very long ago that an English officer, very popular in London society, was harshly treated at a railway station in Germany. People are not aware how much ill-will against Germany, in the best and most influential society in England, was caused by that single incident. England hangs very closely together, and it is surprising to see how easy relationship by blood or by marriage is made out there between perfect strangers. English railway servants, those drawn from our lower class in England as in Germany, are certainly far less dictatorial, and treat their passengers far less *du haut en bas* than in Germany. All such apparently small things may bear fruit when it is least expected. A war of words between the two countries seems harmless enough, but a real war would be so terrible that humanity shudders at the very mention of it. There is an excellent phrase which one often hears at the end of a dispute in France, "Soyons raisonnables," not "Soyez raisonnables." Both Germans and Englishmen would do well to adopt this phrase, and say, before it is too late, "Soyons raisonnables."

F. MAX MÜLLER.

THE KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL RESOLUTION.

THE proposition that this country should have an "American financial system, made by the American people for themselves," is calculated to appeal to national pride, but what does it mean? What is a "financial system" in the meaning of the resolution, and what advantage may there be in having one peculiar to ourselves?

The "financial system" contemplated is a monetary system, and more particularly a standard for the measurement of values. The declaration is that we should have an American standard of value, made by the American people for themselves, and, furthermore, that we should have two of them, gold and silver, valued to each other in the ratio of 16 to 1.

Now every one agrees that our institutions and laws should be designed for the advancement of our own interests, and with especial consideration for our own needs and conditions. But it is not necessary that the American people should originate everything they use. For example, there is the multiplication table. We may well accept the fact that twice two are four, and act upon it, although it is also accepted in England and on the continent of Europe. No advantage accrues to any particular country from a common use of the same multiplication table. It is only a compilation of facts fixed and unchangeable the world around. It constitutes a common basis for calculation and determination, and may be used with equal reliance and safety by everybody.

All of the mountains of the earth are measured from the sea level. No advantage is secured to the mountains of any particular country by reason of this practice. The sea is wholly disinterested and impartial in the service it renders. We always know where to find it, and a given height above the sea level is an intelligible and comparable thing to all.

The metric system of weights and measures has been adopted by many countries, and is expected eventually to supersede all other systems. Everybody recognizes that a great reform will have been consummated when common terms for weights and measures are used

by all the peoples who have relations with each other. It will save a vast amount of labor in computing equivalents, make the statistics of each country more accessible to the people of other countries, and promote intelligence and intercourse throughout the world.

We may extend the thought and conceive that a universal language would be a blessing to the world; bringing the inhabitants of all countries into close intellectual touch with each other, promoting the circulation of ideas, diffusing a more accurate knowledge of one another, and establishing more intimate relations. Is it conceivable that it would be advantageous to the United States to adopt a language "made by the American people for themselves"? Would disassociation from the speech and literature of the widely disseminated English language be other than a wanton folly? Is not the universality of our language the most potent of reasons for maintaining its use?

The general rule, then, is that in the expression of ideas that are common to all the world it is desirable to use common terms, intelligible everywhere. Does the expression of values come under the rule? Is the standard of value something for each country to have to itself alone, original, exclusive, and related only to local conditions? Or is it something relatively fixed and universal, which will serve as a basis of calculation and intercourse, by which the values of different commodities may be compared, and by which values in one country may be brought into relations with values over the world?

If there were no trade over boundary lines prices abroad would have no bearing upon prices at home, and no interest here. But in this age values in every country are related to values in every other country. They are interlocked and dependent upon each other. The great markets of the world are in hourly touch, and the values of the staple commodities are being constantly compared. It is impossible to detach the values of these staples in one country from their values elsewhere. Governmental action cannot disconnect them. It may obscure their relations. It may complicate the calculation, introduce elements of uncertainty, and involve the exchanges in risk and expense. But the markets will grope their way through the difficulties until they feel each other. Trade will go on, and somebody will pay for the uncertainties.

People cannot trade without some common idea or standard of value. They can do nothing by quoting prices in terms that have no significance to each other. They must get on some common ground, find some measure that has a value to each. If they use

different standards at home they must establish relations between them, fix their value to each other, and thus make them in effect one standard for the purposes of a transaction. But if their relations are unstable this must be done for every transaction, and their relations at a given time can never be foretold. The Mexican dollar has been worth in our money from \$.45 to \$.48 in the past year, with daily fluctuations; and all the business relations of that country with the world, and the prices at home of all staple articles of international value, have been involved in that uncertainty. Trade is facilitated, intercourse is simplified, and relations are made closer by a common standard. It is in the interest of commerce, of civilization. It brings producers and consumers nearer together, and promotes that vast system of exchanges which endows each man with the skill of all the race and with the resources of every land and clime.

To have each country in the world doing business by an independent standard of its own, with no stable relations to that used by any of the others, would be a commercial anarchy. Trade between the various countries would be like exchanges between a colony of boats on a choppy sea, while trade between countries using a common standard is on one firm, unbroken platform.

An independent monetary system for each country is, therefore, opposed to the general trend of order, harmony, intercourse, and common understanding among the nations. It is a lapse to primitive conditions. It belongs to a policy of isolation. It is opposed to the spirit and necessities of the age, which tend to unity and coöperation. A nation with great possibilities in foreign trade should be the last to sever the bond that links its markets to those of the world. It needs to do business on a common basis with its customers. Its merchants want to buy at home and sell abroad by the same measure. The grain of gold is now the one universal unit of value; and by maintaining fixed relations to it a nation's currency keeps fixed relations to the currency of all important countries. The producer who pays his costs by the gold standard and sells his goods in any part of the world by the same standard has no allowances to make for possible fluctuations in the relations of different kinds of money. His receipts and disbursements are on the same basis. Variations of exchange there will be, as there are variations in exchange between points in one country; but they cannot exceed the cost of shipping gold. The charge for making a remittance by banking agencies is not to be confounded with the cost of changing money of one standard into money of another. They

are two distinct charges, and the business man who is isolated from the rest of the world by an independent monetary system pays both.

Would it be advantageous or otherwise to the great industries of Pennsylvania for that State to have a monetary system bearing no stable relation to that used in the other States of this Union? A new calculation would be required every day to determine what a given sum in the money of Ohio would be worth in the money of Pennsylvania. A firm with its outlays in Pennsylvania and its income from other States would have its assets in dollars of one value and its liabilities in dollars of another value. Its salesmen outside of Pennsylvania would have to add to its scale of prices a percentage sufficient to cover the possible loss by a variation in the value of the money before payment was made. We have seen that the fluctuations between the money of Mexico and the money of the United States last year covered a range of about 6 per cent. A people which is competing for supremacy in the world's markets at a time when less than one per cent frequently determines the successful bidder on a contract cannot afford to be under such a handicap as that.

The farmers of Iowa, who sell their products by the Chicago market quotations, want a common money standard with Illinois. The buyer of produce in each local market pays the Chicago price, less freight, commissions, wastage, and every item that involves a possible loss in converting the produce back into money in hand. Any possible variation in the relations of the money of Iowa to the money of Illinois would have to be included in his risks and covered by his margin. Such a charge would be intolerable upon commerce between these States, and equally intolerable between the United States and the people who buy annually over a billion dollars' worth of our various products.

Nor is it correct to say that the inconveniences of an independent and fluctuating money standard apply only to the foreign trade. The staples of foreign trade are the staples of domestic trade. They are the common necessities of life, and the chief purchases of the people. Their prices being fixed in gold in international markets, their domestic prices will follow gold, no matter what the local currency may be. And if these things which the wage-earner must buy are to follow gold, his security demands that his wages be on the same basis. Otherwise, every fluctuation in the value of the currency to gold will affect the price of what he buys, but not of what he sells—a most helpless and unfortunate position.

And what are the supposed advantages of this financial isolation, with its confusion of values, and dislocation of world relations? It is said to protect the monetary supply of a country from outside disturbances. This argument would not hold good for a system based on silver if other countries also used silver, and hence cannot be consistently used by those who advocate the restoration of silver to its former place as one of the standard money metals of the world. But most of the leaders in the silver agitation are paper-money men, and it is only by inconvertible paper that a nation can have a financial system absolutely independent, and standing alone. Their reason for favoring such a system is to be found in the following paragraph of a recent speech by Senator Jones, of Nevada, in the United States Senate:

"For my part, I assert that a money exclusively national, a money which would not leave the country on the breaking out of war, and which could not be withdrawn from the country whenever a fright took possession of foreign investors, such money remaining always in the country to do the business of the country and to meet the wants of the people of the United States, would be an infinitely better money than gold. With every considerable withdrawal of money from the country, contraction takes place and the prices of commodities fall. With every considerable influx of money from abroad a great inflation of the currency takes place. One would suppose that an intelligent and progressive people would sufficiently understand the importance of steadiness of value in money to prevent great quantities of it from coming into the country to inflate prices, and then, when contracts are entered into and time transactions based on these inflated prices, permit that money to leave our shores in great quantities, compelling a contraction of the currency and consequent fall of prices, spreading ruin and devastation throughout the country."

This argument assumes that there will be more extreme fluctuations in prices and greater liability to panics in a country where the money stock is a part of the world's stock, and where money may flow between it and other countries without obstruction, than in a country where the money stock is cut off from the world's supply. The assumption is not supported by reason or experience. In all other relations between the peoples of the world, improved communications and a consolidation of interests tend to make more even, steady, and reliable the conditions that are affected.

There is not nearly so great a chance for a crop failure in the world as for a crop failure in a single country; and with modern facilities for transportation the price of wheat is less subject to extreme fluctuations than when each country had to depend upon its own product. And so, as the various peoples of the world come into closer relations, while indeed they become more sensitive to the conditions that affect each other, they also support and supplement each other

modifying everywhere the extreme effects of local conditions. If one country has a famine, another, from its surplus, sends it food; if one country has native resources, another furnishes capital for its development; if one country has a panic, another sends it money. As in the Baring crisis, Paris, Berlin, and New York sent money to London, so in 1893 London, Paris, and Berlin sent money to New York.

The view stated simply sees the liability to disturbing influences, and fails to take account of the steadying influences of an alliance with world-wide conditions. It is like seeing in insurance the liability to loss through others, and not seeing that through the alliance with others risk is minimized. It is a claim that local conditions are more uniform and regular than general conditions; that fluctuations are greater when all the markets of the world are modifying one another than where each market stands alone; that panics are locally less disastrous where each financial centre stands alone than where each is supported by the others. The argument will not stand scrutiny. It is not even in harmony with Senator Jones's favorite contention that a joint standard of two metals will fluctuate less than a single standard of either metal.

Furthermore, it is not true that business conditions in a country with an independent monetary system are uninfluenced by business conditions elsewhere. As already said, the values of the staples of commerce are influenced in every market by their value in every other market. At home they will not get far out of line with what they are abroad. They are more influenced by foreign prices than by any slight variation in the local volume of money. An influence that steadies the price of stocks or of produce in London, Paris, or Berlin, in time of panic, is the most potent of influences for supporting prices in the United States. When an extraordinary demand for money arises in a gold-standard country, gold flows to it from all parts of the world, as wheat flows from all markets to one where the highest prices prevail. A special demand for money in one country to move its crops, or meet any emergency, is thus distributed over the whole world, absorbing any surplus that may locally exist; minimizing the pressure where the greatest need is felt; and not only protecting the markets where panic is rife, but, by preventing extreme fluctuations there, protecting all other markets from disturbing influences. When stocks or produce are being forced down in London by pressure for money, it is better for prices in New York that money should go to London. Buying in London is then more potential than an equal

amount of buying in New York. It restores the equilibrium. It co-operates with the natural forces.

The most changeable factor in prices and panics, and hence the one most commonly influential, is credit. No matter what the money of a country may be borrowing and lending will go on, and there will be periods of confidence and loan-expansion as well as periods of alarm and loan-contraction. They have their genesis in human nature; and any perturbation of foreign money markets will cause sympathetic and precautionary action at home, whether the countries have a common standard or not. Panic in foreign markets will cause a reduction of loans in domestic markets, and thus accomplish without the export of a dollar the only effect of outgoing gold. The ability of all markets to send aid at such a time to the seat of alarm and weakness is the best security against calamity there and its spread elsewhere. Again, when an emergency pressure for money exists in a given country, and the natural movement of money to that point starts from all parts of the world, it is a mistake to suppose that even an irredeemable paper currency is not influenced by the attraction. It is true that the paper currency cannot go, but capital will go. There will be efforts to convert the paper currency into gold, in order that it may be sent to the market where urgency exists. These efforts will depress the currency of the country as compared with gold. So, while the nominal stock in the country remains unchanged, its value compared to gold shrinks; and, as commodities follow gold, the purchasing power of the money stock has been as effectually lost as though part of it had left the country. Thus the influence of the foreign panic which is sought to be evaded works out obscurely, but yet in the same manner as when the standard is gold and shipments of that metal are attracted abroad.

Finally, the argument that an independent system is required because the standard of value adopted by the commercial world, namely, the gold standard, is an appreciating one has been abandoned. The chairman of the Kansas City Convention, Governor Thomas, and many other prominent advocates of free silver have admitted that gold is not, under the present volume of production, advancing in value as compared with commodities. The emergency that was said to exist exists no longer. The fall of prices, which was the evil to be arrested, has ceased. They urge, however, that as production has fluctuated in the past it may do so in the future, and that the free coinage of silver should be reëstablished to provide against a possible

decline in the gold yield. To this it may be replied that the gold yield of the world is of a more uniform and lasting character now than it has ever been before. In the past, gold was obtained chiefly from placer diggings, which were rapidly worked out. The present increase in the product has come from ore deposits, and is promoted by the new metallurgical processes which make available vast fields heretofore without value. There is a regularity and also a reliability as to the supply that were not to be counted on before, and which make it possible to look forward and estimate, and to conclude that whatever problems may attach to a failing supply of gold belong to another generation. It is not likely that the men of to-day will care to involve their own affairs in confusion and disaster, in order to avert possible ills, which, if they come at all, are certain to be so long deferred. The men of that time will have an abundance of literature on the subject to advise them, and perhaps some new light from conditions that do not now exist.

GEORGE E. ROBERTS.

THE BUREAU OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, ITS PAST AND FUTURE.

THE International American Congress was held in Washington in 1889 and 1890 for the purpose of "discussing and recommending for adoption to their respective governments some plan of arbitration for the settlement of disagreements and disputes that may hereafter arise between them, and for considering questions relating to the improvement of business intercourse and means of direct communication between said countries, and to encourage such reciprocal commercial relations as will be beneficial to all and secure more extensive markets for the products of each of said countries."

Realizing that one of the essential prerequisites to a closer union between the various countries of the Western hemisphere was the confidence born of friendship resulting from a closer and more general knowledge of the social and economic conditions obtaining in the various portions of that hemisphere, and that improved business intercourse and extended trade relations could only come with a more perfect understanding of the various commercial methods, laws, local usages, trade regulations and requirements as well as a more extended and thorough knowledge of the products and natural resources of its various divisions, the Conference adopted a resolution creating an association, under the title of "The International Union of American Republics," for the prompt collection and distribution of commercial information. It further resolved that the Union should be represented by a Bureau, known as "The Commercial Bureau of the American Republics," to be established in the city of Washington, under the supervision of the Secretary of State of the United States, and that it should be charged with the care of all translations and publications, as well as with all correspondence pertaining to the International Union. The expenses of this Commercial Bureau were to be shared by all the Republics composing the Union.

This International Union was to continue in force during a period of ten years from the date of its organization; and, unless twelve

months before the expiration of said period a majority of the members of the Union should have given to the Secretary of State of the United States notice of their wish to terminate the Union at the end of its first period, the Union should continue to be maintained for another period of ten years and thereafter, under the same conditions, for successive periods of ten years each. The delegates of eighteen Republics accepted the report. The Bureau was duly established in August, 1890; and, by disseminating among the people of the United States information respecting the resources and business opportunities of the Latin American Republics; and, on the other hand, by making known to the people of South and Central America the many advantages offered to them by the markets of the United States, it sprang almost immediately into public favor.

Though the Conference had defined the purpose of the Bureau to be the publication of information relating to customs tariffs, port regulations, trade statistics, and such like data, and also to act as a medium of communication and correspondence for persons applying for such information, it was at once realized that these limits were too restricted; that information of a more general nature concerning the natural resources, as well as the political, social, and commercial conditions, of the respective countries, was so badly needed that the Bureau could not better serve the purpose for which it was founded than by trying to dispel the existing widespread ignorance. To contribute to this end the Bureau undertook to publish, besides the bulletins, tariffs, etc., which it was bound to bring out, handbooks to the various countries of Central and South America containing general and special information derived from official sources concerning the countries, their history, geography, resources, constitutions and trade, their mining, patent, and land laws, and other information of a useful nature.

The demand for the publications of the Bureau was very great from the first, far exceeding the supply made possible under its limited resources. This state of affairs very seriously affected its usefulness by preventing many thousands of persons from securing the information they desired, and to which they were entitled. From the establishment of the office until October, 1893, the bulletins were distributed gratuitously, and the editions of 5,000 and less of each of them were necessarily restricted to a few public libraries and commercial organizations, and to individuals directly interested in trade with the countries to which they referred. The applications for bulletins from the United States alone during the first year of the existence of the

Bureau numbered 38,000, and the other Republics applied for an almost equal number.

During the second year the general demand for these publications assumed such increased proportions, and so numerous did the requests for them from members of Congress for their constituents become, that at the first session of the Fifty-second Congress special editions of the principal bulletins were ordered printed by that body for distribution by senators and representatives. Not the least among the applicants for the Bureau's publications were the public schools of the United States, whose special attention had been directed to the study of Spanish-American affairs by the meeting of the International American Conference; but it was manifestly impossible fairly to distribute the Bureau publications among the public libraries in the United States and those in the sister Republics, as well as among the inhabitants of all the Republics interested. In 1893 the issue of monthly bulletins was inaugurated; the purpose being to procure and publish promptly, in English, Spanish, Portuguese, or French, information regarding the resources, industries, trade, manufactures, and the general progress of the several Republics, as well as the possibilities of profit in the development of their various industries.

The "Monthly Bulletin" is now published in an edition of 11,000 copies, of which over 9,000 are sent to the various countries of the Union, which, since the entry into it of Chile, in 1898, includes all the independent states of the Western hemisphere; the balance being distributed to other parts of the world. An extra edition of 5,000 copies has been published since July, 1900, by order of Congress, for distribution in the United States on the orders of senators and representatives.

To render the "Bulletin" more serviceable, the Bureau has endeavored to utilize all useful periodical publications, those of Europe as well as those of North and South America. At the present time over 1,700 periodicals, including daily papers, are received; and all important information contained in them is translated, compiled, and published in the "Bulletin" or arranged for reference. The more valuable periodicals are put on the Library's permanent files, while the others are sent to the Library of Congress for its reading room.

As a further means of extending the Bureau's sources of information, and of making the "Bulletin" a true reflex of the conditions prevailing in all the countries comprising the International Union, the coöperation has been sought of prominent persons in the various

Latin-American Republics, in the capacity of Honorary Corresponding Members of the International Union. These supply the Bureau from time to time with information which helps greatly to extend and complete our knowledge of the economic conditions and resources of the respective countries.

Beside the handbooks, the "Bulletin," and the various minor publications in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French, the Bureau has issued in English and Spanish a "Commercial Directory of the American Republics, giving lists of manufacturers, merchants, shippers, bankers, etc., engaged in foreign trade, together with the names of officials, maps, commercial statistics, industrial data, and other information concerning the countries of the International Union of American Republics, the American colonies, and Hawaii." In accordance with a recommendation of the International American Conference—that "the Governments of the International Union adopt a common nomenclature, designating in alphabetical order and in equivalent terms, in English, Portuguese, and Spanish, the commodities on which import duties are levied, to be used by all the American nations, for the purpose of levying customs imports, and also to be used in shipping manifests, consular invoices, and other customs documents"—it has also published a commercial nomenclature of over 50,000 terms in the three languages mentioned. This code, the publication of which was only finished in 1897, has been adopted by the United States Treasury Department and by the Republic of Paraguay as a standard for use in their custom houses, and it is expected that other states will also adopt it.

The Bureau has recently undertaken the preparation of new editions of the various handbooks to the Republics, as the material progress throughout America since the date of the publication of the first editions of these works takes away from the value they had when issued. Two have already been published: Venezuela (1899) and Mexico (1900); those on the Argentine Republic and Brazil will shortly be on the press; while one on Chile is rapidly approaching completion. To add to the value of these publications, the Bureau has sought the assistance of various writers in the different Republics, whose authority on certain questions is universally recognized.

The Bureau has also in preparation new maps of some of the American Republics, compiled from the best official sources, on which all data of an economic nature, railways, telegraph lines, mining districts, areas of culture, etc., are indicated. The map of Mexico is

about to be issued, while maps of the Central American states are under way; and it is proposed to issue on the same large scale (50 miles to the inch), as soon as completed, similar maps of all the South American Republics.

The necessity of forming a good library, especially of official publications, on the American states, was realized by the Conference which founded the Bureau; and it provided that "two copies of all official documents which might pertain to matters having relation to the objects of the Union" should be sent to the Bureau by each country belonging to the Union. With this as a nucleus, the Bureau has built up, by gifts, purchase, or exchange, a library of over 6,000 volumes, besides a valuable collection of maps and photographs. It receives at present the official newspapers of all the Republics, and most of their periodical publications and scientific magazines. A subject-catalogue of the library is being prepared, and in it are noted all works or articles to be found in other libraries of Washington. The same has been done for the collection of maps. By this means the Bureau has become a centre of information on all questions relating to the states of the Union; and its library is being more and more utilized by the public.

As originally organized, the Bureau was placed "under the supervision of the Secretary of State of the United States," but no provision was made for the other members of the International Union taking any part in its management. This resulted in the Bureau being looked upon, not only by the public at large, but even by the various Republics and their diplomatic representatives in this country, as a mere annex to the Department of State — a purely United States concern — in which the Republics had practically no interest, though they were pledged to contribute to its support for a stated number of years. As the existence of the Bureau was in danger, Mr. Olney, then Secretary of State, realizing to the full the great rôle which the Bureau might play in bringing about a closer union of the various states of this continent, and believing that it was essential to that end that the Bureau should be made international in effect as well as in name, and that the other members of the International Union should take an active part in its management, called a meeting of the various diplomatic representatives of the Union on April 1, 1896, to consider with him the subject of the re-organization of the Bureau. A committee was appointed to report upon the best means of carrying out this object; and on June 4, 1896, it submitted its report, which was adopted by all the representatives.

The principal change made by this committee was the placing at the head of the Bureau a Permanent Executive Committee, composed of five members, four to be diplomatic representatives of the nations composing the Union, called to serve in turn for one year, the fifth being always the Secretary of State of the United States, who would be *ex-officio* Chairman. The change worked good, but the experience of the next three years having shown the desirability of further extending the powers of the Executive Committee, it was agreed on March 18, 1899, in another conference of the representative members of the Union in Washington with Mr. Hay, the Secretary of State, that it should have power to appoint the director and other principal employes of the Bureau, to fix their salaries, and to dismiss them at pleasure. It was also empowered to exercise a general supervision over the Bureau, and to perfect its management, "especially in all matters affecting the particular requirements or interest of individual members of the Union, the finances, the business features, and the development of the various branches of the work of the Bureau, as indicated by the International American Conference." The Bureau is now managed under this organization; and is giving, it is believed, satisfaction to all members of the International Union.

The wisdom shown in creating the Bureau is at present fully recognized by all the states of this continent, every one of which now takes an active part in promoting its work. In view of the services it has been able to render in the past, it is believed that its field of usefulness may be still further extended, and that it may be made a yet more potent factor in strengthening the relations of amity and commerce between the various Republics of the Western hemisphere.

Though the first International American Conference, that of 1889-90, did not accomplish as much as its projectors had hoped for, it is believed that the cause of this was principally the absence of any permanent agency to carry on after its adjournment the work inaugurated or recommended by it. A second International Conference is to be held in 1901, in the City of Mexico; and, if it is able to accomplish even a portion of the work outlined for it, other conferences may follow, and the Bureau of the American Republics may become the agency to prevent its work meeting the same fate as that of the first Conference. The Bureau might have the custody of the archives of the Conferences of the Republics composing the Union, and it might conduct with the various governments all the correspondence relating to the convening of the Conferences, as well as that resulting from

their deliberations, with the view of putting their recommendations into effect. It could also be made the intermediary, between the Powers composing the Union, for the transmission of regular and general notifications concerning the objects of the Union; and it could make known to them requests on the part of any one of these countries for modifications of any general agreements into which the Republics may have entered.

The hope is now entertained by many that Conferences of the various states composing the International Union will be held at frequent intervals for the discussion of topics of general interest, and as a powerful agent for strengthening the bonds of friendship between them. In that case the Bureau might be charged with the preparation of the business to be submitted to the Conferences, and could conduct the copying and printing incidental thereto; and the Director of the Bureau might attend the sessions of the Conferences, and take part in the discussions, without voting.

The subject of introducing some uniformity in the methods of keeping trade statistics is of great importance, and various plans have been suggested to attain this end. It is thought that the desired end might be readily reached if each of the Republics composing the International Union would transmit to the Bureau of the American Republics, at the end of each fiscal year (July 1-June 30), on forms printed and supplied by the Bureau, uniform for all the countries of the Union, a series of statistical data relating to the general and foreign commerce of the year. From these data the Bureau could prepare a general report on the trade of America for each successive year. The Bureau could also be directed to prepare, whenever requested by any one of the members of the Union, special reports upon financial, commercial, or other questions coming within the scope of its labor, and relating to any one of the members of the Union.

The above are a few of the ways in which the Bureau might extend its work and further justify the foresight of those who, in founding it, thought they were laying the cornerstone of a permanent union of American Republics, and contributing to an extension of the friendly and commercial relations between them.

W. W. ROCKHILL.

A PLEA FOR CONSULAR INSPECTION.

THE adjournment of Congress has again postponed—indefinitely perhaps—consular reform. This is to be deplored, but it was scarcely unexpected. Such an outcome was clearly foreshadowed when Speaker Henderson picked up the gavel in December last. This statement, be it promptly added, is made in no spirit of criticism of the Speaker, or of the party to which he belongs. The simple fact is that the eve of a Presidential campaign interposes an effectual bar sinister to the passage of a measure certain to provoke much antagonism, and urged by neither party. The disposition of political leaders in Presidential years to enact the minimum of legislation consistent with party pledges, pass the appropriation bills, and go home early was manifest for the first time four years ago. It is now becoming apparent that this legislative innovation, so sharply in contrast with the policy of the past, has come to stay. When by this simple device great measures, like the Nicaragua Canal bill, for instance, are dropped from view, in spite of the powerful pressure exerted to keep them in sight, the fate of measures conceived in the name of reform is not difficult to surmise.

The truth is, of course, that no consular bill has at any time stood the remotest chance of being taken from the calendar and seriously considered. The cause, however, is far from hopeless. Despite the discouragements and setbacks which envelop in a mist of uncertainty the adoption of any adequate system of reform, genuine progress has been made during the past year. This is due chiefly, it is safe to say, to the activity displayed by chambers of commerce and other business associations throughout the country. The practical demands of experienced men of affairs have thus reinforced the academic claims of theorists. Thanks to this propaganda, the conviction is gradually forcing itself on Congress that the mercantile interests of the land, which have so much at stake, are really very much in earnest in their demand for an efficient foreign service.

The proof of this lies not in the meaningless introduction of bills

“by request,” but in favorable committee action. It is significant that two bills designed to place the consular service upon a permanent footing have thus far been favorably reported by the present Congress, and this fact may be fairly regarded as a concession to a growing public sentiment. Of these two bills, one was presented by Senator Lodge, and reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; for the other, which has received the endorsement of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Adams, of Pennsylvania, stands sponsor.

Though both bills are framed on radically different lines and contemplate sweeping changes, it is doubtless true that neither of them is altogether acceptable to the friends of the merit system. This state of affairs—dissatisfaction of reformers with a projected reform—is by no means novel. It is not in this case the outgrowth of any dearth of exact information. Time was—and that time is almost within memory of the youngest inhabitant—when the general public knew about as much concerning our foreign service as it knew of the kingdom of Tibet. The average citizen took no very profound interest in either, and was quite content to leave both to the exploitation of travellers—some of whom had a fancy for holding office. But, during the past decade, fugitive articles in the magazines and in the daily press have laid bare with unerring precision the shortcomings and inconsistencies of our antiquated foreign service. The defects of that service are now too palpable to be defended or denied, and the debate as to their existence has practically ceased. They have come to be generally recognized both in Congress and out of it.

In reality, then, the difference between those who seek to have the law changed and those who have the power to change it is one of degree rather than of kind. The latter have a pretty well defined idea as to what it is possible to obtain; the former too often, unfortunately, have none at all. The obstacles in the way of bringing about any reform, no matter how widespread the sentiment in its favor, are enormous. Not all these difficulties are upon the surface to be sure, but they become apparent upon slight investigation. Take the Adams bill, for instance. Mr. Adams's interest in the service is well known; less than a decade ago he was minister to Brazil. The bill is framed on the simplest possible lines, avowedly to attract to its support all who are impressed with the necessity of a reorganization of the service. It undertakes to provide for little more than

the appointment of a commission made up of senators, representatives, and State Department officials. The details of reorganization are left to the discretion of the President, who, presumably, is to lay out and direct the work of the commission, except as the bill otherwise provides.

This proposed legislation, whatever its defects, is certainly moderate. The inevitable political character of the commission, which is, perhaps, the most vulnerable feature of the bill, is quite enough, however, to invite a well-nigh solid Democratic alignment against it. From the point of view of the minority party, just now Democratic, the present incumbents—appointees chiefly of the present administration—are incompetent, and ought to be removed at the first convenient opportunity. This is axiomatic. Not unnaturally, therefore, any proposal to extend the merit system is suspiciously viewed as a crafty design to provide permanent positions for the political favorites of the party in power.

This alone is a serious handicap, but another, and perhaps more dangerous, obstacle, because it is more insidious, is the opposition of the present incumbents themselves. Any general shaking up of the service is frowned upon by those who now adorn it as jeopardizing their official tenure. Broadly speaking, there are 250 principal consular offices, which are much coveted. Almost every senator and representative of the dominant party has one or more personal or political friends in this list. As a consequence, whenever the Associated Press contains a despatch concerning consular reform, there is a prompt flutter of alarm, and Washington is bombarded with appeals from abroad, more or less frantic, to resist at all hazards the passage of the proposed legislation. The open and covert criticisms which are thus volunteered are suggestive, if not convincing. There is an impressive unanimity of view, for example, among a considerable number of consuls, that the requirement of a fair knowledge of some foreign language would be highly unreasonable and impractical. Judging from certain despatches and reports which mercifully slumber in convenient pigeon-holes in the State Department, some others ought to entertain gloomy forebodings of their ability to stand a test in the rudiments of English.

These are some of the causes that add to the general confusion, and make the present outlook somewhat depressing. To expect any action during the approaching short session, which will terminate the life of the present Congress, is vain. It is a quarter of a century since

either party has controlled the lower House for more than six years at a stretch. A Republican House is by no means assured in the event of President McKinley's reelection. On the other hand, should Mr. Bryan win next November, there is still a hostile Republican Senate to be taken into account. With the executive and legislative departments at loggerheads, any serious reform of the consular service would, in all human probability, again be hopelessly blocked.

The door is not entirely closed to all reform, however. A forward step of far-reaching benefit would be taken if the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, when it reports the diplomatic and consular appropriation bill next winter, would provide for consular inspection by means of regularly appointed consular inspectors. It is almost beyond belief, it is certainly beyond defence, that an orderly and efficient system of supervision has not been established before this for a service that has in its keeping the business interests and property of so many of our citizens at home and abroad. The State Department stands alone in this respect; of no other great department of our government can this reproach be so justly made. The post office appropriation bill for the ensuing fiscal year, beginning July 1st, carries with it a lump appropriation of \$550,000 for post office inspectors. The protection of the public from depredations upon the mail service is of the utmost importance, and there is scarcely a United States attorney who is not, each time a grand jury is summoned, confronted with evidence of the peculations, more or less ingenious, of dishonest postal officials. The detection and conviction of this class of criminals is largely the work of post office inspectors.

Take the twenty-eight special treasury agents now authorized by law as another illustration. These officials, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, inspect and report upon the condition of custom houses and the work of customs officers. They are also engaged in the detection of smuggling and other frauds upon the revenue. The cost of this work is paid out of the fund known as the expense of collecting the revenue. The figures for the last few years are not accessible, but they do not vary materially from year to year. The salaries and expenses of special agents for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, was approximately \$94,000.

Without multiplying illustrations from other departments, which would be merely cumulative, it is plainly the policy of the Government to supervise the official actions of our accredited representative to the Apaches, but to impose no check whatever upon our

representatives abroad. The folly of this short-sighted policy is manifest from the flood of complaints regarding the official and personal conduct of our consuls which, serious and silly alike, deluge the State Department. The complaint against the exaction of illegal fees is, perhaps, the most usual. This abuse of the fee system has grown up in some instances, it is fair to say, from a desire—perfectly laudable in the abstract—to collect money enough for current expenses, Congress in the press of other matters having omitted to provide decent salaries.

The latest scandal of this character to be published broadcast affected the consul and vice-consul at one of the leading European seaports. These two officials, by mutual compact, entered upon a carnival of wholesale extortion. This arrangement for swelling official incomes had all the merit of simplicity, and possessed the additional advantage of not being tainted with partisanship—one official being a Republican and the other a Democrat. The plan worked smoothly enough for a time, despite occasional outcries from the plucked, until finally, the vice-consul, becoming dissatisfied with his allotted share of the plunder, one day reported the delinquency of his chief to Washington, thoughtlessly neglecting to state his own connection therewith. The Department was baffled at first in its attempt to ascertain the facts, but finally secured the evidence which resulted in the dismissal in disgrace of both knaves. If an adequate system of inspection had been in force, it is extremely unlikely that so bold an attempt at fraud would have been made; but had it been undertaken, it could hardly have flourished so long without detection and exposure.

A few years ago a certain consul decided to improve his literary style by a graphic description of a journey into the interior of the country to which he was accredited. Commerce between that country and the United States has increased several fold during the past decade, and new opportunities for trade are constantly developing. Apparently, though he was not quite definite on this point, our representative was impressed with the natural resources, but what struck him most forcibly were the swarms of naked savages that infested the banks of the noble river up which he sailed. He confided to the Department, in the course of his formal “report,” that if he had had a rifle handy he would have taken a “crack” at the game; and he hinted that there were “lots of our boys” who would enjoy the same absorbing sport if they were fully informed of the attractions offered. The ruthless blue pencil of a department clerk deprived the country at large

of this rare gem of humor, with all its possibilities. It is not inconceivable that a consular inspector might have succeeded in convincing this ambitious consul that under the limitations of international law his duties were essentially commercial and not military.

Human nature is much the same everywhere. When officials who are surrounded by all the safeguards of a steady home influence still go astray, and betray their trust, what must be the temptations and opportunities of officials abroad, who are outside the pale of any such healthy restraint? The knowledge that a consular inspector was likely to drop in at any moment unheralded, and subject the office books and methods to a rigid scrutiny, would deter many a weak and sorely-tempted consul from going wrong. It would curb, if not entirely check, illegal practices of all sorts, and elevate the *morale* of the service in every direction.

It may be objected that there have been inspections in the past which were mere junkets, and, consequently, barren of results—to the Government. To this I answer that, in such instances, the work of inspection was subordinated to the delights of foreign travel; it was not seriously undertaken. Notwithstanding the somewhat disparaging view of department officials which an ex-consul has been moved to take recently in a magazine article, it is a fact that some very thorough inspections have been made during the past few years by these alleged incompetent officials. The work of Mr. Robert S. Chilton, Jr., chief of the consular bureau, is a case in point, and suggests the possibilities of an organized service.

The initial and indispensable requirement of such an inspection is its complete divorce from mischievous partisanship. The accomplishment of this is not so difficult as might appear at first glance. The post office inspectors and special agents are now rarely removed for political cause. It is not contended that these officials do not feel the disturbing and reactionary effects which follow in the wake of political upheavals; but their tenure of office is on the whole secure, and there is little doubt that they honestly report things as they find them, irrespective of the political equation. A proviso that not more than a certain number of consular inspectors be appointed from any one party would disarm partisan criticism, and make it impotent. The number of inspectors need not be large—five would suffice for effective work. Finally, the cost of inspection would be comparatively trifling.

From the foundation of the Government our foreign service has been the sport of factions. Mutations of parties have fostered and

encouraged this, and will continue to do so. That a tidal wave of public sentiment will some day sweep away and destroy the present strongly intrenched system, with all its humiliating absurdities and inequalities, seems certain. Meanwhile, consular inspection, which has the merit of being practical and within reach, would cure the most flagrant abuses. It would prove to be the entering wedge — and a most effective one — of a stable service. The growing and imperative needs of commercial expansion will do the rest.

ALBERT H. WASHBURN.

WORK AND WAGES IN FRANCE.

LIKE other civilized countries France has made great progress in the conditions under which aggregate labor is performed. Though the first steps in the betterment of the workingman's condition were made by philanthropists, nevertheless the general improvement has been brought about less by the good-will of the work-givers than by the ever-growing demand of the working population to be treated as human beings, and not as beasts of burden. After Great Britain had commenced her legislation for the protection of child labor, nearly thirty years elapsed before France followed with the law of 1841. The necessity therefor was indeed urgent, if the industrial population was to be saved from utter degeneration. Of this no better proof was needed than the experiences of recruiting officers for the army in 1840. Taking a dozen districts in which nearly the entire population was engaged in manufactures, and comparing them with the neighboring districts where the people labored in the fields or on the sea, it was found that for every 1,000 young men accepted as fit for military service, there were rejected as unfit 459 of the agricultural and marine population, while of the factory workers, for every 1,000 accepted, 1,032 were rejected.

With such figures before them the members of Parliament could not hesitate to prescribe radical reforms. However, while making laws is comparatively easy, their execution depends on such a variety of concurring circumstances that the result frequently falls far short of the effect intended. This has been largely the case with the labor laws. In spite of all the legislation of half a century, providing minute regulations for the employment of women and children, building up a most elaborate system of inspection, prescribing punishments for the innumerable sins of commission and omission, Parliament has been recently led to take what was considered by many as a step backward, but what a larger view must regard, at least from the humanitarian standpoint, as a step in progress. The first labor laws sought to protect children; later they limited in some cases

the working hours of men; many years afterward they imposed rules for the protection of women; but their combined result was to render impracticable the execution of the laws in establishments where men, women, and children worked together, without contravening seriously the unity of organization.

Hence, it became evident that the only sure means of arriving at the desired result was to subject all workers in the same establishment to the same laws. In order to avoid sudden changes in the conditions of labor which might produce a crisis, causing more harm to the working classes than the good to be effected, a compromise was designed, which became law on March 30, 1900. Under its provisions all industrial establishments where women or children are employed must limit their working time to eleven hours per day, and allow one or more periods of rest, aggregating at least one hour. Thus are legalized and made general the conditions under which the best conducted factories to-day are run. But the law does not stop there. By the law of 1892 the work of women and children was to be limited to ten hours per day, and that still remains an object to be attained—with the addition, however, that, for the future, the men in the same factories shall have the same hours. Looking toward that end, the present law provides that two years after its promulgation the day's work for all alike shall be reduced to ten and one-half hours, and in four years to ten hours; thus realizing on March 30, 1904, the law's ultimate application, when the work in all factories employing women and children shall be limited to a maximum of ten hours per day.

It is stated as a curious and cruel fact that for some time past many establishments where only men have been employed have adopted the ten-hour day, while the long days, reaching in some cases even fourteen to fifteen hours' work, have been imposed on the feeble element. Not least among the advantages of the present law is the provision that all workers in the same establishment, with certain unavoidable exceptions, shall have their rest at the same time, thus putting an end to the system of "relays," which, by deceiving the inspectors, has opened the door of escape from the law of 1892; and, moreover, the union of family life will be thereby distinctly promoted. In fact, the law aims to be, in the words of Minister Millerand, "a work of social moralization, solidarity, and pacification."

A personal inquiry sent to different sections of France reveals the fact that the hours of work in various industries range from seven to

fourteen per day ; depending on the orders received by employers, the season of the year, etc. Though the coal miners have been perhaps the most persistent in demanding the eight-hour day, they have not yet gained it under the law, except for boys of less than sixteen years of age ; but the secretary of the largest federation reports it as being maintained in a coöperative mine at Saint-Etienne, and, perhaps, at Carmaux. In March of the present year, however, a bill was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies to make the eight-hour day universal in the mines. While, according to the reports received, eleven hours appears to be the general day's work in the centre and north of France, the south, represented by its extremes, Nice and Bordeaux, reports ten hours as the average.

The biggest labor union in the country, and the one which has made the most noise, is that of the railroad workers ; and, however exaggerated we may find their demands, facts vouched for by respectable witnesses show a pitiable condition of labor for many of the men. A ministerial order of November 4, 1899, required for the locomotive engineers and firemen on all trunk lines and the belt line of Paris a limit of 100 hours of work in ten days, with a maximum of twelve hours per day, and corresponding long rests, aggregating 100 hours in the same period, together with an uninterrupted rest of twenty-four hours every ten, fifteen, or, as a maximum, twenty days. While complaints are still being made that the order was defectively drawn, and that it is not thoroughly executed, it has nevertheless produced a good effect. On the 23d of the same month similar orders were issued regarding those employés on trains and at stations whose work concerns the general safety.

There followed, on March 15, 1900, a circular letter requiring the preparation of new regulations for the remainder of the railroad workers, the performance of whose duties may affect the public safety. These are certainly gains for the workingman, but only accomplished under the pretext, real or fictitious, of care for the public safety, and not because of humanitarian regard for the laborer. A few examples may serve to illustrate what has been the condition of many of these laborers. Switchmen at Dunkirk had twelve hours of consecutive work, snatching a bite to eat between trains. Firemen on the Orleans railway were required to clean machines during the time calling for rest, and then were often obliged to go out at night on extra trains. At one station the men were kept at work only ten and a half hours per day, but for seven and a half hours without a chance to

eat. Switchmen were generally required to work from fifteen to sixteen hours per day; and one, who was cited as responsible for an accident, proved before the court of justice that he had been at his post fourteen days and fourteen nights, consecutively.

At Nice the laborers who loaded, unloaded, and changed trains were worked eighteen hours per day. Near Roubaix the track layers are said to have had only twenty-five to thirty days' rest in the year, and to have been on duty sometimes from 4:30 A. M. to 11 P. M. Reserve conductors at Paris were put at all sorts of odd jobs and kept employed twelve to fourteen hours per day. During the congress of railroad workers (1898) one member stated that twenty hours was no exaggeration for a day's work; that, in fact, he himself had known cases of engineers being on duty twenty-four, twenty-five, and even thirty hours, consecutively. A case is cited of a station master who alone had to sell tickets, check baggage, and attend to the stoppage of 120 trains a day. At another station the master had a single helper; and between them they attended to 64 passenger and 28 freight-trains per day, besides sending and receiving 100 telegrams daily, often causing the helper's absence in delivering them. Under these intolerable conditions one station master died of exhaustion within a year, and another hung himself. With this system of over-work railway accidents became so frequent that it was openly stated in Parliament that France was at the time the leading country in this lamentable respect. Finally, a socialistic Minister of Public Works, M. Baudin, thought fit to interfere energetically, and issued his now famous orders.

Among the advantages enjoyed by the employés of the leading railroads, none probably affords more real pleasure and satisfaction than the annual vacation, increasing in length with the elevation of the position occupied, and coupled with the privilege of passes on all the trunk lines of the country.

Certainly the condition of the railroad employés in general has been far superior to that of the omnibus-drivers of Paris, who, before the strike of 1891, averaged seventeen hours' work per day, exposed to all the changes of heat and cold, rain, snow, and wind. The waiters in the cafés and restaurants are on duty from 8 o'clock in the morning until past midnight, receive no pay but the tips, and, in fact, often pay the proprietor or head waiter for the privilege of working. The cooks in the same establishment have in vain demanded one day of rest per month, and many among them get none during the entire

year. The butcher boys are given but one day's vacation in the year, and are worked from fifteen to eighteen hours a day.

Many have been the criticisms decrying the far too frequent holidays in the old time of church rule; but under the new régime the other extreme has been reached, holidays, in numerous cases, being almost unknown. The Government, however, sets a good example in this respect, and gives its workers, with necessary exceptions, rest on Sundays and national holidays. While many of the working classes have, as we have just seen, too much to do, leaving insufficient time for eating and sleeping, not to speak of leisure for pleasure or self-improvement, there always exists close at hand an army of "out-of-workers." Many of them are idlers by nature, and in their heart of hearts do not want to work; but, on the other hand, there are thousands who are longing for a chance to earn an honest living, and even regard with envious eyes those occupying permanent positions such as may appear to more fortunate members of the human family as pitiable rather than enviable. Even in exceptionally good times it is believed that at least seven per cent of the workers are idle, not from choice, but from necessity. Government positions are presumed to offer sinecures; but the employés of prisons have to work thirteen hours a day, with five hours extra added every third night, while the school janitors are said to pursue their work fourteen hours out of the twenty-four. A recent order reduced to eight hours the hard outdoor work of linemen in the Government telephone and telegraph service; but in the noisome toil of the State monopolies of tobacco and match manufacture ten hours' work is still the rule.

Though the execution of the labor laws has not been perfect, a great deal has been accomplished by the army of labor inspectors kept at work in all parts of the country; and their reports furnish a wealth of statistics regarding the condition of factory labor. If the labor agitators, on the one hand, complain of the inefficacy of their activity, there are not wanting, on the other hand, employers who consider the inspection an impertinence. One is cited in the last annual report who, instead of following the injunction of the inspector to conform to the law requiring hygienic protection to his employés, has occupied his time and exerted all his influence in trying to have the inspector removed. While the official reports express optimistic opinions as to the working of the labor laws and inspection, M. Pelloutier, a recognized authority on labor questions in France, gives voice to an extreme skepticism as to their utility; basing his opinion apparently

more upon theory than on observation, on the ground that the fines for infractions are too small as compared with the possible profits of disobedience.

Turning to the official figures this objection appears well founded. The 1,119 convictions of 1898 resulted in fines aggregating only 28,633 francs, which is about 25.60 francs on an average, or say \$5 for each infraction proved and punished, not to mention the probably far more numerous ones which escaped the inspectors' gaze. Opposed to this criticism is the allegation that the constant expectation of a visit of inspection, and not the payment of fines, is the most powerful mainspring of obedience to the laws. However, the usefulness of the inspection is more and more recognized by all those interested; so that cases are not infrequent where laborers demand the interference of the inspectors, expressing confidence in their just interpretation of the law, and where employers call upon them for information as to the best methods of avoiding accidents.

The statistics furnished by the Upper Labor Commission (Commission Supérieure du Travail) are not claimed to be absolutely exact; but they are as nearly so as care and work have been able to make them. In 1898 the number of industrial establishments liable to inspection under the laws was 299,468, employing 2,633,570 workers. Of these establishments 61,915 employed only women and girls, and 141,899 only adults, leaving 95,654 with workers of all ages and both sexes. As to the age and sex of the workers, 60.6 per cent were men over 18 years of age, 8.5 per cent were boys, and 30.9 per cent were women and girls. The inspectors made during the year 144,485 visits to 122,607 establishments, which employed 1,872,970 persons, or 71 per cent of all the industrial workers liable to inspection.

A curious fact is emphatically brought to light by the statistics thus gathered; namely, that in these days, when so much is talked and written about the concentration of wealth and the growth of big manufacturing enterprises, France has her industries, like her real estate, divided into small unities. Thus, 262,089 establishments employ each from one to ten persons only, while but 367 give work to more than 500 persons each. All the establishments inspected averaged only fifteen workers each, while those not inspected were but small shops, generally isolated in the country districts. Paris alone is said to contain one-fourth of the industrial workers of France; and the inspectors paid to its establishments 39,514 visits.

The State itself is a large employer of labor; having 28,000 em-

ployés in its war department, 12,000 in the service of the State railway, and 22,000 in its various factories, of whom more than 17,000 are women and children.

During the year 1898 the inspectors reported 6,033 offences against the various laws applying to the regulation of factories, of which 1,326 were against the rules of hygiene and security. Looking to the infractions of the rules governing the hours of labor, days of rest, and night work, it is the dressmakers who are the most guilty. The majority of cases were such as not to call for judicial punishment, and the inspectors began 1,352 suits only, gaining conviction in 1,119 cases; but they complain of the "excessive indulgence" of certain courts of justice toward offenders, and of the bias displayed against the inspectors and their testimony. These cases were, however, but a small part of the activity of the inspectors, who, as a result of their numerous visits, issued some 105,327 prescripts of all kinds.

One of the most surprising facts brought to light by the inspection is the condition of affairs in establishments posing before the public as charity organizations, giving "homes" to children. Previous to 1890 several scandals in connection with such asylums had come to light; causing the passing of a law in that year submitting them to inspection, under certain conditions. Then public attention became drawn to other matters, and, under certain influences, the inspection grew lax until a couple of years ago, when it was discovered by the press that one of the bishops had sent to Rome a report revealing shocking treatment of children in such an institution in his diocese. Orders were given to pursue the inspection in such establishments in the same manner as in avowedly industrial factories. Children of four and five years of age were found hard at work; some of the little ones being obliged to throw silk eleven hours a day, and to sleep at night in crowded quarters. In fact, in the sweet name of charity, unlawful barbarity was being practised; and 694 offences by such institutions were reported during the year 1898, or more than one-tenth of the whole number for nearly 3,000,000 working people. Thus, so-called charity was found to be far more cruel than the much abused capitalism. As there has been some conflict of opinion between the courts of justice and the executive branch of the Government regarding the legal status of such religious asylums, a new bill, specially regulating the matter, is said to be now in preparation (June, 1900) by the ministry for introduction in Parliament.

Another branch of the inspectors' activity is the investigation of

and report on accidents happening to employés in the course of their work. Since the law of 1898, making employers responsible for practically all accidents, this portion of the work has assumed a new importance. It is now to the interest of the working classes to make known at once every accident; seeing that the possible consequence may be the gaining of support from the employers in case of serious results. Many accidents which appear unimportant at first become grave later, because of blood poisoning or other unexpected complications; and with the new law the workingman has become alive to the value of official evidence. In 1893 the number of accidents reported was only 3,655. The number rose to 14,954 the following year, increasing every year thereafter, until, in 1898, it reached the formidable total of 35,433.

The law of 1898 did not go into effect, however, until July 1, 1899; and the number of declarations of accidents during the six months which followed far surpassed those for any whole year previously. According to the report of the Labor Bureau, the total number of victims of accidents during this short period was 83,742, of whom 83,708 made formal declarations. Yet, in spite of such results, the insurance companies are said to be "agreeably surprised" with the working of the law after six months' trial ("Revue d'Economie Politique," March, 1900). Notwithstanding the increase in the number of accidents reported, the inspectors are unanimous in the conviction that the accidents to the laboring classes during recent years have decidedly diminished both in number and in seriousness. Moreover, there is no doubt that a large proportion are caused by the negligence of the workers themselves, many by direct disobedience to rules, and could be avoided by the exercise of prudence and thought by the employés. Of the total number of accidents in 1898 only 643 resulted in death, which figure is so small in comparison with the whole number of industrial employés that it practically disappears in the general death rate.

Under the inspection laws there are reported together all mines, quarries, and diggings, of whatever nature, along with their dependencies. These numbered, in 1898, all told, 33,687, of which 30,685 were visited by the inspectors. Here were employed during the year 297,787 persons, of whom 11.3 per cent came under the special protection of the labor laws. The risks of this kind of work are particularly great, and the results are necessarily sad. Accordingly, we find that during the year over 18 per cent of all those occupied

received such injuries by accidents as to necessitate more than three days' cessation of work; while 1.2 per cent found surcease from toil in the very midst of their occupation. However, a great deal has been done in the last few decades for the improvement of the conditions of work underground, and the number of serious accidents is steadily decreasing. The inspectors report with satisfaction the general observance of the special laws governing such occupations. They found only one woman working underground. She was sent to the surface, and the proprietor was prosecuted. Altogether, only twelve suits were instituted, and convictions were secured in ten cases.

One-fourth of the population of France lives from the profits of industry. We have hurriedly passed in review the conditions revealed by official inspection, under which about one-third of this number works in order to live. What do these receive in return for their toil and the multifarious risks of their daily tasks?

The greatest single industry is that of the railroads. I shall not take into account the highly paid upper officials, but shall confine my attention to those who are commonly designated as workingmen. Some years ago an inquiry into the subject resulted as follows: Of 71,273 workers on the railroads investigated, 6 received less than 15 francs per month; only 267 were paid more than 375 francs; while the vast majority received wages varying from 71 to 165 francs a month. It is but fair to add that about one-third of them received also their lodgings, which is valued at approximately one-tenth of the salary.

Grouping the employés of the seven trunk lines and of four of the most important secondary companies, another investigation showed that 138,587 men and 19,037 women were receiving wages. The women were placed as crossing watchers, were generally the wives of employés, and received, with lodging, from 16 to 40 francs a month. Many of the men were paid by the day or piece, and the earnings of 85 per cent of them were from 22.6 centimes to 55 centimes per hour. Of those paid by the month, the wages of 84 per cent were within the limits of 71-165 francs. Some fifteen per cent received in addition their lodging. In the North Railway Company the highest wages paid were 1.50 francs per hour. Of all the workingmen included in the 66,000 employés of the Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean Company only two received better pay. For the trunk lines in general, including the one owned by the State, the pay of a very large proportion of the workingmen varies between 86 and 165 francs per

month. By railroad workers it is asserted that the whole number of employés in this branch of industry is more than 400,000; but this is probably an exaggeration, as the official figures for 1895 gave for all the companies of any importance 253,000.

After the railroads probably the most important industry is coal mining, which employs 143,000 persons, of whom 101,700 work underground. The aggregate wages paid in 1897 have been computed at 171,198,000 francs, which, divided by the whole number of days' work, 41,319,000, gives as the average day's wage the sum of 4.14 francs. The largest federation of coal miners numbers 34,000 members; and its secretary writes that the lowest wage paid to any of the members is 3.75 francs per day; the highest, 6.50; the average being 5.00. These figures will probably give a fair idea of the wages of coal miners throughout the country.

A vast number of working people are constantly engaged by the governmental authorities, both central and local, in all kinds of public works, and in furnishing supplies for the various departments. It is said that, as a rule, the Government pays better than private employers, besides adding an old-age pension. On the other hand, it was affirmed, in 1892, by the president of the railroad syndicate, that the Government was less liberal in the treatment of its railway employés than some of the private companies.

The Government exercises a monopoly of the tobacco and match industries. In the former, there were employed, in 1895, 1,446 men and 13,674 women, distributed in twenty factories. For the men, the average wages were 53 centimes an hour, while the women received but 32 centimes. However, the cases are relatively somewhat altered in the seven match factories, where the average pay of the men is 50 centimes, and of the women, 35 centimes per hour. Commencing in the tobacco factories with a minimum of 25 centimes per hour, boys can earn, by the time they are eighteen years old, 41.5 centimes an hour, rising to a maximum of 75 centimes at the age of 25, and later to a possible, but not frequent, pay of 1.50 francs. The highest pay to any woman is 90 centimes an hour.

In the match factories conditions are even less favorable. The boys commence with 17.6 centimes the hour, and work up to a maximum of 65 centimes, while but three of the men, out of 676 employed, receive as high as 1.10 francs. The women workers are still more miserably rewarded; beginning the life of dangerous drudgery for 2.5 centimes the hour, and reaching a maximum, after years of steady

application, attained by only three out of 1,444, of 90 centimes an hour, or \$2.20 a day.

It is true that the Government promises a small pension at the end of thirty years' work, and medical attendance and medicines to alleviate the sufferings produced by the poisons they are handling. But, on the other hand, many never live to enjoy the pension, and life meantime is often rendered dreary and painful by dyspepsia and colic, cough and bronchitis, jaundice, and torpor of limbs, caused by the phosphorus handled. In the latter part of 1898, after years of agitation on the part of the unhappy workers, the use of white phosphorus was finally abolished. Very large numbers in both the tobacco and match factories fall a prey to tuberculosis, caused largely by the conditions under which they are obliged to live in the factories and at their homes.

The above figures date from 1895, since which time wages have advanced a fraction of a centime per hour. Some other improvements have also been made in the lot of the workers, especially by the present minister; but even he has not been willing or able to grant all their requests, having told the delegates in a recent interview that the necessities of the budget did not warrant him in doing so. Yet these are industries which pay about 300 per cent yearly profit on the capital invested! The official figures for 1897 abundantly prove the statement. Matches: on December 31, 1896, the capital invested was 6,248,336.40 francs. Net profits for 1897 were 21,602,075.75 francs. The sales for 1898 aggregated 29,938,000 francs. Tobacco: capital invested, same date, 129,072,741.56 francs. Net profits: 325,597,719.50 francs. Sales for 1898: 404,602,713 francs. Can any reviled capitalist or trust show larger profits or smaller wages?

If such examples of state ownership were to be generalized, what would be the gain of the working classes? French cigars are pronounced by travelling Americans to be dear and bad. As to the matches, an article on the subject in "L'Autorité," for May 23, 1900, remarks among other things, "Everybody knows that the state matches are worthless."

But to return to the question of wages. The great works of Creusot are usually looked upon as the model establishment in France among the iron and steel manufactures. During the big strike of 1899, which was terminated by the friendly arbitration of the Prime Minister, M. Waldeck-Rousseau, the "Temps" published (June 17)

an article on the condition of the men, from which I quote the wages paid. The laborers or help earn from 2.50 to 3.75 francs per day, and comprise one-fourth of the 13,000 workmen employed. Then come the journeymen, who receive from 4.40 to 5 francs a day. Above them stand the body of skilled laborers, to whom 5.25 to 6 francs are paid for the day's wages. About one hundred specialists are rewarded with sums rising from 7 francs to a maximum of 15 francs per day. As the same writer informs us that "the situation of the workingman at Creusot is not bad," it may be taken, I think, for granted that he has not minimized the above figures in order to present a state of misery.

A model weaving factory is said to exist up in the country, owned by M. Harmel, who has been very active in starting and promoting Catholic labor organizations. Here are employed some 500 men, women, and boys, in well-ventilated rooms, with protection not only from the dangers of contact with the machinery, but also from contact between the sexes. The males and females enter by different doors, work in separate rooms, and the women are dismissed after work several minutes before the men. The wages are high, the boys earning a minimum of 5.05 francs per day, the women 5.27 francs, and the men 5.40 francs. The highest wages are 6.52 francs a day. Moreover, the pay is regular and the employment permanent, help is given in case of sickness, increased pay is assured to the heads of large families, and Sunday rest is religiously observed.

To more than twenty letters addressed to labor exchanges and other large labor organizations but seven answers were received, and only one from a large city, Bordeaux. Previous experience had led me to anticipate such a result, as secrecy is the rule in France, among all classes, from the Government to the peasant, not only toward foreigners, but in regard to each other. While at Paris I learned from a well-informed source that the highest wages paid to hand work in the city were 1.10 francs per hour—for pattern makers. The printers are among the best situated laboring men in the country. They usually work by the piece, and are said to receive from 5 to 7 francs a day. For other trades the wages vary from 3.50 to 6 francs a day, with an average of between 4 and 5 francs. As to the pay of women, the only answer which mentioned the matter reported 25 centimes an hour for those sewing men's clothes. These figures being supplied by labor organizations, and hence representing in general the earnings of the more intelligent as well as those most insistent in

their demands, they may be presumed to be higher than the general average of all the working classes in the country.

During the years 1891-93 the Labor Bureau made an extended investigation into the subject of wages. The ground covered included some 2,957 private factories or workshops of all kinds, giving work to 451,000 persons. Adding to these the number working for the Government and engaged in transportation, the total investigation included 674,000 persons. The averages of all those regularly employed were found to be as follows: For the hour, 35.5 centimes; the day, 3.75 francs; for the year, 1,080 francs. Only about 60 per cent of all this working mass of humanity are computed to have regular employment, with an average of 250 days' work during the year. The extremes are curious; for while a large number are believed to work 295 days out of the 365, one-fourth of the hands are engaged in paying work only 170 days per year.

In the furnaces, for example, it is believed that for every 100 men employed at any one time some 135-140 men pass through the establishment during the year. One-half of the establishments under consideration never work over hours, and of those which do so, one-fifth reported paying a higher rate of wages for the over-time. In regard to women-workers the average wage is only one-half that paid to the men. Be it remarked, however, that the character of their work is nearly always different; but even where it is the same, they were less highly valued than the stronger sex, with the single exception of the cutters of precious stones. On May 1, 1900, the Minister of Commerce, Post, and Telegraph sent to the President of the Republic a report, wherein he reviewed the subject of "lady employés," as they are officially called. Among other things, he remarks that it is generally found necessary to employ three women for the work which two men would perform; that thereby an average money-saving of 850 francs a year is made, which, however, is easily counterbalanced by the charges for absences and substitutions; that out of 5,490 women at work in 1897, there were during the year absences amounting to 161,013 days.

Go into any of the innumerable stores of Paris, and you will be waited on by men or women well dressed, and apparently prosperous. They receive, however, from 100 to 250 francs a month only. Yet the places are so eagerly sought that, according to report, employés pay to foremen in some large establishments as high as an entire year's salary in order to be engaged. In recent years the habit

has increased of employing boys, who are considered well paid with 40 francs a month; and the salaries of the adults have in many cases been correspondingly decreased. In company with this movement, another has gained ground; namely, paying a small fixed salary, and adding a certain percentage on sales. Devotion is thus secured, and the intelligent, expert salesman is proportionately recompensed.

Another method of work and pay has recently come into notice, especially since Parliament has voted to introduce it as an experiment in the National Printing Office. It is called the *Commandité*, which is an old word with a new application. The workmen in a given establishment voluntarily form themselves into groups, each of which elects its own chairman and forms its own rules as to the distribution of labor and proportion of pay. When an order is received by the proprietor of the establishment he hands the whole or a part of it over to one of these groups, after an understanding with the chairman as to the price to be paid, the quality of the work, and the time of completion. After that the group takes upon itself the entire responsibility of filling the order, the care of the machinery, the discipline of the workers, etc. The system is believed to work best when all members of a group receive an equal division of the gains; but other arrangements have also been put into successful practice. Under such a régime, it is asserted that contentment is increased, that the machinery and other materials are better cared for, that production is augmented, that book-keeping is simplified, and that the workingmen are educated in the true use of liberty.

Notwithstanding the number of changes in employés noted above, the great majority of French workingmen desire steady employment, but demand therefor periodically increasing wages. In the railroads, Government works, furnaces, etc., the demand is, after a period of probation as day worker, to be engaged on a permanent basis, or classed, as the phrase in use expresses it, with a fixed rate of increase in pay from time to time. This arrangement has now been so generally accepted that a sudden discharge may give rise to a claim for damages, based on the law of December 27, 1890. Labor agitators maintain that the courts do not want to apply the law against the employers; but at least one case is cited to the contrary, where a railroad employé at Chambéry was discharged for drunkenness, at a time when his twenty-five years of service were almost completed, which would have entitled him to a pension. He brought suit against the railway company, and obtained judgment for 300 francs damages

and a life annuity of 120 francs, "without prejudice to the repayment of his contributions to the pension fund."

It is affirmed by those interested that slight pretexts for discharge are occasionally seized on by the companies as the time of pensioning draws near, but that in general they are restrained from such action by fear of public opinion. In answer to such reproaches, the Paris-Lyons-Mediterranean Company advertises its generosity in having distributed in 1897 to its employés extras to the amount of 13,030,700 francs, which was 29 per cent of the amount distributed to the shareholders. But the men complain that the generosity exercised is almost exclusively for those already well paid, while of the families nearly starving on a pittance per day, perhaps one in twenty receives a puny sugar-plum of 20 to 30 francs. The matter of discharge has another very serious side, inasmuch as the greater number of railroads refuse to engage new men who have passed thirty-five years of age; some even reducing the limit to thirty years. Still another blow in the same direction was given on January 13, 1900, by an order of the Prefect of the Seine, forbidding the engagement of new men for city works who have passed forty-five years of age. Discharged on the one hand for a trifling fault, rejected on the other on account of age, what is to become of such men? Is it any wonder that the army of the discontented is growing rapidly to formidable proportions?

Even if the laborer succeeds in keeping his place, he is not always certain of obtaining the wages for which he has agreed to work. His character is not perfect; and many employers and foremen, being themselves equally imperfect, are nevertheless tyrannical, and for the least fault impose a fine on or suspend from work the unhappy employé, and thus produce for him and for his family new sufferings. Fortunately, the system of fines has been recently abandoned by the leading railroads; and it is to be hoped that the example will be generally followed. Another cause of trouble is also diminishing, namely, that of company stores for the workers in mills and factories situated at a distance from commercial centres, by which arrangement the employers added largely to their profits, and the poor workingman only too often did not receive the value of his hard-earned money. Moreover, many employers pay only at long intervals, others irregularly, and many never pay the full amount due, retaining certain sums under various pretexts. Besides, we must not forget the constant liability to accident and disease through exposure in the various industries.

Although, in spite of the dangers and hardships through which they pass, many workmen live to a ripe old age, yet they have generally saved little or nothing for their support without work, and must hence become a burden either to their relatives or to the community. The sentiment is fast growing, however, that men who have worked honestly during many years should not be left in such a painful situation. Since January 1, 1895, the miners have by law been contributors to and recipients of an old-age pension. The trunk line railroads have their systems of pension, while the sailors and all permanent workers for the Government are also of the number who look forward to relief from toil and care in their declining years. An official investigation in 1896-97 counted 660,000 working people as insured for an old-age pension, or 17 per cent of all those in the country designated as workers. Of this number, 461,000 were employed in private enterprises, 37,000 in industries under the Government, 42,000 were road-menders, and 120,000 were sailors. The amount of the pensions varies from almost nothing up to 8,000 francs a year. In Parliament a bill is now pending for making general the system of old-age pensions to workmen.

WALTER B. SCAIFE.

A PLEA FOR THE NEW CEREAL, THE COTTON-SEED.

TIME was when the cotton-seed was the least of all seeds in the public estimation. It still holds a place far below its intrinsic worth; but it bids fair to become, in the future, by its merit, the greatest of all. Its romantic history is now so well known that it is not necessary to dwell upon it, or to state how an agricultural product which farmers were once glad to dump into a river, if one flowed conveniently near, has become worth 30 cents a bushel — \$20.00 a ton — on the banks of the Mississippi itself.

This remarkable progress has only been gained by a hard and constant struggle against ignorance and prejudice, and against the opposition of competing products which were regarded as primary crops. The cotton-seed was regarded as an impertinent by-product, interfering with the markets for the cereals. At the same time it was admitted that all competition between the cereals should be free and unhampered. But now those who have been accustomed to look upon the cotton-seed as a mere “by-product of the cotton-field” must alter their point of view. Let us compare this so-called by-product with one of the cereals:

WHEAT AND COTTON-SEED COMPARED.

	Protein.	Carbohydrates.	Fat.	Value.
Wheat.....	11.87	73.69	2.09	\$1.00
Cotton-seed.....	17.57	10.82	20.19	1.39

The above table gives the number of pounds of food components and the analytical value of 100 pounds each of wheat and cotton-seed, according to the methods in use by the Agricultural Experiment Stations. It shows the surprising fact that, pound for pound, cotton-seed has a greater intrinsic value than wheat. Neither is the bulk of the cotton-seed crop by any means insignificant as compared with wheat. There are raised in the Southern States alone five-sevenths as many bushels of cotton-seed as there are raised bushels of wheat in the whole of the United States.

In spite of all the criticisms, just and unjust, of Southern agricultural methods, the yield per acre in bushels of cotton-seed, over and above the fibre, is greater than the yield of wheat per acre; and it is increasing. The reports of the United States Department of Agriculture for the season of 1897-98, the latest obtainable when these calculations were made, place the average yield per acre of cotton-seed at 14.9 bushels, as against 13.43 bushels for wheat. They are given more in detail in the table below :

ACREAGE AND YIELD OF COTTON-SEED AND WHEAT.

	Acres.	Bushels.	Yield per Acre.
Wheat.....	39,465,000	539,000,000	13.43 bushels.
Cotton-seed.....	24,319,500	363,261,000	14.9 bushels.

Surely, in view of these figures the cotton-seed deserves attention as such, independently of the cotton fibre.

Although the cotton-seed has been almost obscured by the far more showy cotton crop, it has nevertheless been proved by recent investigations to have an intrinsic value half that of the cotton crop, when fully and properly put to such uses as are already known for it. There is a known latent value in the cotton-seed crop of \$200,000,000, equal to 4 cents per pound on the entire cotton crop, which is still annually lost. Little real scientific study and little close economic thought have been given to this modest article as yet; but when they are given to it to the same degree as they are given, for instance, to petroleum or iron or sugar beets, new properties or new uses or new products may be discovered which may make the cotton-seed crop a more valuable one than the cotton crop. The United States Department of Agriculture was begged in vain to make such an investigation this year. Its importance fully justifies it, and it is no more than both France and Germany have done for the beet.

It is worthy of remark that the cotton-seed as an article of utility and value sprang into notice only after the Civil War. Unlike cotton it had no historical connection or intimate association with slavery or the war. It has never made the boastful claims of King Cotton; yet it has contributed far more to scientific agriculture and to the study of economies, in the cotton States, than cotton. In the four hundred or more mills engaged in "crushing" cotton-seed the freed negro has found ready employment; and he forms nine-tenths of the employés of these factories to-day. In its beneficent influence over the South the cotton-seed has indeed been marvellous.

It seems, therefore, strange and doubly unkind that the cotton-seed's progress should meet with bitter jealousy or violent opposition, that it should be constantly receiving new and unexpected checks. The latest attempt of this kind is a most unworthy and uncalled-for piece of legislation. The finest and best of cotton oil, which comprises one-fourth, and is the most valuable part, of the seed, is sweeter in flavor and more neutral in odor than almost any known oil or fat. A considerable percentage of this oil is used in the manufacture of artificial butter, a perfectly pure and wholesome article—a boon to the poor—which enjoys government protection and supervision, and also *enjoys* a governmental internal revenue tax of 2 cents a pound—as unjust a tax as that put on cotton just after the war. This tax is, of course, paid by the very class of consumers least able to bear it.

The “Grout Bill” recently agitated in Congress, reported favorably by a small majority of the Agricultural Committee, and likely to be passed at the next meeting of Congress, proposes to increase this tax on artificial butter to 10 cents a pound. Even if this tax does not prohibit the manufacture of artificial butter altogether, which is the real object sought by it, it will hurt not only cotton oil, but also oleo oil, another large ingredient of artificial butter, prepared from the fat of freshly slaughtered Southern and Western cattle. The Southern cattle are raised and fattened on two of the products of the cotton-seed, which comprise two-thirds of its weight, meal and hulls. The passage of this bill will, therefore, work a peculiar hardship upon the Southern planter; it will lessen the wages of the negro employes of the oil mills; it will reduce the earnings of the negro tenant farmers, who often get nothing but the seed out of their crop; and it will check the growth of cattle upon the small farms of the South, than which nothing is of more economic importance to that section to-day. This bill is, in reality, a purely sectional piece of legislation aimed at a cotton-growing section of the United States in the supposed, though mistaken, interest of a dairy section. I say “mistaken interest,” for if the dairymen would only let oleomargarine alone, it would find its way into all the markets of the world; into places where natural butter cannot go, and in such enormous quantities that to make it would call for more milk and cream (without which it cannot be made) than our present dairies can possibly supply.

Now, will none of those men who have deservedly gained reputations in the world of economic thought, but who have left this unkind attack against the cotton-seed unanswered, come forward and de-

nounce this unjust attack upon the cotton plant, founded, as it is, too, upon an economic fallacy? We can forgive a New England economist, whom we know is a friend of the South, for insisting that we have just the right sort of climate in the cotton States for growing lambs — the New York Exchanges anticipated him in this discovery — but just the wrong kind of climate for building cotton mills for “finer numbers.” But what respect will our people have for economists who watch burdens placed upon the shoulders of the cotton States too grievous to be borne without lifting a finger to aid in removing them?

Finally, if neither economists nor the Government will actively help the cotton-seed, the cotton plant, or the cotton States, at least let there be removed the severe, unnatural handicaps — and they are many — that have been placed upon these States, and allow them alone to work out their industrial salvation *without* fear and trembling. Then, in ten years’ time, if the question is asked, “Can any good thing come out of the cotton-seed?” no other answer will be necessary but “Come and see!”

EDWIN LEHMAN JOHNSON.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN AUSTRIA.

LAST June a scene was enacted in the Austrian Diet which might well have impressed the uninitiated as a sort of carnival entertainment devised for the special delectation of a favored guest. Old men with venerable beards blew tin horns, while others made a frightful noise by striking kettles with the lids thereof. The shrill tones of the penny trumpet mingled with the droning of a mighty gong. A rhythmical accompaniment was furnished by the thumping of heavy rules against wooden desks; and the pandemonium was augmented by the shrill sound of whistles of every description, and the din of all sorts of noisy instruments borrowed from the nursery.

This performance, euphoniously designated as "obstruction," was systematically carried out, according to a fixed programme, until long after midnight, with the firm determination of hindering the proceedings of the Diet. Meanwhile, the other parties listened in mute astonishment to the rendering of the symphony. The President of the Diet, powerless by reason of a lack of enactments making provision against such disgraceful scenes, permitted hour after hour thus to elapse, while the deserted benches of the ministry stared desolately into the beautiful hall thus shamefully desecrated. The ministers meanwhile held a council of war in a neighboring dwelling; and there, as a last resort, it was decided to awaken the venerable monarch — then sojourning at his summer residence, Schoenbrunn — at midnight, in order to secure from him the necessary constitutional permission to close the session.

Nothing could be more characteristic of the unnatural conditions now prevailing in Austria than this necessity of disturbing the rest of a venerable and grief-stricken monarch. Yet the disgraceful scene just described is by no means unique in the modern parliamentary procedure of Austria, and I cite it merely as the most recent illustration of a long series of similar demonstrations. Fierce conflicts have been repeatedly waged within the walls of Parliament; Government and Presidency alike have been constantly subjected to the vilest

ridicule and abuse ; and on several occasions, indeed, it has been found necessary to summon the police to quell the tumult.

Apart from these external demonstrations, the Austrian Parliament has for years ignored all legislative work of a serious nature. It has been found necessary to pass most important enactments, such as the Budget and the decennial compromise with Hungary, in the form of defensive measures. In the midst of an unexampled economic prosperity among neighboring nations Austria is suffering from a deep-seated depression. Commerce and traffic are languishing, and an industrial insecurity has ensued which is crippling capital and paralyzing enterprise. Despite numerous natural advantages and the frequently under-rated industrial capacity of the country, economic opportunities have been lost, exports have declined, internal consumption has decreased, and the Bourse, once so flourishing, has become impoverished. Within two years the Government has changed six times, while a great proportion of those eligible to the ministry have already been called to the helm in vain. All attempts to restore order, whether proceeding from the Federal Government or the several parties, have been futile. The destinies of the nation are involved in darkness and obscurity ; and though the humblest citizen realizes that this situation cannot long continue, none has undertaken to indicate the way in which order may be constitutionally reëstablished.

A satisfactory solution of this question is daily becoming more difficult, because the points of difference developed by former conditions are constantly becoming more sharply defined. Under the plea of guarding their most sacred interests, the various national elements of the Empire have adopted the motto that the end justifies the means. Goaded to obstinate resistance by the radical leaders of both parties — who naturally fear to lose their artificial prestige — Germans and Czechs alike take the unreasonable view that the triumph of one must necessarily imply the downfall of the other ; whereas the real point at issue is an equitable adjustment of mutual demands. The parties themselves, it is true, have either everything to gain or everything to lose. Consequently, while those interested from an economic standpoint, in view of the personal damage already sustained, and regardless of partisan affiliations, have continued in their efforts toward the reëstablishment of national peace, the professional politicians, oblivious of every duty and obligation, have as constantly endeavored to fan the flames of discord. Hitherto the latter have been preponderant, and have succeeded, by means of an impassioned, bitter, and

somewhat unscrupulous rhetoric, in keeping the voters in that state of exaltation which so frequently destroys dispassionate judgment.

Austria enjoys the doubtful distinction of being a historic conglomerate of petty nationalities, which for centuries have lived beside, rather than mingled with, one another. It is this condition which has given edge to the struggle between centralization and federalism. While the federal bodies have hitherto held to the natural theory which accords to the provinces the right to exercise jurisdiction in local matters, relegating the conduct of national affairs — taxation, justice, and education — to the central Government, the provinces, on their part, have sought to extend the influence of their respective legislatures. As the Centralists furthermore originally evinced pronounced Germanizing tendencies, the Federalists have endeavored to secure a hitherto unprecedented degree of autonomy for their respective provinces. It is impossible here to review in detail the successive systems of legislation, which, originally based upon the maxim, “All for the Germans,” eventually led to the antagonisms embodied in the cry, “Rule against the Germans.” I shall, therefore, confine myself to a brief presentation of the recent ominous phenomena arising from the mistaken policy embodied in Count Badeni’s “Language Ordinance,” favoring the Czechs at the expense of the Germans.

The advent of Count Casimir Badeni to the ministry was regarded as particularly auspicious, as he had long been the confidential adviser of his Majesty, who had advanced the Count to the rank of Governor of Galicia, and had repeatedly distinguished him with honors and rewards. The political henchmen of his party had skilfully contrived to secure for him the title of the “Austrian Bismarck,” an appellation borne out by a certain physical resemblance to the great chancellor. Soon after his accession, however, the discrepancy between Badeni’s meritorious achievements in Galicia and the diplomatic qualifications requisite to a successful solution of the racial question in Austria became painfully manifest; and, although actuated by the best of intentions at the outset Count Badeni was unfortunately soon led astray by partisan advisers. His very first move, the fatal enactment of the “Language Ordinance,” from the consequences of which the nation is still suffering, gave evidence of a lamentable political short-sightedness.

In order to remove the greatly feared Czech opposition to the compromise with Hungary, Count Badeni attempted to gratify the highest national aspirations of the Czechs by the passage of the “Lan-

guage Ordinance.” But the form in which those laws were cast proved to be a most fatal one, although their content, under the prevailing conditions, was open to discussion. It was, above all, the unparliamentary manner of the procedure and the failure to assure German acquiescence in the measure that created the intensely bitter sentiment which has since prevailed. It was among the German element that the President of the ministry had originally met with the strongest sympathy. The Germans were disposed to credit the assurances of Badeni concerning the “strong hand destined to lead the parties,” and they furthermore believed that they had in the new unpartisan minister a means of fusion, a link between the German and Czech parties. In view of these facts, the exercise of more skilful tactics would have enabled Badeni to effect a compromise.

As it was, the Czechs and the Germans assembled around the respective banners of their parties, and proceeded, quietly at first, but gradually with increasing turbulence, to bring about that complete cessation of the parliamentary machine which has since become widely known as “obstruction.” The Germans determined that until the unconditional repeal of the obnoxious “Language Ordinance” should be granted, no legislation of importance should be effected. The order of parliamentary procedure, originally established without the faintest idea of a contingency such as had now arisen, permitted the absolute obstruction of the legislative machinery, while an attempt to institute new and more stringent laws to fit the case was met with the most determined opposition, finally culminating in the menacing revolt, which was only prevented by the demission of the ministry and the eventual appearance of the police in Parliament.

Had Badeni’s successor, Freiherr von Gautsch, been summoned to the helm under different conditions, it is possible that he might have enjoyed a long tenure of office. Like his predecessor Badeni, a close personal adviser of his Majesty, von Gautsch, to the general astonishment of the nation, was already in early years summoned to the Taffe cabinet as Minister of Education. The type of an Austrian Centralist official, elegant in appearance and carriage, distinguished by distinctly modern, though perhaps slightly Clerical, ideas, and a German by birth and training, von Gautsch, by reason of his continuous service in the Taffe and Badeni cabinets, had succeeded in establishing a great popularity among the leaders of all parties, excepting the highly aristocratic Feudalists, to whose activity I shall later refer. To these von Gautsch was a veritable thorn in the flesh,

inasmuch as he was not a member of those princely families from whose ranks, according to a well-established principle, the Presidents of the ministry had theretofore been recruited.

Before encountering the series of embarrassing situations growing out of the Czech matter, von Gautsch was confronted by the compromise between Hungary and Austria, the prospective reestablishment of which seemed to threaten a sacrifice of important Austrian interests — a sacrifice which, as the sequel shows, was actually entailed upon Gautsch's successors. As it was, the conscientious and honest nature of the man could not support the idea of such a sacrifice; and the consequence was that, after an official activity of several weeks, von Gautsch, to the general astonishment, submitted his resignation.

By a singular fatality the bitter conflict between the Germans and the Czechs was attended by the no less violent economic differences between the two great divisions of the Empire, Austria and Hungary; and a harmonious adjustment of these differences was urgent, in view of the early expiration of a decade, for which term, since the days of Deak, the compromise between the two national groups has been renewed. Necessarily, a deviation from this principle would have furnished a dangerous precedent, jeopardizing the stability of the Empire.

A serious complication now arose. For, while the Hungarians endeavored to profit by the internal complications of Austria proper, and sought to obtain all possible concessions as compensation for maintaining the provisional *status quo*, the Austrian deputies, shortsighted and blinded by partisan interests, were sufficiently unpatriotic to sanction the employment of obstructionary methods also with regard to the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Thus there arose, upon the one hand, a strongly Hungarian legislature, whose every demand was supported by a large majority; and, upon the other, an Austrian party, which simultaneously attacked Parliament in the rear. Under these conditions von Gautsch unhesitatingly resigned his position in favor of the man who was confidently expected to pave the way to success.

This man was Count Thun, who was now summoned to the helm. He had been Governor of Bohemia, and was consequently entitled to rank as an authority on Czech affairs. Yet, singularly enough — and this is the peculiar irony of our political comedy of errors — even men ostensibly the most serviceable experience a paralysis of their faculties so soon as they are called upon to unravel the present polit-

ical tangle. As Governor of Bohemia, Count Thun had very properly rejected the unreasonable political aspirations of the Young Czechs, and thereby seriously offended that powerful party, which retaliated by eventually compelling his resignation from office. Nevertheless, when summoned to the Presidency, Count Thun at once became a docile ally of these very Czechs. The consequence was that the Germans, who had greatly honored Count Thun as Governor, now opposed every measure devised by him as President of the cabinet, and eventually succeeded in overthrowing his ministry. Parliament was repeatedly dismissed, and the proceedings of the Thun cabinet were based principally upon the emergency clause embodied in paragraph 14, which stipulates that in case Parliament is out of session, and the needs of the state demand it, urgent laws may be provisionally passed by the Government, with a view to their ultimate ratification by the Diet.

In accordance with this provision, Parliament, which had given additional proofs of its obstinacy, was repeatedly adjourned in order that urgent legislative measures might be effected; and in this way not only were international treaties eventually secured, but also the passage of the Budget and the Compromise with Hungary. This procedure, although contrary to the spirit of the constitution, alone enabled the state to make provision for pressing legislative needs. Yet, unfortunately, the disordered legislation caused by this enactment has resulted in a condition of great insecurity, the ultimate consequences of which can scarcely be foreseen. For it should be remembered that the Compromise with Hungary, established according to paragraph 14, still awaits its ratification by Parliament, and the overthrow of the measure might be fraught with serious peril to the state. Nor is the rejection of the Compromise at all improbable, as its terms are very unfavorable to Austria.

When, therefore, we consider the rivalry between the dual governments, Hungary, upon the one hand, strong, confident, and determined systematically to utilize every political advantage, and Austria, upon the other, torn by internal dissensions, and consequently incapable of pressing her claims and of defending her interests, we can readily conceive the magnitude of the results here pending.

It is necessary to emphasize here that the purposes as well as the ideas of Count Thun were very favorable at the outset, and that the designation of that statesman as a political dilettante — frequently heard during the latter half of his official term — has been most unjust. I well remember an interview with Count Thun, held in the now his-

toric *salon* of the Ministry of the Interior. Our conversation, at first on general topics, gradually drifted into politics, and it soon became evident that the Count was desirous of giving full expression to his sentiments on the great question of the day — a rare occurrence with him. I attached a certain degree of importance to these utterances, because they were by no means lightly expressed, and were confided to me by his Excellency under the pledge of secrecy. Even now that the circumstances have already become history, I think it advisable to confine myself to a single feature of our conversation, which I think will serve as a not unwelcome exposition of Count Thun's views regarding his obligations to the German national element :

"It is but natural that my sympathies should be in the German camp. I am a German by birth and parentage, and before my political career compelled me to acquire the Bohemian language, I ever spoke and felt as a German. This fact was thoroughly appreciated during my official term in Bohemia, and the bitter hatred with which the Young Czech party then honored me is attributable to it. But sympathies cannot rule a state; and, as the matter stands, I find it indispensable that the Germans on their part make concessions, in order that they may not forever lose their legitimate participation in the affairs of the government."

This categorical view has since been proved erroneous; for the united German party strenuously pushed its opposition until the Language Ordinance was abrogated, without, however, entailing a sacrifice of political prestige. That Count Thun, the staunch defender of Germanism, has gradually become a docile tool of the Slavs, is due to the ascendancy of Minister of Finance Kaizl, one of the leaders of the Young Czech party. Dr. Kaizl surpassed Count Thun in energy and capacity for political intrigue; and even the bitterest opponents of the latter must concede that he was ever a cavalier in the fullest sense, whose character rendered him incapable of coping with the political subterfuge and trickery so characteristic of the Slavophile-Clerical majority in the Diet. However, the personality of Thun was gradually forced into the background, while his cabinet was dubbed "The Ministry of Kaizl named Thun."

The case of the Minister of Finance, Kaizl, furnishes a weighty example of the baneful influence of politics and high official station upon character. Dr. Kaizl, formerly professor of fiscal sciences at Prague, was a man of acknowledged scientific standing, who had ever been closely identified with the liberal wing of the Young Czech party, and had repeatedly distinguished himself by his energetic opposition to all reactionary measures. In the endeavor to intrench himself as securely and permanently as possible in his exposed official

position, he gradually sacrificed all his former tenacity of purpose, becoming emulous, above all, of currying favor with those court circles which have so frequently exercised a fatal influence upon the destinies of the Austrian people.

Thus it happened that Dr. Kaizl, who had on several occasions become affiliated with the Socialist party, actively participating in the enactment of extreme reactionary measures, now became an obedient member of the most radically clerical Federalists in Austria. The Thun ministry might have had totally different results to record had Dr. Kaizl confined himself to the *rôle* of the honest intermediary between the Germans and the Czechs, a capacity for which his past experience would seem to have especially qualified him. He aspired instead to leadership in the highest arena of national politics; and the opinion of those who declare that the man who had risen from a modest professorship to the rank of excellency also aspired to the still higher post of President seems to have been not altogether without foundation.

Owing to the repeated difficulties naturally arising from the enforced application of paragraph 14, the Thun cabinet, like its predecessors, eventually drifted into a blind alley; and there arose the necessity of a change of government, the benefits of which, however, were regarded by the competent as questionable. The successor of Thun, Count Clary-Aldringen, formerly Governor of Styria, was not even invested with the title of President of the cabinet, being designated merely as leader of the Ministry. This régime was stamped at the very outset as a transient episode; and its installation was primarily due to the necessity of abrogating the "Language Ordinance" of Badeni, which was still regarded as the fruitful source of all our political evils.

No illusions were entertained, however, regarding any amelioration resulting from the repeal of this ordinance, as it was assumed that the reckless and violent opposition of the German element would at once be transferred to the Czechs. The correctness of this assumption was fully verified by the results; for all attempts to establish a *modus vivendi* by long and frequent conferences with party leaders, for the purpose of devising important economic measures, to the temporary exclusion of purely political questions, proved abortive.

Count Clary, distinguished by a winning personality, and favored with the personal confidence of the party leaders, after a term of several weeks, returned to his former post as Governor of Styria.

A brief interval ensued, during which the official business of the cabinet was somewhat informally conducted by the Wittek Ministry; and this in turn was succeeded by the present cabinet, under the leadership of Dr. von Koerber.

Already upon his accession a rumor was circulated that Dr. von Koerber had demanded extraordinary powers from the Crown, and that these had been granted. It was further bruited that in case of a failure on the part of the present Ministry—a body somewhat indifferently constituted—to effect a settlement by parliamentary methods, these were to be supplanted by a new system of procedure, the nature of which seems to have been veiled in mystery. After the scene described at the beginning of this paper, the Ministry was empowered—according to the provisions of paragraph 14—to conduct the necessary political and financial business of the state until the close of the year; and it is hoped that within this period a decided change for the better will facilitate a peaceful termination of the present constitutional crisis.

The frequent postponement of the decision regarding ultimate changes in the former constitution may be readily explained. While competent statesmen of the Empire agree that harmony cannot be established under a constitution which enables a small minority completely to arrest the machinery of the state, there is great diversity of opinion as regards the method of constructing a more perfect scheme. Recognizing the necessity of arresting the party conflicts in Bohemia, one party has formulated the demand that the power of the provincial governments be extended, while the jurisdiction of the central Parliament be limited to imperial affairs of a general nature, with emphasis on economic questions. The other party recommends that the ill-concealed absolutism, which for years has been fostered by the enforcement of paragraph 14, be once for all openly declared, and that a powerful Ministry, eventually supplemented by a council of state consisting of representatives of all parties, be empowered, independently of Parliament, to fill the legislative gaps which have hitherto furnished the means of exploitation to self-seeking politicians.

An enlightened absolutism of this kind would be entrusted with a threefold task: (1) A revision of the present parliamentary rules, so as to completely forestall a recurrence of the before-mentioned turbulent conditions; (2) the permanent settlement, by direct order of the Crown, of all the knotty problems involved in the present controversy; and (3) the enactment of a measure facilitating the formation

of a new and equitable legislative system for Austria, and chiefly Bohemia, which shall have a special bearing upon judiciary, educational, and internal affairs.

The formation of such a cabinet, as repeatedly asserted by prominent leaders, now seems very likely, owing to the gradual narrowing down of the technical differences between the parties, and to the recognition of the circumstance that the futility of the efforts tending to secure a harmonious solution of pending problems is traceable to the constant friction engendered by incessant political controversy. An energetic Government, conscious of its aims and unhampered by narrow partisan interests, may still succeed in solving the problems now pending. Nor is it probable that a dissolution of Parliament in Austria, at a time when its complete downfall seems imminent, will be attended by serious dangers. On the other hand, it is clear that the people, among whom discontent and the pursuit of unattainable ideals are now artificially encouraged from without, will become calmer and more rational in their demands so soon as the influence of the professional politician shall be curtailed. Moreover, only an absolutely independent government can hope to cope successfully with the Feudal-Clericals, those formidable adversaries that have hitherto persistently hindered a reconciliation between the two great national elements of Austria proper.

The Clerical party of Austria — which, supported by the still all-dominant feudal nobility, has, within the past ten years, acquired a dangerous ascendancy — is fully aware of the fact that its domination will cease with the establishment of a permanent reconciliation between the German and Czech peoples. The popular sentiment of both nationalities is decidedly anti-Clerical; and so soon as a better understanding shall be effected between them we shall witness a reawakening of those progressive tendencies which the “party of the robe” has ever successfully opposed.

We may readily conceive the grave fears on the part of the Clerical party of a possible national reconciliation when we consider that even the German Clericals, during the entire controversy discussed in these columns, have been the staunchest supporters of the Czechs — an element still dominated by the reactionaries — and have repeatedly, in important instances, cast the vote which decided the issue against their own countrymen. Similarly, the greater part of the feudal aristocracy of Bohemia, who derive their descent from an ancient Germanic ancestry, are arrayed shoulder to shoulder against the Ger-

man people. At the same time the Young Czechs, who were originally organized as a thoroughly radical party, have, by reason of the pressure exerted by the Feudals and Clericals, gradually lost every vestige of a progressive tendency, and survive as a lamentable caricature of the will of the people. It follows that a permanent national reconciliation can be effected only by a complete demolition of the Clerical dominion; and it is equally certain that the Clerical party, which enjoys the protection of the highest court circles, will spare no efforts to overthrow every government not vested with extraordinary powers.

I have shown that the national question, owing to its complications, will be extremely difficult to solve. The extraordinary conditions here involved will require the application of extraordinary remedies; and, although experimental legislation will undoubtedly be fraught with perils, its exercise, under the present circumstances, will be imperative. As it is, the only normal method yet untried — the dissolution of the present Diet preparatory to a reëlection — would result only in intensifying the situation; and the radical wings of all parties, profiting by the general excitement and bitterness, would undoubtedly find accessions to their ranks. Hence, a strong, independent, and absolutely unhampered Government will be required to grapple with the problem; and every statesman, however radical his personal views, will recognize the necessity for the vigorous exercise of state authority.

It may, therefore, be taken for granted that the only opposition which a temporary absolutism will encounter will proceed from the professional politicians. All others will regard the remedy as a dose which, however unpleasant, must nevertheless be administered. Upon the whole, it is probable that immediately upon the establishment of a new official method of procedure, excluding obstructionary feats, and introducing German as the language of mediation, the points of contention between the two nations will be removed; for the economic conditions have become so serious as to justify the hope that the prosaic needs of the stomach will eventually obliterate the differences caused by discordant national "ideals."

I shall take advantage of the present opportunity to correct a serious misconception pervading foreign circles in regard to the Austrian question. It has become customary to consider the Austrian Empire as a moribund confederation of states whose complete dissolution will ensue upon the death of the present monarch. Even among

ourselves the opinion has gained ground that in such an event the so-called interior provinces of Austria would become annexed to Bavaria, and that such territorial extension would enable the latter state to sever its connection with the German Empire and to organize as a first-rate power. It is asserted, furthermore, that Hungary would then become established as an independent kingdom, which would eventually absorb all the Slavic provinces, and in this way grow to an empire under the Czech hegemony.

But these views are purely speculative. While it is undeniable that the present constitutional crisis has shaken the internal organization of the Empire, the sense of union existing among the various states is still too strong to admit of the wide dissemination of pan-germanic or panslavistic ideas. Only recently the question of succession has again been clearly enunciated, while faithlessness to the dynasty is restricted to the small circles of a few provinces. Furthermore, the acquisition of these disaffected elements by a neighboring state would be a questionable gain, inasmuch as the methods of disintegration now employed in Austria would then be extended also to the other country.

The preservation of the union between Hungary and Austria must be regarded as indispensable. And, as the present monarchy, notwithstanding frequent internal and external crises, has repeatedly demonstrated its vitality, we may confidently expect that an outlet from the present dilemma will be ultimately found; so that the dark prophecies of those who would place the Austrian Empire in the same category as Turkey or China must be regarded as neither more nor less than puerile fancies.

MAURICE BAUMFELD.

CHINA AGAINST THE WORLD.

THE NATIONAL UPRISING AGAINST FOREIGNERS.

It has for some time been clear to observers of Chinese affairs that a great anti-foreign uprising among the Chinese masses was inevitable. This anticipation has been fulfilled sooner than was expected. The great dimensions which the Boxer movement has already taken on make it necessary to regard this revolt not as a local, factional disturbance, but as a national resistance to foreign interference.

Heretofore the Chinese have given little evidence of national patriotism. They are clannish in the extreme, and full of local prejudices. It would be possible to raise an army in one province against the people of another, and the industrial rivalries between different sections are very intense. The dynasty and the political unity of the empire have never called forth any enthusiasm. Of course, it may be said that in a world state there would be no room for patriotism; and, up to very recent times, the Chinese have been in the position of a world state, free from the competition of other nations. All this, however, has been changed in the last few years. The present invasion of China by foreign enterprise and industry has awakened a dormant sense of nationalism, and has taught the Chinese that they have common interests to defend.

Although the present movement was at first directed against missions and missionaries, still it has a much broader basis than mere religious fanaticism. The Chinese are, perhaps, the least religious among nations. They are too matter-of-fact, too practical and prosaic for religious enthusiasm. Their national religion is hardly more than a code of social observances, and their religious activities are exhausted in ceremonies. They, therefore, do not oppose the Christian religion as such, but merely as interfering with their local customs and ideas. In most cases Christianity appealed in China to the poorer classes and the unhonored. Their connection with the missionaries gave the new converts a certain importance. They were often

defended against oppression, and enjoyed some advantages which brought upon them the envy of their neighbors. Moreover, they were looked upon as traitors to their native customs, and despised and persecuted by the unconverted Chinese. The missionaries, on account of their political influence, often obtained advantages, judicial and industrial, for their protégés which were keenly resented by the neighborhood.

Of far greater importance than the religious question, however, is the industrial revolution which has begun in China as a consequence of the introduction of foreign methods and enterprise. When we remember the keen and widespread distress caused by the industrial revolution in Great Britain at the beginning of this century, and when we compare the extent of population and resources of that kingdom with those of the Chinese Empire, we can, by stretching our imagination to the utmost, picture the far greater unrest and suffering that will necessarily be engendered by the great industrial changes impending in China. In China, as formerly throughout the Orient, manufactures are still "house industries"; that is, they are carried on according to ancient methods by families in their homes. The different handicrafts are organized into guilds, and China presents the same picture of industrial life that existed in the Europe of the Middle Ages. The concentration of industry in large factories has scarcely begun. Although there are large cities, still they do not bear that proportion to the rural population which obtains with the cities of Europe.

In order to introduce European industrial methods it was first of all necessary to improve the means of transportation. Already for twenty years past Chinese mandarins in high official positions have been discussing the advisability of establishing railways in the Empire; the chief supporters of railway enterprise being Li Hung Chang and Chang Chi Tung, the most influential among the viceroys. On the other hand, many reactionaries opposed the policy as tending to disturb the equilibrium of the population, and as threatening to rob of employment the multitude of carriers. It was also urged that the desecration of burial places and sacred shrines could not be avoided if railways were to be constructed. All the superstitious geomancy of China, which forbids the disturbance of the soil as disagreeable to the spirits that inhabit it, was utilized by the opposition.

A few small experiments in railway construction were made, and proved successful, as the Chinese people seemed eager to use the new

convenience. Then came the Chino-Japanese war, with the consequent invasion of China by foreign influence. The latter took the form especially of a demand for railway concessions, and within a few years construction grants for lines aggregating 10,000 kilometers in length were made by the Chinese Government to foreign corporations. In these grants, however, the Chinese Government reserved to itself the ultimate reversion of the railway and a large share in the profits. It also provided for the establishment, in connection with every line, of schools of railway engineering, where the youth of China might learn the methods of Western industrialism. For a time everything moved auspiciously. The carriers were as yet undisturbed in their employment. As a matter of fact, money was brought into the provinces, and work was abundant. The population seemed to take cheerfully to the new means of communication. As yet the true industrial revolution had not begun, because, with the exception of a few factories erected in Shanghai, the old house industries continued the sole method of production.

But a vague fear seized the Chinese masses. They saw that foreigners, disregardful of their customs and prejudices, were entering the land and carrying things with a high hand. The Government itself was not backward in fostering this feeling. While formal edicts were issued demanding that full protection be given to foreigners, the Empress and her advisers secretly encouraged the growing opposition to foreign enterprise. It is at present becoming known that she gave full warrant to the viceroys to use force in repelling unauthorized advances on the part of the representatives of foreign powers and industries, without waiting for instructions from Peking.

This fear finally came to a head in the province of Shantung. The Germans had been the first to seize a portion of the Chinese territory, at Kiaochow. Thence they pushed their railways into the interior of the province, and began the exploitation of the mines. They were, however, not very considerate or tactful in their treatment of the natives. By government regulation they fixed a very low maximum of wages, so that the neighboring population would not work for them; forcing them to import inferior coolies from other regions. From the first they met cases of serious popular resistance to their advance.

Now, there existed in Shantung a society, the Boxers, especially organized for the purpose of protecting the peasant population; and very naturally these were the first to oppose an organized and de-

terminated resistance to foreign encroachment. To understand the nature of this organization, we must remember that while only lax political bonds unite the Chinese people, they are very clannish and are bound together by the closest ties of family and guild relationship. In all the provinces handicraftsmen, merchants, and bankers are united into guilds. These have a very strong, though informal, organization, with regular officers, who, in council, fix the minimum of prices and of wages, and determine the character and quality of the products of an industry. They exercise a very beneficent influence on Chinese commerce and industry; so that while in official life the Chinese are hopelessly corrupt, their integrity in business affairs is well known and appreciated throughout the Orient.

The individual guilds are formally united by the ceremonious worship of a patron saint, carried on at stated intervals at large feasts, in which all the members take part. Controversies between members are settled by the syndics, according to the customs of the guilds; in fact, the customs of the guilds and arbitration by their officers take the place of a regular system of civil law in China. The law of the mandarins is almost entirely penal. For the settlement of controversies about contracts and commercial dealings, private tribunals are resorted to almost exclusively. There are secret organizations for many other purposes, some of them having members throughout the empire. Even the robbers are organized as a secret guild, similar to the ancient order of *thugs* in India. It is quite common for merchants to make a contract of immunity with the heads of the robber guilds; and the great carrying companies, which transport money between important towns, always have an understanding which assures the safety of their shipments.

The Boxers are an organization originally formed in the province of Shantung, for the purpose of protecting the peasant population against robbers in the time of famine. The society has been perpetuated for the avowed purpose of general physical and moral development among the masses, without, however, having its aims clearly outlined. The two names of the society indicate a double purpose. With the name of the "Big Sword" it threatens its adversaries; and the "Society of Righteousness and Protection" offers resistance to encroachment or oppression and enforces justice. The latter name has by a Chinese pun been changed to "Society of Righteousness and the Fist," which combined with the martial attitude of the organization has led to the designation "Boxers."

It was very natural that a society of this kind should be the first to take alarm and try to resist foreign interference, a result which the reactionaries were eager to bring about. Everything foreign had come to be looked upon as dangerous. The British and American missionaries, the German and Russian railway builders, the French engineers who surveyed new routes or opened mines, were all classed together as plotting against the peace of Chinese civilization. The report spread and gained credence that China was to be divided and governed by the European Powers, like India. As soon as the Boxers manifested their anti-foreign enthusiasm, they drew to themselves large numbers of lower and middle class Chinamen throughout the northern provinces. Even a large part of the newly created special bodyguard of the Empress, called the "Glorious Tigers," joined the Boxers — a fact which gave their organization great political importance, especially as Prince Tuan openly championed their cause and became their leader.

The society of Boxers has no formal organization; its leaders being selected by an informal understanding. Orders are given by means of bulletins posted on the walls of public buildings, in which manner intelligence is rapidly diffused among the masses. Its very informality is a great source of strength to the organization, as its leaders are bound by no rules, and its activities are covered with the mantle of mystery. The first outrages of the Boxers were directed against the missionaries. In the case of the murder of the missionary Brooks, the Powers were still influential, and the Peking Government was willing enough to enforce summary punishment. But, as the majority of the population began to sympathize with the movement, and large numbers joined it, it became impossible to control it through the weak central Government, which, moreover, was far from disapproving of the motives that animated the rioters. Thus, what was at first a local disturbance has suddenly flamed up into a vast national uprising, which may delay the work of civilization in China for decades, and may have even a far-reaching and unexpected effect on the rest of the world.

As we turn to consider the political importance of the present movement, we must remember that there are practically three parties in China. To be sure, these parties are not organized as are those of America and Great Britain; but still their tendencies of action may be clearly outlined. First, we find the party of the reactionaries, headed by Prince Tuan. They systematically oppose every reform as inim-

ical to the established order and to the Manchu dynasty. It was heretofore believed that they were friendly to and greatly influenced by Russia; but recent events have shown that their opposition goes to everything European. The second party comprises the moderates, who are not averse to a certain measure of reform upon European models, and who at the present juncture admit the necessity of protecting European life and property. They are especially strong among the educated classes in Southern China. The leaders among them are the great viceroys, Li Hung Chang and Chang Chi Tung. These men exercise a great moral influence with the mandarins and the Chinese middle classes; and if events had not, by the brutal murder of so many Europeans, come to a desperate pass, they might be relied upon tactfully to mediate between the whole Chinese people and the European Powers, and successfully to guide China into an era of peaceful development.

The third party, at present of little political influence, is the reform party of the unhappy Emperor Kwang Su and his former minister, Kang Yeu Wei. But two years ago this party was in a fair way to arouse among all classes in China a great and abiding enthusiasm for Western learning and industrial progress. They were beginning to utilize the educational system of China for the purpose of introducing new, practical methods in government and industry. Had they at that time been encouraged and upheld by the influence of the Powers, their work might have been successful, and might have bridged the chasm into which China has now fallen. Unhappily, the European Governments and their representatives at Peking did not understand the importance of the movement, and did not offer any aid to the Emperor when he was deposed by the Manchu cabal, and when his chief advisers were sent to execution — martyrs to the regeneration of China.

At present, the masses of the Chinese people are too much excited, too much filled with a fear of all things foreign, to make it possible for a programme of reform to be carried out. A reform minister, even with the support of the European Powers, could count upon but little success, even were the disturbances of the present time allayed. Had events not moved so fast in the direction of a great war, the moderate mandarins, who are fully aware of the serious nature of the crisis, and who enjoy a great amount of influence, might have concentrated their influence in Peking, and protected foreign interests. However, the party actually in power at the capital is intensely re-

actionary, and reveals more and more its sympathy with the riotous opposition to foreign influence; so that the existence of a state of war between the Chinese Government and the governments of Europe, Japan, and the United States can hardly longer be denied. Whether the chance for the regeneration of China, which diplomacy has allowed to pass by, can be regained by the arms of the Powers remains to be seen. At any rate, lack of interest in, and understanding of, the Chinese question, and the absence of tactful treatment of the Chinese Government and people, have led to the present necessity of protecting European rights by force of arms.

The European Powers, of course, have the right and duty to protect their citizens who are at present in danger in the Chinese empire, and to hold the authorities at Peking personally responsible for the acts of the rioters. As a matter of fact, however, they are themselves not entirely free from fault in bringing about the situation. After the Japanese war, they began to look upon China as a helpless colossus, destined to fall a prey to the first comer. They used every injury inflicted upon a member of a European nation as a pretext to extort large grants of railway and mining concessions. France, Germany, and Russia were especially highhanded in forcing their way into China in this manner. Missions were made the means of extending political influence; but as events have shown, and as missionaries are at present declaring, religious work was decidedly injured by this alliance with politics. It certainly cannot be denied that the Powers, by act and deed, indicated their desire to control the destiny of China, and the Chinese, becoming aware of this tendency, naturally felt an impulse to resist this current of foreign influence.

At the present time the Powers are working together. The concert, however, is preserved only by the momentary peril. When all tremble for the safety of their ministers and missionaries their mutual jealousies for the time give way. Should the threatened persons be rescued, or should their fate be definitely sealed, the operations against China could not continue long without involving the Powers in mutual hostilities. These rivalries will make it exceedingly difficult to restore order in China by outside force. As a matter of fact, the Chinese are not so inefficient and cowardly as soldiers as is generally believed. Their behavior during the Japanese war is not a fair test. At that time the Chinese generals were paid for a certain quota of men, whom they were supposed to enroll. They consequently hired the very riff-raff of the streets, whom they could get for the lowest

pay; and, giving them the most rudimentary drill, they led them against the enemy. It is not such soldiers that the European Powers now have to oppose, but an infuriated multitude fighting for their homes and their civilization, which they believe endangered. It is well known that the Chinese would rather suffer death than submit to an infringement of a custom which they consider sacred; and they will stop short at no cruelty and no treachery to defend themselves against the threatened domination of the stranger. When we remember what terror is produced in a settled community by a few dynamiters or tearers-up of rails, it will be clear how little European forces could accomplish if a whole nation of four hundred millions should determine to resist outside influence at all odds. The terrors of the Taping revolution of forty years ago show with what fury the Chinese will fight when they become thoroughly excited.

It must, however, be noted that at this writing the revolt and anarchy have spread only over the two northern provinces — Shantung and Pechili. The south is still quiet, and the mandarins and viceroys in this region are not in sympathy with the riotous reactionaries of Peking. The reform party was especially strong in the south of China. It there took on a specific national character, connected its propaganda with Chinese traditions, and thus excited the suspicion and anger of the Manchu party at Peking. If it is still time for a rational policy to prevail in Chinese affairs among the European Powers, it should be their aim to give all possible aid to the viceroys of the southern region in maintaining order and in resisting the spread of rebellion beyond the northern provinces. On account of the general demoralization of the central Government, more can be accomplished by influencing the local officials than by appealing to the authorities at Peking. It would, however, be essential for the success of such a policy to give assurances to the moderates in China that the conquest and division of the Empire would not be attempted by the Western Powers.

The only policy that seems comparatively without danger at the present time is for the Powers to seize Peking and to restore order in the northern provinces before the conflagration has time to spread farther. Then, by strengthening the moderate party in China, it might be still possible to preserve the old forms and the unity of the Empire, and yet to give it a government which would be open to the influences of civilized nations. Should the uprising spread and become general throughout the Empire, it would be a fearful calamity for

China and for civilization. The total dissolution of government and society would lead to the most terrible suffering and loss of life among the Chinese themselves, who are full of factional hatred and animosities. The woes of anarchy and war would be charged to the original meddling of foreigners; and the seed of bitter hostility to the West and its ideas would be sown throughout China. A pacific fusion of Oriental and Western civilization in China would become impossible, and even if the Western Powers should succeed in the gigantic task of pacifying the raging forces, the smouldering embers of resistance could not be extinguished. The most probable consequence of a failure of the southern viceroys to maintain order would be either the relapse of China into absolute barbarism or the acquisition of sovereignty over it by either of the great Oriental Powers, Russia or Japan. It is a mistake to believe that the Chinese can be governed like the Hindoos. They are of a different fibre; they assimilate their rulers; and only an Oriental Power could exert a permanent mastery over them.

PAUL S. REINSCH.

JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA.

THE "Yellow Peril" is a new name for an old idea; or, to be more precise, it is the epigrammatic expression as positive belief of what has hitherto been advanced merely as hypothetical opinion. The dormant potentialities of China, the possibilities of good or evil to the civilized world from the adoption of an intelligent militant policy by her rulers, are familiar themes. Her immense population and the practically unlimited resources of her vast empire appeal irresistibly to the imagination, and induce forecasts that are like gorgeous day-dreams, but not without many elements of plausibility; for these anticipations of China's future have a solid substratum of fact as a basis.

Says Mr. E. T. Sheppard, who was for years consul of the United States at Tien-Tsin:

"Potentially, China is by far the greatest productive power in the world. Her wealth does not consist of doubtful sources of production, but of immense areas of fertile lands already under cultivation, and suited to every form of agricultural employment. Her known mineral resources are of the most sterling and valuable character, and of inexhaustible extent. The whole empire is accessible by a system of navigable rivers and canals unsurpassed in the world. Her seaboard, which stretches for more than 2,000 miles along her Eastern front, is superior to that of all other Asiatic nations, and abounds in the finest deep-water harbors on the Pacific Ocean."

Given an empire like this, with an industrious and frugal population 400,000,000 in number, and no prophecy of future power can well seem overdrawn, if only it is admitted that the Chinese Government and people are ever likely to realize their opportunities or to endeavor intelligently to utilize them.

In that last hypothesis lies the crux of the whole situation. Those who advocate the theory that the awakening of China's teeming millions to a realization of their dormant strength forbodes the gravest perils to civilization take it for granted that this awakening is inevitable, and that it must, as a matter of course, assume an aggressive form. They hark back to the time when the Tartar hordes threatened to engulf Europe, and picture the rising of some leader with the ambition of a Genghis Khan, who will sweep down upon the civi-

lized world, followed by countless hosts versed in the use of all the appliances of modern warfare. This picture is a gruesome one, and in some quarters is regarded, apparently, as a serious contingency, or, at least, as a possibility which must be taken into account in dealing with the grave questions to which the present crisis in the East has given rise.

For my own part, I should be inclined to pass it by as nothing more than an interesting excursion of fancy, were it not for the fact that in some inscrutable way this foreboding as to the most probable result of the development of China's strength has led to a serious misapprehension with reference to Japan's position. To any one acquainted with the actual relations of the two nations, past and present, an assertion of the possibility of their being joined in common cause against the Western world would seem a fanciful absurdity. Nevertheless, indications are not wanting that the theory has gained credence, or at least a tentative belief, that Japan desires to acquire predominant influence in China, and that her success in the endeavor to do so will give form and substance to the shadow now known as the "Yellow Peril." Nothing could be more inaccurate, or more liable to work mischief at any time, and most of all at this juncture when union and harmony among the Powers concerned with China are so essential to the interests of civilization.

Surmises of this description will never, of course, be dignified by an official disclaimer on the part of Japan; and it should, therefore, be distinctly understood that what is herein said is merely the expression of the writer's personal opinion. With that reservation there need be no hesitation in asserting: first, that everything we know of China and her people tends to prove conclusively that the "Yellow Peril" is a wholly imaginary danger; and, second, that there can never possibly be a community of interest between Japan and China which will, in any wise, threaten Western civilization.

In forecasting the future of Chinese development there can be no safer guide than the past. China has been a field for European and American effort, religious, commercial, and political, for more than half a century. Very many of her people have been brought into more or less intimate contact with Western methods of thought and modes of energy. Her rulers have had abundant opportunities to study and adopt the agencies of modern progress which have made other nations prosperous and powerful. Nothing but the will has been lacking; and even the best informed among those who have made

China a study can only explain this lack by reference to national traits and tendencies, the outgrowth of an ancient civilization distinctly *sui generis*.

Take the Government itself as an example. It is to-day what it has been for centuries, wise and puerile, civilized and barbarous—in theory, the finished product of administrative genius of a high order, in practice oftentimes inept and inefficient. That is, it seems so to the occidental observer. Nevertheless, for a period extending back to the time when Europe was peopled by barbarians and America was unknown, in China the functions of government have been exercised under this system with few or no radical changes. Dynastic upheavals have occurred, and invaders have seized the reins of power, but only to become themselves Chinese, and to perpetuate the ancient system. Although contact with a younger and more virile civilization has revealed the weaknesses of this system, and shown it to be an anachronism, the ideas which underlie it seem to be too closely interwoven with national customs and habits of thought to be uprooted or even materially changed. They give it a vitality which may well excite our wonder. Thirty-four years ago, Dr. Williams, in his time the highest authority on China, expressing the opinion of foreign officials in Peking, said :

“ We find that in practice the Emperor has come generally to depend on his prestige and position for the maintenance of his power, while that has, in a great measure, really passed into the hands of his provincial officers, who are made responsible for the peace of their several districts.”

On the same occasion he declared that this régime, inefficient as it was, ought not, in his opinion, to be overthrown, because the only alternative he could foresee was that the ignorant multitudes of China would become the undisciplined troops of rival chiefs.

Dr. Williams, it should not be forgotten, was a sincere friend of China, and never a harsh critic of its Government or people. It is interesting to note, therefore, that everything he says of the China of his time may be repeated, almost in the same words, of the China of to-day. He understood—no one better—the people among whom he lived for the greater part of his life, and with the highest of whom he came in intimate contact; and yet in nothing he wrote can there be detected the slightest trace of fear that China's millions would ever become a peril to civilization. In his day Chinese secret societies, and the innumerable evils they propagated and spread, were sources of disturbance as fruitful as they are to-day. The missionary

question was as complicated and as troublesome. In a word, the Chinese question, so far as the Chinese themselves were concerned, was in all essential details the identical question which at this very moment confronts us.

Dr. Williams and the observers of his time did not see in these embarrassments, or in any probable phase of China's future career, the threat of anything like a "Yellow Peril." He hoped much for the country if better government and more progressive ideas could ever be introduced, but his hopes contemplated the peaceful development of its resources and its nearer assimilation to Western ideals. So far from anticipating that China would ever be a danger to the civilized world, he thought the case would be the other way, as witness his words in a despatch written to Secretary Seward in 1867—words which, in the light of present events, seem almost prophetic:

"The preservation of the autonomy of the Chinese Empire will be hard enough, amidst all the transforming and conflicting agencies of a mercantile, missionary, and political character now pressing on it."

He believed that these agencies would recommend themselves to the Chinese people as they became better acquainted with them, and he thought he saw ground for the belief in the changes which had taken place in those portions of China which had been brought into closer contact with Western ideas since the signature of the Nankin treaty, in 1842. But in all that he wrote on this subject—and I refer now especially to his official correspondence during the many years he served as United States Chargé d'Affaires at Peking—the thought uppermost in his mind was not that China could ever by any possibility become a danger to the civilized world, but rather that the impact of civilization meant danger to China herself.

There is nothing in what Dr. Williams and other competent observers tell us of the Chinese people themselves which would lead to the belief that military aggrandizement can ever become a dominant object with them. They are a race of people in whom centuries of training in a system of ethics inculcating its principles have implanted a love for peace. As every one knows, the military profession ranks very low in Chinese estimation. Notwithstanding all the efforts which have been made for years past to improve the military organization, the results attained are surprisingly inadequate. The Chinaman makes a good soldier under favorable circumstances; but, in the great majority of instances, it is necessity, and not inclination, that leads him to adopt the profession of arms. There are exceptions, of

course, as, for example, the celebrated "Black Flags" of southern China; but the exceptions only prove the rule.

As has often been pointed out, the greatest aptitude of the Chinese, as a race, is for trade. They understand it, like it, and thrive by it. As merchants they are painstaking and progressive, liberal and enterprising, and withal scrupulously honest and exact. Nor are they petty traders merely, but merchants in the largest sense, quite capable of coping with any whom they may meet. With such a mercantile class, with an industrious and frugal population, and with the resources China possesses, the question of the development of the empire's industries and commerce would be, under ordinary circumstances, infinitely the most important factor in the problem of China's future. Unhappily, circumstances have arisen which bring other factors into consideration and cloud the whole situation. But in fulfilling the imperative duty which the present crisis in China has created, of determining responsibility and administering equal and exact justice, there is nothing which is known of the past of the Chinese nation as a whole, and nothing which can be reasonably anticipated of its future, which would justify the consideration of a chimerical danger like the so-called "Yellow Peril."

To any one familiar with Japan's history during the past three decades, or possessing anything approaching to exact knowledge of the guiding principles of her policy, it seems a work of supererogation to deny that she desires a combination with China hostile to American and European interests. The action of her Government at this juncture, supported by every exponent of intelligent public opinion in the empire, is a practical refutation of this idea. And yet it continually appears above the surface of current talk and comment, sometimes in the most unexpected places. Only a short time ago a British member of Parliament was reported as saying that while he deplored the opportunity for aggression which he thought the Chinese crisis presented to Russia, he feared also the apparently unavoidable alternative of "giving Japan too free a hand in China." Journalists have followed this promising lead, and have regaled the British public with a veritable Hobson's choice, the Russian bear, on the one hand, or the "Yellow Peril," on the other!

Such flights of fancy might be safely left to the refutation of facts, were it not for the mischief their dissemination creates at a time when mutual harmony and good feeling are of so much consequence. Only the overcredulous of those who are too careless to ascertain the truth

can believe that Japan has any feeling regarding China that differs in any degree from that of the United States, for example; and yet intimations that the Japanese people sympathize with China at the present time have appeared in the press of this country. As an instance in point, the following paragraph may be quoted; it was copied from an English newspaper published at Yokohama, and has been widely circulated in the United States:

"Though the most influential organs seem to approve of Japan's coöperation with the Powers in coercing China, the people generally evidently feel no enthusiasm, and are more inclined than ever to sympathize with the Chinese."

There is enough truth in statements of this kind to make them doubly mischievous. Undoubtedly, there is a great deal of sympathy in Japan for the Chinese. It would be regrettable if there were not, because it would argue very poorly for their sense of kindness and right feeling if the Japanese people viewed with satisfaction, or even with indifference, the misfortunes of their ancient neighbor. Japan owed much to China in the past, and her people have always shown their willingness to acknowledge the indebtedness. China, or at least the dominant class of Chinese officialdom, has not invariably displayed equal readiness to maintain cordial relations. But the Government and people of Japan have encountered in this respect precisely the same obstacle to the establishment of complete mutual good understanding that other governments and peoples have met in their intercourse with certain of the ruling classes of China; and they understand, as well as others, that it is not just to judge everything Chinese by the bigoted conservatism which exists among certain people in China, the attitude of whom toward all people and things foreign to their own narrow world is one of thinly veiled arrogance and contempt.

It is this mental attitude that is responsible for the outrages in China which have shocked the civilized world; and to insinuate, as is done in the above paragraph, that the Japanese people, or any number of them worth mentioning, sympathize with it, or with its manifestations, is a libel, to say the least of it. The press of Japan, without a single discordant note from any quarter, hailed the action of their Government in coöperating with the other powers in China as a proper and legitimate exercise of authority necessary in the cause of humanity, and indicative of a due regard for national dignity and honor. Of course, the same differences of opinion are expressed by the Japanese press as by the newspapers of other countries regarding

the ambitions and purposes of this or that foreign government in China, the same surmises and predictions of which that theme has been so fruitful; but with respect to the plain duty of the moment to humanity, and to the cause of civilization, there has been but one opinion, namely, that Japan owed it to herself and to the world to coöperate with the other Powers in obtaining, by all proper means, reparation for the past and reasonable guarantees for the future. As a prominent Japanese journalist justly observed, this unanimity of sentiment "proves in a striking manner the utter groundlessness of the oft-repeated apprehension in Europe and America of Japanese ambition to marshal the yellow forces to the exclusion of the white influence from Eastern Asia."

The treaty of peace concluded between Japan and China in 1895, by its stipulations enlarging the commercial privileges of all the Powers having treaty relations with China, furnishes signal proof of the liberality of Japan's policy. Its three principal features were the cession of territory, the payment of an indemnity, and the grant of new commercial rights. Through the intervention of three European Powers the first stipulation was modified so far as regarded the cession of a portion of the Liaotung peninsula. But even had that portion of the treaty remained unchanged its most notable feature would still have been the enlargement of privileges to foreign commerce granted by China. These were, in brief: (1) the opening of four new "treaty ports" in important districts; (2) the extension of the right to employ steam navigation in vessels carrying passengers and cargo on the upper Yang-tsze and Woo-sung rivers; (3) the right to rent warehouses temporarily in the interior for the storage of goods purchased there or imported; (4) the privilege of freely engaging in every kind of manufacturing industry in all the open cities, towns, and ports of China, together with the liberty of importing all kinds of machinery upon the payment of no more than the stipulated duties; and (5) the extension to articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China, so far as regards taxes and dues of every kind and description, of the same privileges and exemptions enjoyed in respect to merchandise imported into China.

As was stated by Earl Li in a memorandum commenting upon the draft of the treaty proposed by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries during the progress of the negotiations at Shimonoseki, some of these concessions related to questions which had been much discussed with the Diplomatic Corps at Peking and which had been settled against the

privileges asked for. The concessions were included in the final draft of the treaty, however, and thereby were secured not only to Japan, but to every other nation having treaty relations with China; for, as Earl Li also stated, in the memorandum to which I have referred, "If these privileges are granted to Japanese subjects, they must necessarily be extended (by the operation of the favored nation stipulations) to all nations having treaty relations with China."

Thus it appears that Japan, in the latest and most important transactions she has had with China, utilized the advantage her arms gave her to obtain important commercial concessions not for Japanese subjects exclusively, but for the common benefit of all nations interested in the development of commerce with China. It detracts nothing from what the Japanese Government did on that occasion to say that it could not avoid the participation of the other Powers in the concessions thus obtained, but had perforce to accept it as an unavoidable result of Japan's enjoyment of them. The fact remains that Japan obtained from China for all the treaty Powers, as well as for herself, commercial privileges which the Chinese Government had repeatedly refused to yield to the foreign representatives at Peking, the surrender of which it resisted at Shimonoseki, and in lieu of which it would, in all probability, have preferred to make other concessions in which the treaty Powers would not necessarily have participated.

It would be foolish to deny that the Liaotung retrocession, especially in the light of after events, created an unpleasant impression on the public mind in Japan; but it may be safely asserted that it left no indelible scar. Putting other considerations to one side for the moment, attention may be called to the fact that the retention of the peninsula would have imposed a heavy financial burden, with little or no return. Under certain contingencies it might have meant, also, the unavoidable adoption of a policy not consonant with Japan's best interests. In a word, it was a heavy responsibility, which, as subsequent events have shown, bade fair to prove more embarrassing than advantageous. The world understands the circumstances under which the retrocession was made, and it may be reasonably presumed that the knowledge has not injured Japan's prestige. We may go even a step farther and hope that it has strengthened her with those nations which do not desire the partition of China, but are determined to participate in the commercial and industrial advantages that the prospective development of the empire promises to all. The retrocession serves, therefore, to emphasize the fact—a fact undoubtedly fully recognized

by the Japanese Government and people—that Japan's best interests do not lie in the direction of what has been euphemistically termed territorial "exploitation" in China, and, as a natural corollary, that the truest exposition of her policy is to be found in those portions of the Shimonoseki Treaty which provide for peaceful commercial and industrial expansion.

The war of 1894 was the result of complications in Korea, rendered unbearable, after repeated attempts at amelioration on Japan's part, by constantly recurring exhibitions of that species of tortuous diplomacy of which China is preëminently past mistress. The acquisition of territory formed no part of Japan's original design. It was the result of the fortunes of war and not of deliberate initiative. The final result leaves Japan precisely where her friends would wish to have her stand, *vis-à-vis* with China, not land hungry or eager for aggrandizement at the expense of her neighbor, but desirous of the continued expansion of commercial and industrial interests, which near neighborhood and rights justly and lawfully acquired entitle her to expect that other nations will respect. Consequently, her attitude as regards the present crisis in Chinese affairs does not differ in any wise from that of the United States or of the other Powers whose only desire is to protect their people and to safeguard their political and commercial interests.

It is natural, no doubt, but none the less to be regretted, that the present unhappy condition of things should have given renewed prominence to the question of China's partition. But, if we pause for sober reflection, the thought immediately suggests itself that this crisis is the strongest argument that could be possibly adduced against the expediency, if not the justice and honesty, of such action on the part of the Powers. The overthrow of government as at present organized, and the attempt to introduce foreign rule in China, would mean the infinite multiplication of troubles like the present. Think of the cost in life and treasure, and estimate the possible profit. This vast empire, bound by the traditions and conventions of an ancient civilization, is not to be divided as one cuts an orange. The Government may be weak and inefficient, corrupt, what you please; but it cannot be suddenly uprooted without precipitating a national convulsion beside which the existing difficulties would seem insignificant.

It is undoubtedly a fact that the great body of the Chinese people have little or no affection for the dynasty which rules them. Plots against it are apparently widespread; but the one great at-

tempt to overthrow it, the Taiping rebellion, was accompanied by a horrible devastation the scars of which may still be seen. In a social fabric honeycombed as is that of China by secret societies like the Boxers, and permeated by dislike for foreigners and foreign methods, any attempt to supplant the present form of government by foreign rule would undoubtedly be followed by a general conflagration in all parts of the empire which would dwarf even the fearful Taiping episode. It hardly seems possible that the powers would be so oblivious to their real interests, not to mention all humane considerations, as to make the present crisis an excuse for precipitating what would virtually be a state of chaos in China, wherein no power could hope to obtain any material benefit, and which would leave the stain of criminal responsibility upon those who caused it.

The problem of China's future presents great and complicated questions to which no one has yet pretended to give anything like satisfactory answers. The empire may be regenerated by the gradual attrition of contact with foreign methods, especially through the agencies of commerce, for which its people have so great an aptitude, and by progressive tutelage as to the benefits to be derived from the adoption of Western industrial appliances. Or the process of disintegration already to be noted may go on by degrees until China is divided into different states coterminous with racial and geographic lines. But, what is best of all, it may happen that the present crisis itself will furnish a solution, inasmuch as it will give the opportunity for a full and frank exchange of views by all the Powers, which may make it possible to establish a just and reasonable *modus vivendi* for themselves and for China. Therefore, nothing should be more strongly deprecated than hints of incipient jealousies, hostile views, and divergent intentions.

The immediate task is self-evident and imperative. It is the enforcement of reparation for the past, and of such respect for the dictates of humanity and solemn treaty obligations as shall afford security for the future, followed by such a strengthening of the hands of the best elements of legitimate, constituted authority as shall give the most reasonable promise of tranquillity hereafter. In coöperating in the performance of this task, Japan, it may be confidently predicted, will be found acting with those who regard their debt to humanity at this juncture as superior to any consideration of selfish advantage.

D. W. STEVENS.

THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PLATFORMS COMPARED.

PARTY platforms, generally speaking, are a collection of meaningless platitudes, framed to be honored more in the breach than in the observance. They are the adroit expressions of experienced and skillful politicians, who dangle the alluring phrases before the undecided voters, and then care little whether the pledges are ever redeemed. It is only in unusual cases, when the public mind is centred upon some all-important question, that the platform utterances really prove factors in a Presidential campaign. The tariff has, in years past, played such a part, and the exciting struggle of 1896 over the free coinage of silver is too recent to be yet forgotten. In the latter case, especially, the declaration was positive and specific, its purpose not being disguised in a jumble of words.

It is rather interesting to note, also, that while a platform may be as long as the moral law, and include every topic of past, present, and future interest, the American people very quickly focus the struggle upon a very few issues. I scarcely believe that one out of ten readers of THE FORUM can to-day recall one-half the number of subjects included in the Republican and Democratic platforms of 1896, not to speak of the declarations of previous years. The intensity of the American mind, its constant trend toward concentration, could not be more emphatically illustrated than in this elimination of all subsidiary topics and the filling of the political horizon with one object. When the tariff was the all-engrossing theme, people read, listened, and studied as if there was naught else in the world. The campaign of education on the silver question was one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of the United States.

Thus we find to-day that, despite many apparently important issues, the campaign simmers down to one or two, possibly three, really vital and engrossing questions. There are some pessimistic people who insist that even these can be reduced to the simple matter of being "for" or "against" the Government. Literally this is

true; for the Government is the administration in power, and the final question is, Shall the record of the Government be approved or disapproved? In fact, it seems now to be the purpose of the Republican managers to bring this question of endorsement into prominence. "Are you for McKinley or are you against him, and why?" are the inquiries addressed to the voters. The answer, of course, involves a discussion of all the issues which have been raised since he became President. Meanwhile, the platform, with its multiplicity of declarations, is lost sight of, and one wonders why it was prepared. Indeed, few planks need to have been included in it. Three planks, relating respectively to the foreign policy of the Government, to trusts, and to the currency, defining the position of each party, would have sufficed. All other issues will be subordinated by the people, and any orator upon the stump who ignores this trio of important topics, and seeks to interest his auditors in minor matters, will either have to return quickly from his diversion, or else will find himself deserted by the impatient crowd.

This being the case, it is worth while to analyze the position assumed by the Republican and Democratic parties in the platforms recently adopted at the Philadelphia and Kansas City conventions. The Democrats sound their keynote in a single sentence, as follows:

"The burning issue of imperialism, growing out of the Spanish war, involves the very existence of the republic and the destruction of our free institutions, and we regard it as the paramount issue of the campaign."

And as if still further to emphasize the paramount nature of imperialism as an issue, nearly one-third of the platform is devoted to a discussion of the Philippine policy. For purposes of comparison I shall place the Republican and Democratic utterances side by side:

"REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.

"In accepting, by the treaty of Paris, the just responsibility of our victories in the Spanish war, the President and the Senate won the undoubted approval of the American people. No other course was possible than to destroy Spain's sovereignty throughout the West Indies and in the Philippine Islands. That course created our responsibility before the world, and with the unorganized population whom our intervention had freed from Spain, to provide for the maintenance of law and order, and for the establishment of good government, and for the performance of international obligations. Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued peoples. The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law. To Cuba independence and self-government were assured in the same voice by which war was declared, and to the letter this pledge shall be performed."

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.

"We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present administration. It has involved the republic in unnecessary war, sacrificing the lives of many of our noblest sons, and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing with military force the efforts of former allies to achieve liberty and self-government. The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperilling our form of government, and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization or to convert the republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation: First, of a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference, such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.

"The greedy commercialism which dictated the Philippine policy of the Republican administration attempts to justify it with the plea that it will pay, but even the sordid and unworthy plea fails when brought to the test of facts. The war of criminal aggression against the Filipinos, entailing an annual expense of many millions, has already cost more than any possible profit that could accrue from the entire Philippine trade for years to come. Furthermore, when trade is extended at the expense of liberty, the price is always too high.

"We are not opposed to territorial expansion when it takes in desirable territory, which can be erected into States in the Union, and whose people are willing and fit to become American citizens. We favor expansion by every peaceful and legitimate means. But we are unalterably opposed to the seizing or purchasing of different islands to be governed outside the Constitution, and whose people can never become citizens.

"We are in favor of extending the republic's influence among the nations, but believe that influence should be extended not by force and violence, but through the persuasive power of a high and honorable example."

The points of difference between the two parties are here very clearly defined. The Democrats say that the present situation in the Philippines is the result of a "war of criminal aggression against the Filipinos"; the Republicans assert that it is simply the exercise of rightful authority in suppressing an "armed insurrection."

Which is right? This is one of the questions which the people must decide for themselves next November. There is no lack of literature on the subject. The preliminary debate occupied many hours of the last session of Congress, especially in the Senate, which, after all, has usurped the position formerly enjoyed by the House of Representatives—of being a great forum for popular discussion. Much was said on both sides, but no conclusive word was spoken, and each individual voter, if he proposes to have his judgment and his ballot depend upon the justice or injustice of the present war in the Philippines, must study the question for himself. If he is led to believe that the Filipinos were our allies and were promised independence; that the first shot which started the "insurrection" was fired from the American lines without provocation; and that the Filipinos are now battling for that liberty which led our forefathers to lay down their lives on Bunker Hill, then he will regard the Democratic platform as a true state-

ment of the case. If, on the other hand, he is convinced that the Filipinos wantonly attacked our soldiers, and that the aggressive operations against them are necessary for the United States to maintain her authority, he will accept the declaration of the Republicans and be content. It is not, however, the province of this article to present the testimony offered on both sides, the substance of which forms the basis for the platform utterances.

The Democratic platform not only asserts that imperialism is the paramount issue; but it defines imperialism as being "the seizing or purchasing of distant islands, to be governed outside of the Constitution, and whose people can never become citizens." There is, in my opinion, no question of the accuracy of this definition. A republic is composed of free and equal citizens, enjoying the largest amount of individual liberty consistent with the welfare of society, and exercising absolute authority in the matter of government. In an empire the ruler is forced upon the people. The Democrats claim that we have placed the Filipinos in this position, and that even in the case of Porto Rico, where the authority of the United States was not disputed, the Republican majority in Congress declined to allow the people the privilege of living under the Constitution of the United States.

Curiously enough, the Republican platform is silent upon this question of tariff legislation for Porto Rico. The omission carries with it the confession that the action of Congress was either indefensible or discreditable. It would seem as if the Republican party ought to have had the courage to endorse its own action. From my knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the platform, I might add, parenthetically, that I take no stock in the assertion that the omission was accidental.

It seems to me, viewing both platforms as a judge would consider briefs filed in court, that the Democratic deliverance presents the strongest case. True, it is *ex parte* in the highest degree; but the fact remains that, upon its face, the Democratic indictment is much more complete and logical than the Republican demurrer. We find in the former not only a denunciation of imperialism, with an adequate definition of the term, but also a specific assertion of policy for the future. One may not agree with the solution that is offered; but that is, after all, a matter of opinion. The platform asserts that the Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization, and cannot be subjects without imperilling our form of government; there-

fore, the Democrats would give them a stable form of government and their independence under a protectorate.

The Republicans, on the other hand, deal in glittering generalities. They propose to confer upon the Filipinos "the blessings of liberty and civilization," and to secure them "the largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties." These are large-sounding words, but they are elusive. Who is to determine how large a measure of self-government is consistent with their welfare and our duties? On this point the platform is silent. When is this determination to be reached? Again we are left to wander in a maze of indefinite language. In fact, if the policy of the Republican party is to be learned at all, it must be found, not in the declaration of the National Convention, but in the utterances of President McKinley and other recognized leaders. Compared with some of these expressions, the platform itself seems sadly lacking in emphasis and definite purpose.

It is a rather curious fact that nowhere in the Republican platform does the word "expansion" occur. There is no self-glorification over the acquisition of large areas of territory, no attractive word-painting of the value of such new possessions. The Democrats, on the other hand, discuss expansion, and draw a distinction between territory acquired by every peaceful and legitimate means for purposes of Statehood and additional citizenship and the possession of distant, dependent colonies. Here again we see the superiority of the Democratic platform, considered merely as the presentation of one side of the case, over the document to which formal sanction was given by the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention. It may be that the Republicans considered expansion a fact accomplished, but by the same reasoning they should have ignored the gold standard law.

In fact, the more one considers the two platforms, the more marked does the contrast between them become. The Republican declaration consists of an infinite number of brief paragraphs, which scatter like bird shot discharged from a gun. Its very multiplicity of subjects, ranging from good roads to the loyal devotion of women nurses during the Spanish war, mars its effectiveness. The vast amount of ground which it covers tends to weaken it, both force and earnestness being totally lacking. The Democratic platform is like a thirteen-inch shell, all the ammunition being practically concentrated in one charge. If this single issue of Imperialism, upon which the Democrats have entered the campaign, proves to be as powerful in arousing opposi-

tion and criticism as the Democrats anticipate, great will be their victory. If it misses the mark, there is no chance of striking the target of the Presidency with scattering shot.

It is also a notable fact that the strenuous efforts made by the Republican party, at the last session of Congress, to secure a larger standing army, find no words of approval in the Republican platform. Again, therefore, we find the document more interesting for what it does not say than for its actual declarations. In view of the very large German vote and its alleged hostility to any increase in the military establishment, one can readily understand why the platform ignored this important subject.

Without commenting on this silence, the Democrats take their stand very vigorously against the proposed increase. Their position is admirably stated in the following extract from their platform:

"We oppose militarism. It means conquest abroad and intimidation and oppression at home. It means the strong arm which has ever been fatal to free institutions. It is what millions of our citizens have fled from in Europe. It will impose upon our peace-loving people a large standing army and unnecessary burden of taxation, and a constant menace to their liberties. A small standing army and a well-disciplined State militia are amply sufficient in time of peace. This republic has no place for a vast military service and conscription. When the nation is in danger, the volunteer soldier is his country's best defender. The National Guard of the United States should ever be cherished in the patriotic hearts of a free people. Such organizations are ever an element of strength and safety. For the first time in our history, and coeval with the Philippine conquest, has there been a wholesale departure from our time-honored and approved system of volunteer organization. We denounce it as un-American, undemocratic, and unrepblican, and as a subversion of the ancient and fixed principles of a free people."

Some allowance must, of course, be made for the fact that it is easier to criticise than to praise; that denunciation can be more emphatically expressed than commendation. But even when we take this allowance into consideration, it is not difficult to see that the Republicans have not made the most of their opportunities. It is fortunate for them that the Presidential campaign will not be decided upon the issues as they are presented in the two platforms.

As with imperialism and militarism, so with trusts. Here again we find the Democratic platform detailed and specific, the Republican platform brief and general. Let me place the two declarations side by side:

"REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.

"We recognize the necessity and propriety of the honest co-operation of capital to meet new business conditions, and especially to extend our rapidly increasing foreign trade, but we condemn all conspiracies and combinations intended to restrict business, to create monopolies, to limit production, or to control prices, and favor such legislation as will effectively restrain

and prevent all such abuses, protect and promote competition, and secure the rights of producers, laborers, and all who are engaged in industry and commerce."

"DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.

"Private monopolies are indefensible and intolerable. They destroy competition, control the price of all material, and of the finished product, thus robbing both producer and consumer. They lessen the employment of labor and arbitrarily fix the terms and conditions thereof and deprive individual energy and small capital of their opportunity for betterment. They are the most efficient means yet devised for appropriating the fruits of industry to the benefit of the few at the expense of the many, and unless their unsatiated greed is checked, all wealth will be aggregated in a few hands and the republic destroyed. The dishonest paltering with the trust evil by the Republican party in State and National platforms is conclusive proof of the truth of the charge that trusts are legitimate products of Republican policies; that they are fostered by Republican laws, and that they are protected by the Republican administration in return for campaign subscriptions and political support.

"We pledge the Democratic party to an unceasing warfare in nation, State, and city against private monopoly in every form. Existing laws against trusts must be enforced, and more stringent ones must be enacted providing for publicity as to the affairs of corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and requiring all corporations to show, before doing business outside of the State of their origin, that they have no water in their stock, and that they have not attempted and are not attempting to monopolize any branch of business or the production of any articles of merchandise, and the whole constitutional power of Congress over interstate commerce, the mails, and all modes of interstate communication shall be exercised by an enactment of comprehensive laws upon the subject of trusts. Tariff laws should be amended by putting the products of trusts upon the free list to prevent monopoly under the plea of protection.

"The failure of the Republican administration, with an absolute control over all the branches of the national Government, to enact any legislation designed to prevent or even curtail the absorbing power of trusts and illegal combinations, or to enforce the anti-trust laws already on the statute books, proves the insincerity of the high-sounding phrases of the Republican platform.

"Corporations should be protected in all their rights and their legitimate interests should be respected, but any attempt by corporations to interfere with the public affairs of the people or to control the sovereignty which creates them should be forbidden under such penalties as will make such attempts impossible.

"We condemn the Dingley tariff as a trust-breeding measure, skilfully devised to give the few favors which they do not deserve and to place upon the many burdens which they should not bear."

What does the Democratic party do? It pledges itself to an unceasing warfare against private monopoly in every form; to enforce existing laws, and to enact more stringent ones requiring publicity; to amend the tariff laws by placing products of a trust on the free list; and to deal severely with corporations which attempt to influence legislation or public affairs. In the Democratic platform, therefore, we find trusts not only severely denounced, but a remedy for the evil suggested. It may not be the proper remedy, but it is, at least, offered to the voter in a straightforward manner.

The Republican platform, on the other hand, indulges in a wholesale condemnation, and "favors such legislation as will effectively re-

strain and prevent all such abuses, protect and promote competition, and secure the rights of producers, laborers, and all who are engaged in industry and commerce." It is almost impossible to consider this assertion in serious spirit. Judging from the record of the past, the Republican party favors nothing of the kind, or, at least, its leaders do not. Certain it is that under Republican administration the laws against trusts have not been enforced; and the attempt made in the House of Representatives, during the last session of Congress, to pass a constitutional amendment was simply a transparent humbug. The Republican party may suffer innocently from a bad name, but I do not believe that one voter in ten in the United States honestly thinks that, if continued in power, it will wage successful warfare upon the trusts. It is possible that the Democratic party, if installed next March, will be equally reluctant to show a hostile hand. This is not a question now in dispute. The point which I desire to emphasize is that the Republican platform declaration, considered in the light of the record of the party, is of no value whatever.

Having shown the vital issues upon which the platforms disagree, and having analyzed the character of the differences, let me now point out the particulars in which they are identical. Both endorse the irrigation of arid land, which is a local issue in the doubtful State of Wyoming. Both throw a sop to the old soldiers, as well as the new ones, by endorsing a liberal pension policy; this being cheap demagoguery, with its purpose not even thinly disguised. Both favor the construction of an inter-oceanic canal; the Republicans deftly using the word "isthmian," and the Democrats committing themselves to the Nicaragua route.

In this case, as in the declaration for Statehood for the Territories, one cannot help remembering that the Republican party, after being in absolute control of the executive and legislative branches of the Government for four years, has failed in its opportunity to enact laws covering both these subjects; so that its assurances for the future cannot be accepted with the most sanguine spirit. It is well known that Arizona and New Mexico are too Democratic in their inclinations to expect Statehood at the hands of any Republican administration. In the same way, the declaration regarding the inter-oceanic canal must be considered in its relation to past events. Senator Hanna, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and leader of the party, voted against a favorable report on the Nicaragua Canal Bill in committee; and consideration of the measure in the Senate was prevented.

by the votes of the Republican majority. There never was an hour in the Senate, at its last session, when it would not have been possible to pass the Nicaragua Canal Bill, if Senator Hanna and his Republican colleagues had lowered their bars of opposition. I will not undertake to suggest why the Republican party should have thus placed itself in antagonism to an enterprise universally supported by the people of the United States. I only desire to point out that platform declarations do not always stand the test of analysis and of comparison with facts.

Upon minor issues, the Republican platform demands protection to American labor, urges restriction of immigration, appeals for the development of the merchant marine — which means a subsidy of at least \$9,000,000 a year to a special class — commends civil service reform, denounces negro disfranchisement in Southern States, commends extension of the free rural delivery system, and promises reduction of the war taxes. Upon all of these subjects the Democratic platform is silent. On the other hand, the Democrats suggest amendment of the interstate commerce law, endorse the election of senators by the people, oppose government by injunction, ask for a Department of Labor, and suggest a more rigid enforcement of the Chinese exclusion law; all these subjects being ignored by the Republicans. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether these omissions, by one party or the other, will have any effect upon the voters. The outcome of the campaign will be determined by graver issues than those just cited.

Four years ago, the Republicans, after a struggle of no mean interest, inserted the word "gold" in the financial plank of their platform at St. Louis, but emphasized the tariff issue, intending to make their fight upon the latter, Mr. McKinley being the embodiment of the protection idea, and the country having just emerged from the dark shadow of a panic caused by the disastrous effect of a low-tariff law upon manufacturing industries. But, to paraphrase a familiar quotation, "Politicians propose, and the people dispose"; so that, in the middle of the campaign, the Republicans were forced to drop the tariff and make their fight upon the money question. In 1896, the question whether the United States should adopt the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, without the aid or consent of any other nation on earth, was uppermost. It was determined in the negative, and the adverse decision was later clinched by the enactment of a law which recognized gold as the only legal standard.

Under these circumstances, we find the Republican party in 1900

declaring positive and unqualified allegiance to the gold standard. In 1896, the mention of gold in the platform was assented to with much misgiving, and even Mr. McKinley, in his speech of acceptance, hesitated at taking what seemed to be a dangerous plunge into the icy waters of monometallism. In 1900, the Republican party, irretrievably committed to the single gold standard, declares as follow :

" We renew our allegiance to the principle of the gold standard, and declare our confidence in the wisdom of the legislation of the Fifty-sixth Congress, by which the parity of all our money and the stability of our currency upon a gold basis has been secured. We recognize that interest rates are a potent factor in production and business activity, and for the purpose of further equalizing and of further lowering the rates of interest we favor such monetary legislation as will enable the varying needs of the season and all sections to be promptly met, in order that trade may be evenly sustained, labor steadily employed, and commerce enlarged. The volume of money in circulation was never so great per capita as it is to-day. We declare our steadfast opposition to the free and unlimited coinage of silver. No measure to that end could be considered which was without the support of the leading commercial countries of the world. However firmly Republican legislation may seem to have secured the country against the peril of base and discredited currency, the election of a Democratic President could not fail to impair the country's credit and to bring once more into question the intention of the American people to maintain upon the gold standard the parity of their money circulation. The Democratic party must be convinced that the American people will never tolerate the Chicago platform."

No hint here of bimetallism ; no promise to seek the coöperation of foreign powers ; no expression of the slightest friendliness toward silver ; no desire to propitiate, even in remote degree, the great mass of voters who honestly believe in a bimetallic standard. Very different is this attitude from that assumed in 1896, and very courageous, also. It is a plain notification that no bimetalists are wanted in the Republican party ; and it has some importance in view of the fact that large numbers of Republican voters who believed, in 1896, that their platform pledges of bimetallism would be redeemed may vote this year against the party that gave them gold monometallism instead, which enlarged the powers and privileges of the national banks, and which promises to add in the future to the money-making opportunities of these institutions.

Defeated on the money issue in 1896, the Democrats had the choice this year of either ignoring or evading it, or of boldly reiterating the declaration upon which they staked all and lost four years ago. Mr. Bryan chose the latter. I say Mr. Bryan, because upon him alone must the responsibility for the action rest. The sentiment of 600 out of the 900 delegates in the Kansas City convention was against it. They believed that the adverse judgment which had been rendered by a majority of the country had settled the question of the advisability

of the free coinage of silver, and they did not want to inject into a campaign which promised victory an issue which would invite defeat. Mr. Bryan, however, willed otherwise, and to his dominating judgment the delegates obediently bowed. It can be said for Mr. Bryan that no other course was open to him. Free coinage of silver had been his shibboleth. To have abandoned it would have been a confession of weakness, an exhibition of political expediency entirely foreign to his nature.

At the same time, we find in the financial plank which he dictated a suggestion of bimetallism, the purpose of which is plainly evident. It is noticeable, also, that this plank is injected into the platform most inconspicuously. It reads as follows:

"We reaffirm and endorse the principles of the national Democratic platform adopted at Chicago in 1896, and we reiterate the demand of that platform for an American financial system made by the American people for themselves, which shall restore and maintain a bimetallic price level, and as part of such system the immediate restoration of the free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation."

The Republicans already signify their intention of emphasizing this 16 to 1 declaration, and hope by this means to frighten back into the Republican party any voter who may have contemplated departure therefrom. Whether they will be able thus to make substance out of shadow is a doubtful question. The great mass of the people must realize that any repeal or even modification of the gold-standard law is impossible until the present anti-silver majority in the Senate is converted into a minority, and this is not likely to occur for some years to come. It would be difficult, also, to secure a House of Representatives with a majority for the free coinage of silver. Under these circumstances, it seems almost impossible to infuse life into the currency question. However, with corporate interests, and with individual representatives of allied capital, the fear of silver coinage will be ever present, and they will aid neither by contribution nor vote the candidate who stands upon the silver platform.

It is worth remembering, also, that these corporations and individual capitalists would not have succored Bryan, no matter whether the platform contained a specific declaration for free coinage, or was wholly silent. To them, Bryan is committed by every possible pledge to the cause of silver. Their eyes are fastened upon him, and not upon the platform of his party.

At the same time, the financial planks of the two platforms stand

for something entirely apart — the Republican, for the unadulterated gold standard; the Democratic, for an alleged bimetallism based upon the free and unlimited coinage of silver. To this extent the money issue is much more sharply defined than it was in 1896, when both parties were pledged to bimetallism, although promising to secure that result by different paths. The platforms of 1900 are not to be misinterpreted. There can be no room for doubt. There is no disguising of purpose. The Republicans have taken an advanced radical stand, the wisdom of which seems justified by a prosperity which, while it may be only temporary, is at least very real while it lasts.

Mention of prosperity leads me to the discussion of a point favoring the Republican campaign which, after all, stands beyond mere pre-election promises, namely, the remarkable prosperity accompanying the present Republican administration. The Republican platform very properly begins with a glowing eulogy of the general and abundant good times. I took occasion to point out in *THE FORUM*, as long ago as last May, that if the Republicans crossed to victory this fall, prosperity would be their one ample, indestructible bridge. That I reflected the views of the Republican managers is shown by the fact that they make prosperity the keynote of their platform. There is no doubt that the development of trade, with its consequent employment of labor, during President McKinley's administration, would afford, even if there were no other reasons, a strong and possibly effective argument for his reelection.

I do not care, and neither does the country care, whether or not this great revival of industry was due to causes over which the Republican party in general, and President McKinley in particular, had no control. That is not the question. The great mass of the people do not analyze. They simply know that whereas once they were blind, now they see; that whereas they were sick, now they are well. To them this happy change occurred under McKinley's administration, and they are disposed to give him the credit for it, just as they would have charged him with being responsible for all the ills of bad times, if such affliction had befallen them during his administration. Consequently, the right of the Republican party to take credit to itself for what may simply have been good fortune cannot be questioned.

In the midst of all the perplexing problems which have arisen, and which are a long distance from solution, prosperity is the one incontestable fact. It appeals to every citizen, requiring no argument, admitting of no dispute. It stands in direct contrast to the dark days

of the last Democratic administration, and it is not surprising that the Democratic platform does not refer to it, even in indirect fashion.

In somewhat the same spirit the Republicans indulge in self-laudation over the successful conclusion of the war with Spain. "It was a war," says the platform, "unsought and patiently resisted, but when it came the American Government was ready. Its fleets were cleared for action, its armies were in the field, and the quick and signal triumph of its forces on land and sea bore equal tribute to the courage of American soldiers and sailors and to the skill and foresight of Republican statesmanship." As a matter of fact, it was the persistent urging of the minority in Congress which finally brought the administration to the point of declaring that Cuba must be free and independent, and thus made war inevitable. "The skill and foresight of Republican statesmanship" had nothing whatever to do with the signal triumph of the land and naval forces; while the unanimity with which all parties cheerfully voted the \$50,000,000 emergency fund and upheld the hands of the President removed the war from the plane of partisan politics. It is safe to say that under a Democratic administration there would have been exhibited the same patriotic courage of soldiers and sailors, and the results achieved would have been just as glorious. On the other hand, we find in the Democratic platform a condemnation of "the ill-concealed Republican alliance with England." As a matter of fact, this is pure nonsense. There is no ground for charging the administration with any alliance, concealed or open, with Great Britain. All this is very cheap politics on both sides.

There is equally slight ground for arraigning the administration, as the Democrats do, for its failure to speak a word of sympathy for the Boers. The President, as the Republican platform accurately states, "tendered his friendly offices in the interest of peace between Great Britain and the South African Republic." This was all that could be done under The Hague treaty, which pledges our non-intervention in European politics, in return for which the Monroe Doctrine has been formally recognized, and will be respected by every European court. The silence maintained by the Republican majority in Congress concerning the struggles of the Boers is, however, by the Democrats made a political issue. There is absolutely no reason why it should be injected into the campaign.

HENRY LITCHFIELD WEST.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1900 FROM A DEMOCRATIC POINT OF VIEW.

THE purposes of this article are: (1) to define the position of the Democratic party on the leading issues of the campaign; (2) to consider what would be the probable effect on each issue in the event of the success of the one party or the other; and (3) to venture a forecast as to the result of the election.

By leading issues is meant those issues which are most conspicuous, which will attract the most attention, and which will be the most generally discussed. In this class it is safe to say that there are but three. These are what are usually called the money question, the trust question, and imperialism. Other questions will, of course, claim more or less attention, in a minor degree; but the battle of this year will be fought out around the three principal issues stated, and the result will depend upon the final judgment of the people upon those issues, singly and as a whole.

Taking these issues, then, in the order stated, let us first ascertain the exact difference between the two parties upon the money question. In its last national platform (1900), the Republican party declared in favor of the single gold standard, by which is meant that in this country we shall use gold alone as primary money, making all other forms of money subsidiary or subordinate to gold, and, for the most part, redeemable in it. As against that policy the Democratic party declared in favor of the free coinage and use of both silver and gold as primary money, at the legal ratio of 16 to 1, and this without waiting for the aid of any other nation. Both parties favor the use of gold as standard money. The free use of that metal, therefore, is not involved in this issue between the parties. But the Democratic party goes further, and favors the use of silver, also, on equal terms with gold, as standard money, at a precise ratio to be fixed by law. The present legal ratio is 16 to 1, and has been for over eighty years, and the Democratic party favors the reopening of our mints to the coinage of both metals at that ratio. The ratio,

however, is of minor importance, is, indeed, but an incident to the main question. The main question is that both metals shall be freely coined into standard money; the ratio of coinage being of secondary consequence. If both metals are coined, a ratio is of course necessary, but what it should be must depend upon circumstances.

Ratio is not necessarily an immutable quantity. It has been changed, and can be changed again, if need be. Republicans say that if we coin silver and gold at the ratio of 16 to 1, the silver dollar will be worth less than the gold dollar, will have a smaller purchasing power, and that, in consequence, we shall have two measures of different values. They say, also, that silver, coined at that ratio, being a cheaper money, would drive gold out of circulation; that it would disturb our exchanges and make commerce with foreign nations difficult; and that it would be dishonest to creditors, since it would compel them to take less than had been promised to them. But while the Republicans make these special pleas against the particular ratio mentioned, they are in fact opposed to the free coinage of silver at any ratio. The fundamental objection made to the ratio of 16 to 1 is that the bullion value of the silver dollar would be only about one-half the bullion value of the gold dollar; and, therefore, it is said, that the intrinsic value of the two dollars would be so radically different that parity between them could not be maintained. But if parity between them could be maintained, that is to say, if the gold dollar and the silver dollar could be made to have the same, or substantially the same, intrinsic value and purchasing power, then they would be interchangeable, and the evils apprehended from coining both, whether real or imaginary, would disappear. If this parity or equality of value cannot be maintained at the ratio of 16 to 1, then it certainly can be at some other ratio.

Now, we Democrats believe in sound money, in parity, in equality in the purchasing power of dollars, and all that, as much as anybody believes in them. If any person, or party, who really desires bimetallism believes that the ratio of 16 to 1 is not a correct ratio, we are ready to discuss that minor phase of the question with a view to reaching an agreement. But we cannot discuss that subject with gold-standard Republicans, for the reason that they are opposed, as above stated, to the free coinage of silver at any ratio. In other words, they are opposed to bimetallism. Upon the coinage question, therefore, the difference between the two parties is fundamental. The Democratic party stands for bimetallism, while the Republican

party stands for monometallism; and, concisely stated, that is the real difference between the two.

Up to 1896 both parties professed to favor bimetallism; both pretended to believe that the general welfare would be best promoted by the impartial use of both metals. In 1888 the Republican party, and Mr. McKinley personally, even went so far as to criticise Mr. Cleveland for his unfriendliness to silver. In 1896, for the first time, the Republicans declared in effect that the United States could not, unaided and alone, successfully maintain bimetallism, and then declared in favor of the single gold standard until international bimetallism could be secured, at the same time pledging themselves to exhaust every effort to bring about an international agreement.

After the election, a pretence was actually made of carrying out that pledge. A Commission was appointed by the President and sent abroad to open up the subject with European Powers. But it was only a pretence; for hardly had the Commission reached Europe, when the Secretary of the Treasury declared in a public speech that this country was committed, as a matter of interest and of choice, to the gold standard, and would not depart from it. This speech was cabled to all the European capitals, and, of course, blocked the way to any successful negotiation. Since then the Republicans have thrown off all disguise. They have come out unqualifiedly for the gold standard, and, both by legislation and executive action, have done everything they could to commit the country irretrievably to that policy. But, while the Republicans have now come to this extreme point, the significant fact remains that, as a party, they advocated bimetallism until after McKinley's election. If, then, bimetallism is a bad thing in Republican estimation, it has become so within the last three years, unless they are willing to admit that for years before they were trying to deceive the people, being afraid to show their hand, by pretending to believe what they did not believe.

Democrats still believe in the quantitative theory of money. They believe that the value of property, and of wages, is largely dependent upon the value of money in existence and available; or, stating it differently, they believe that the purchasing power of money depends to a great extent upon the quantity of money — the purchasing power being greatest when the quantity is the smallest, and *vice versa* — and that the debt-paying power of property is correspondingly affected by the same cause. They believe that an inadequate supply of money is advantageous only to those who hold interest-bearing securities, or

have fixed incomes, and this because it enhances the value of their possessions; but they believe also that an inadequate supply is always injurious to the great body of the people, and to the country at large. If, for any reason, money is scarce, business stagnates, enterprise falters, property values fall. In 1896, and for some time before and after, the business situation was extremely bad, due in large measure to an inadequate supply of money. The phenomenal gold discoveries since made have added enormously to the world's money supply; more, indeed, than had been previously added from year to year by the use of both metals. This increase, most welcome, although unexpected, has resulted in a substantial improvement in business conditions, and that proves the Democratic position true — that prosperity is greatest when the volume of standard money most nearly meets the demand and the need of the *whole* country and the world. It is upon these conceptions that the contention of the Democratic party for bimetallism is chiefly predicated.

Now, what would be the effect of Mr. McKinley's election upon this question, and what the effect of Mr. Bryan's election? If Mr. McKinley should be elected, it is safe to say that, so far as the single question of silver coinage is concerned, nothing would be done during his term. The gold people have got about all they want in that particular, and they would be content to leave the coinage question as it is. No doubt they would strive to procure, and probably would procure, the passage of additional currency legislation — retiring the greenbacks, for instance, and conferring greater privileges upon national banks; but the coinage situation would probably remain undisturbed.

Practically the same effect as to the coinage would follow in the event of Mr. Bryan's election. The Senate, by a large majority, is pronouncedly committed to the gold standard, and there is not one chance in fifty that any legislation favorable to silver coinage could be enacted during Mr. Bryan's term. The effect on silver coinage, therefore, during the ensuing Presidential term, would be practically the same whether Mr. Bryan or Mr. McKinley should be elected. There would be an important difference in effect, however, as relates to other phases of the money question. If Mr. Bryan should be elected the greenbacks would not be retired, and the national banks would cease forthwith to exercise sovereignty over the financial affairs of the people. And even as to the coinage question, silver would have its friends, instead of its enemies, in power — friends who would strive intelligently and conscientiously to restore it to its old place in the

confidence and affairs of the business world, both in America and Europe. However, while the principle of bimetallism is as important as ever, events transpiring since 1896 make it, as a practical question, of less immediate consequence in this campaign than it was in the last.

Second, the trust question. The trust is a recent invention. Formerly there were pools and combinations of divers descriptions, and they still exist to a greater or less extent; but the trust, so-called, is the latest industrial device of that character. It is also the most formidable contrivance of that character yet conceived, the most intricate, the most elusive, and the most dangerous. Pools and like combinations, entered into between separate corporations, can be easily attacked and broken up when they are formed in violation of law; but the trust is organized to avoid attack by pretending to get rid of the idea of a combination. It is made by organizing a corporation, distinct and separate, and then, by some hocus-pocus, obtaining ownership of the properties of other corporations. Instead of several corporations combining, each retaining its own corporate existence and activity, the trust is formed by the several corporations who enter it practically dissolving after merging their business and possessions into the trust corporation. But the purpose of the trust, like that of the simpler organizations out of which it grew, is monopoly. Its purpose is to restrict and, if possible, to destroy competition, and to establish monopoly. The trust corporations are fast acquiring control of all the important industries of the country. Competition is being driven from the field, and the era of the trust is upon us. Of the bad effect, in a practical way, of industrial monopoly on the public welfare, it is not the purpose of this article to treat; nor is it necessary, since they are so well and generally known. It may be said, however, that monopoly has been odious to the common law for a thousand years; jurists and publicists, almost without exception, have denounced it as against a wise and beneficent public policy; and drastic statutes have been enacted against it by parliaments, congresses, and legislatures. Still, the trusts multiply and monopoly grows apace.

What to do with the trusts has become one of the leading questions of this campaign. Both parties profess to be opposed to them; the platforms of both parties treat them as a public evil; and both promise to provide some remedy for the evil. In this state of the case, what would be the probable difference in effect upon this question, if any, by the election of one candidate or the other? A remedy can be proposed either to regulate the trusts or to destroy them.

Would Mr. McKinley attempt the more radical measure? The Republican platform offers no specific suggestions as to remedy; it is vague and general in its terms. Senator Hanna has said that trusts are a natural evolution of modern commerce, and that they have come to stay; and Senator Hanna ordinarily speaks for the Republican party. Attempted regulation of some indefinite character, therefore, would be the best that could be expected in the event of Mr. McKinley's reelection. Whether that attempt even would be made is more than doubtful; for, after nearly four years of opportunity, with trusts multiplying every day, no such attempt has been made by the President. And even if it should be made, considering the fact that the trusts are the largest contributors to the Republican campaign funds, it is questionable whether the Republican party would regulate the trusts, or whether the trusts would regulate the Republican party. He is an ungrateful man who smites the hand that succors him.

Mr. Bryan would undoubtedly attempt to extirpate and eradicate the trusts. There is not a trust magnate in America who does not believe that. Can that be done, if the whole power of the Government should be used to accomplish it? Why not? The Democratic platform proposes a means of defining trusts, and points out some specific remedies against them, which, if enforced, would make them unprofitable and impossible. But, if only the milder method of regulating them should be attempted, whose hands could be the better trusted to put a stiff bit on and hold the reins most firmly — McKinley's or Bryan's? The practical difference in the effect of electing the one candidate or the other would be this: If Mr. McKinley should be elected, the trust question would sink into "innocuous desuetude," while trusts themselves would continue to flourish; while if Mr. Bryan should be elected, the question would remain a vital question, and the trust evil would probably disappear.

Third, as to imperialism. What is imperialism, in the sense in which the term is currently used? By the treaty of Paris, made at the end of the Spanish war, Spain ceded to the United States her claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Philippine Islands. Of what honest value this Spanish claim of sovereignty was, under the circumstances, is a doubtful thing; but whatever claim she had, good or bad, Spain ceded to the United States. What shall be done with the islands now? is the question. The policy of the McKinley administration, which has been endorsed by the Republican party, is to hold the islands as a permanent part of our domain, but without

giving to them the ordinary rights of an American Territory, and without conferring upon the people thereof the ordinary rights of American citizenship. It is proposed that this Government shall exercise sovereignty over the islands and their inhabitants, keeping them in subjection to our authority, but without permitting them to enjoy the privileges attaching to our other Territories and which belong as of right to all our people, thereby making colonies of the islands and subjects of their inhabitants.

This is what is called imperialism; and imperialism, as thus defined, is the policy of the Republican party. To this policy the Democratic party is opposed. It is opposed to it because the Democratic party believes that the United States cannot, without violating the Constitution, hold the Philippine Islands as a colony, or the Filipinos as subjects. Democrats are not opposed, and have never been opposed, to the principle of territorial expansion. On the contrary, historically considered, the Democratic party occupies a unique and conspicuous place as *the* party of expansion. But, at the same time, Democrats believe that the very form and theory of our government, as well as our fundamental law, place a limitation upon the purposes for which territory may be acquired. They hold that a large area of territory cannot be constitutionally acquired and held except for the purpose of ultimately organizing it into a State, and of conferring upon its people the dignity and prerogatives of citizenship. Any attempt to introduce into our system the principle of colonial dependencies, with vassal subjects, is unwarranted by the Constitution, is destructive of our theory of government, violates our noblest traditions, and is altogether revolutionary. If the Philippine Islands are kept by us, they must be organized into Territories, with a view to Statehood, and their people must be clothed with the rights of our citizenship.

It may be admitted that the islands can be constitutionally held in this way, and for this purpose; but to hold them as the Republicans propose would be to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution. If it should be proposed to hold the islands in a constitutional way, then a question of public policy is raised; and on the ground of public policy the Democratic party is opposed to this government exercising sovereignty over the islands in any way, or for any purpose, constitutionally or otherwise. Upon the ground of public policy, the Democratic party opposes the retention of the islands, because it would introduce into our governmental autonomy,

to be held by force in unwilling subjection, an enormous population, alien in race, thought, faith, and civilization; because it would involve us in constant embroilments, and necessitate the maintenance of a large and expensive military establishment; because it would amount to a practical abrogation of the Monroe doctrine, which is so essential to our supremacy in the Western Hemisphere, and because it would subject our industries at home to a dangerous, if not ruinous, competition. To talk of organizing American States in the Eastern Hemisphere is absurd, and to talk of organizing colonial dependencies is intolerable. So, no matter from what point the subject may be viewed, whether in defending the Constitution or in advocating a wise public policy, the Democratic party is right in opposing this Republican scheme of imperialism, for in doing so it fights for the safety of our people and the integrity of our institutions.

If Mr. McKinley should be reëlected, strengthened in his purpose by popular endorsement, he would go forward with this perilous adventure upon which he and his advisers have embarked the nation. If Mr. Bryan should be elected he would, he has said, immediately convene Congress in extraordinary session, and recommend: (1) that we establish a stable government in the Philippine Islands, as we are doing in Cuba; (2) that we grant independence to the Filipinos, as we have promised it to the Cubans; (3) that we protect the Filipinos from outside interference, just as we protect the republics of Central and South America, and as we are pledged, by the Monroe Doctrine, to protect Cuba.

Now, as to the election. What are Mr. Bryan's chances? While it is true that Mr. McKinley's plurality over Mr. Bryan in 1896 exceeded 600,000, and that his electoral majority was 95, it is also true that a change of 22,078 votes, properly distributed, would have given Mr. Bryan the States of California, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oregon, and West Virginia, which would have elected him. A change of 38,191 votes, properly distributed, would have added Maryland to the Bryan column, in addition to the States named, and thus given him the election by a majority of 23 in the electoral college. Of the eight States named, a part were carried by only slight pluralities; and the aggregate opposition vote, not cast for either Mr. McKinley or Mr. Bryan, amounted to 39,438, of which 14,303 were gold Democratic votes cast for General Palmer. These figures make it clear that the Republican victory of 1896 was not so sweeping as some would make it appear; and when we reflect

that at least half of the eight States named are ordinarily and normally Democratic, and that all are fairly debatable, and when we further reflect that most of the gold Democrats who deserted the party in 1896 are disposed this year to support the ticket, there is nothing in the returns of the last election to discourage Democrats in striving for a different result this year.

Again: In 1896 the Democratic party was in the throes of an almost savage conflict within its own ranks. Nearly one-third of the delegates to the convention that year refused further to participate in the proceedings of the convention after the adoption of the platform, and they afterwards nominated an independent Democratic ticket. No such condition as that exists now.

Again: In 1896 an almost entirely new National Committee was elected, only one member of it ever having had any experience in the conduct of a National campaign. This Committee entered upon the struggle without time for careful preparation, without a dollar in its treasury, with its party ranks divided, to face not only the Republican party, compact and powerful, with millions at its command, but to face also a hostile faction of recalcitrant Democrats, led by some of the ablest and most influential men of the party. No such condition as that exists now.

Again: The battle of 1896 was fought almost wholly upon the one issue of silver coinage. Mr. Bryan is not weaker upon that issue to-day than he was then. In one sense he is stronger—stronger in that all who voted for him upon that issue in 1896 will vote for him in 1900, while many who voted against him on that issue in 1896 will vote for him now. From this it does not necessarily follow that those who thus change their votes to Mr. Bryan at this time have changed their opinion on the silver question, but they will be moved to support him from other considerations.

Again: In a popular sense, Mr. Bryan ought to be the stronger on the trust issue than Mr. McKinley, and ought to gain more on that issue than Mr. McKinley. All those interested in trusts who voted for Mr. McKinley in 1896 will vote for him again; but since circumstances have forced the trust issue more prominently to the front, it is fair to say that many of those who voted for Mr. McKinley in 1896, when this issue was less prominent, will, on this issue, vote against him now. Mr. Bryan will lose nothing on this issue, but will gain largely; and whatever he gains will be Mr. McKinley's loss.

Again: The issue of imperialism ought to bring a large accre-

tion to the Bryan vote. It is certain that he will lose but few votes upon that issue, while, if we are to place any reliance upon the utterances of many of the most eminent Republicans of the land, or upon the reports which come to us of the strong prejudice against imperialism and militarism among foreign-born Americans, it would seem to be almost certain that the McKinley side of this issue will encounter a strong opposition sentiment in the ranks of the Republican party.

Again: In 1895 the metropolitan press was arrayed almost solidly against the Democratic ticket. Chicago furnished a pointed illustration of the disadvantages of that condition. In that great city, where Democratic headquarters were located, there was not a single publication friendly to us, not one which was not aggressively hostile to us. This year we are better off in this respect, for this year, in all the great cities we shall have one or more daily papers advocating Mr. Bryan's election, through the columns of which the Democratic side of all things can be presented to the people.

Again: In 1896 Mr. Bryan was a new man, practically unknown in American politics. The country was uncertain about him, and business interests were afraid of him. Now he is well known. He is universally esteemed to be what he is — an earnest, sincere man, gentle as a woman, yet strong as a giant; honorable, just, and brave; a man of positive convictions, yet conservative; broad-gauged, liberal-minded, and, above all, intensely anxious to be right. Such a man is a safe man. He has improved with age and with acquaintance. The people generally have come to believe that he can be trusted with power, for now they are confident that he would do nothing rashly. This wider confidence in the man's splendid integrity, character, and intelligence is one of the strongest of Mr. Bryan's new elements of strength.

And so, looking the whole field over, the conclusion is reached, and the prophecy made, that Mr. Bryan will be elected. All who love our Republican institutions, and would preserve them unimpaired, should strive ceaselessly to accomplish that result.

WILLIAM J. STONE.

AMERICAN CENSUS METHODS.

THE word census in its present meaning is probably a recent addition to modern European languages. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the thing for which the word now stands did not really exist until near the beginning of the nineteenth century and the organization of the United States government. There is no higher authority in such matters than Professor Von Mayr, of Munich. He says in a recent work: "It was no European state, but the United States of America, that made a beginning of census taking in the large and true sense of that word." Not until after the second American census was taken in 1800 did any other country adopt a similar practice. England and France took their first census in 1801.

That the United States was the pioneer in modern census taking is admitted, but experts differ regarding the amount of credit and of honor which the country may justly claim as a result of her successful innovation. At one extreme stands Moreau de Jonnès, who says:

"The United States did something unexampled in history. They established the statistics of their country when they founded its government, and in one and the same instrument made provision for the census, for their own civil and political rights, and the destiny of the nation. . . . It is evident that they took statistics seriously."

At the other extreme is General Francis A. Walker, who argues that the provision for a national census was incorporated in the Constitution solely from political, not at all from philosophical, considerations, and that therefore the eulogium of Moreau de Jonnès was scarcely merited.

The words of General Walker are undoubtedly true, but the disclaimer is perhaps over-modest in its implications. Modern census taking began in association with representative democratic government, and during the century the two have advanced hand in hand. This connection has been obscured by confusion of the modern democratic census with the old Roman census. The primary aim of the latter was to secure an accurate list, not of the entire population, but

of the citizens and taxpayers, and in some countries, like Spain, where Roman law and Roman administrative methods are dominant, this older form of census still survives. In Cuba down almost to the present day, such a list, sometimes called a census but more accurately a "padron," has been maintained by the local officials, and used for purposes of police and taxation. The modern census first exemplified in the United States is different. Its primary aim is to secure the equitable distribution not of taxes, of military service, or other obligations to the government, but of political power and political rights. In a representative democracy these are distributed more or less directly on the basis of population, and to determine the population the people must be counted. Hence, the theory of representative government implies a census; and it was not merely a political accident that the United States, as a leading exemplar of representative government in the modern world, initiated the custom.

The original object of the census stated in the Constitution was to provide a basis for apportioning both representatives and direct taxes, that is, both political power and financial obligations. The "Federalist" justified this provision on the ground that it would conduce to getting a true count. Communities would wish much political power but also light taxation; and as a resultant of these conflicting motives leading them to desire an undercount and an overcount the truth would probably be approached. The abandonment of direct taxation apportioned according to population has removed the motive for desiring an undercount. At the same time the motives for wishing an overcount have been strengthened. To-day not only is political power apportioned according to population, but also, and in large measure, industrial power and prestige. As a motive for wishing large numbers to be reported by the census, a city's desire to equal or surpass rival cities is now far stronger than a State's desire to secure more representatives in Congress. All motives, therefore, tend to create an exaggerated idea of the population of any community; and no complaint that the numbers reported for the dissatisfied city were too large has ever yet been received at the census office.

The primary object of the census is political, not scientific. A student of the subject will fail to get a true perspective until he thoroughly appreciates the scope and significance of this fact. The census office differs from the purely scientific bureaus of the Government in that it is compelled to serve two masters, and to hold the balance between their diverse, and sometimes antagonistic, claims. The pop-

ular interest in the subject maintains the census, and that interest centres about the population and other political returns concerning a locality often so small that the figures from it taken alone have no scientific value. The history of the American census has been a history of the competition between this popular interest in the enumeration and the scientific interest in accessory statistical data and inferences therefrom — a competition in which the interests of science have gained ever fuller recognition. The inquiries subordinate to the mere numbering of the people greatly increased from 1790 to 1890, especially in 1840, 1850, and 1880. At the tenth and eleventh censuses these subsidiary inquiries saddled upon the enumeration were so numerous and complex as to endanger the accuracy of the count. Hence, under the present law most of these inquiries are to be put off until the enumeration shall have been finished. The only subjects not postponed are those for which the help of the army of enumerators is indispensable. Where the inquiry can be conducted through correspondence or by special agents it is delayed.

The work of the twelfth census now in progress may be divided into three main stages: (1) the preliminary work, lasting from the organization of the office until the time when the field work begins; (2) the field work; and (3) the tabulation, interpretation, and publication of the results.

The preliminary work organized the four primary lines of inquiry ordered by Congress and requiring for their completion the aid of the army of enumerators. They have to do with the population, with deaths, with agriculture, and with manufactures. This work culminated when the schedules and pamphlet of instructions were sent from the central office at Washington to the three hundred local supervisors for the fifty-two thousand enumerators charged with the house-to-house visitation. The amount of material sent out to the field from the central office is perhaps made most clear by the statement that through a period extending over more than two months there were shipped about two car-loads a day. In all, three hundred tons were sent out by registered mail.

The field work done by the army of enumerators, designated by, and working under the direction of, the supervisors, consisted in filling the schedules in accordance with the printed instructions given them. These schedules were large sheets, partly printed, and with blank spaces for the answers to the series of questions asked about every resident, every death during the preceding year, every farm, and

every manufacturing and mechanical establishment. The enumerators before appointment were required to do a sample piece of work, by transferring the information contained in a narrative to blank schedules identical with the population schedules to be filled for the census. In doing so, they were to follow the printed instructions with which they were supplied. The schedules thus filled were corrected by the supervisors in accordance with a key furnished them by the census office, and were then sent to the Washington office for examination. If the schedules were found satisfactory, the supervisor's designation was approved by the director. In this way a supervisor could protect himself against incompetent men who had been recommended to him for appointment, and the office could assure itself that the instructions to enumerators had been examined and understood.

Each enumerator was given an accurate description of the metes and bounds of the district in which he was to work. In cities he was also given a map of his district cut from a plan of the city and with the boundaries of his district heavily marked. The enumeration district was usually coterminous with the election district, in case that gave promise of having enough residents to occupy the average enumerator about the time allowed him by law; namely, two weeks in the cities, or a month elsewhere. With the return of the schedules to the central office, and the payment of the enumerators — at the date of writing they are being paid at the rate of about one thousand a day — the field work of the census comes to an end.

Other countries which take a periodic census, as most now do, organize the two divisions already described, the preliminary work and the field work, after much the same fashion. A country may have one schedule for each person, as Massachusetts in its State census, or one schedule for each family or household, as England, or one schedule for a larger arbitrary number, as the United States has for each hundred persons. But the differences caused by variations — either in the character of the schedule, or in the length of time the enumerator may take for his work, ranging from one day to one month, or resulting from variations regarding the population counted, which in this country is the resident population, but in most others includes all persons physically present in the district on a certain day or night — entail only minor variations of method.

The methods of tabulation, on the contrary, differ not a little in the several countries, and have changed radically in recent years. Contrast the way of making population tables used in the American

census office in 1880 with that now employed. At the two dates the raw material supplied by the enumerators was the same. The population schedule was the so-called "blanket" schedule, carrying names of fifty persons on each side. These names were written down the left-hand side, and the information regarding each was written on a horizontal line after his name; the place for the answer to each question being marked by a column at the head of which the question was printed.

In all census tabulation it is necessary to bring together from the schedules the identical answers and find their sum. At this stage the transformation of the last score of years has occurred. In 1880 the raw material was wrought into statistical tables by hand methods. For this purpose a tally sheet was required so large as to be cumbersome and unmanageable. Hence, the parts not in use were kept out of the way by putting the tally sheet into a simple machine, shaped like a box, 10 by 15 inches on top and 15 inches deep. It carried a long roll of paper, on which tallies were entered by hand. This paper ran over rollers placed at the top and bottom of the machine in such a way that at the upper surface of the machine six narrow columns of paper appeared side by side. On these six columns the tallying clerks made entries for the hundred persons reported on a schedule, and then moved the whole roll of paper back half an inch, so as to hide those entries and offer blank spaces for tallying the next schedule. In such fashion one group of facts on each schedule was tallied. After an enumeration district was finished, the paper was cut into sections, each section carrying similar entries; and the total for the district could then be easily found. As the machine presented only six columns of paper, the number of facts which could be entered at one run of the schedules was rigidly limited; and to exhaust the information carried on the schedule the process had to be repeated many times. The machine was simply a device for conveniently tallying facts by keeping out of sight the parts of a large tally sheet not in immediate use and bringing the parts which were in use into juxtaposition.

The time and money involved in such a series of hand tallies, the danger of error owing to the carelessness or weariness of clerks, and the difficulty of discovering errors when they occurred, were serious obstacles to the development of census work. Accordingly, various efforts were made looking toward supplanting the hand tally by mechanical methods. The most successful of these has been the inven-

tion of Mr. Herman Hollerith, first employed in the eleventh census of the United States, and adopted with modifications and improvements for the twelfth census. This supersedes the eye and arm of the tallying clerk by a current of electricity. As electricity moves far more rapidly than the human machine, the substitution results in simultaneous instead of successive tallying. Electricity cannot be made to tally the symbols written on the enumerator's schedule, but it can be made to tally holes in fixed positions on a card. Hence, before the electrical system can be applied to these symbols, they must be translated into the language of electricity. This is done by punching holes in a card, the location of which represents all the statistical information contained on the schedule line to which the card refers. To make this method clearer, notice the following cut :

1	2	3	4	W	M	0	1	6	0	Un	0	0	12	0	6	12	Mo	NH	VT	MA	RI	SD
5	6	7	8	B	F	10	12	12	1	6	8	1	7	12	1	7	12	CT	MA	MA	MA	MA
1	2	3	4	Ch	20	21	25	30	2	7	MO	2	8	14	2	8	N	NY	NJ	CT	MA	MA
5	6	7	8	Jp	35	40	45	50	3	8	MI	3	9	15	3	9	F	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
1	2	3	4	In	55	60	65	70	4	9	Wd	4	10	16	4	10	Del	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
5	6	7	8	75	80	85	90	95+	Un	D	5	11	17	5	11	DC	GA	MA	MA	MA	MA	MA
1	2	3	4	So	OR	0	1	4	17	11	5	Un	15	2	0	US	Un	Un	Un	Un	Un	Un
5	6	7	8	OL	NR	1	6	5	0	12	6	NO	20+	3	1	Gr	Ir	So	Gr	Ir	So	Gr
1	2	3	4	2	NW	4	c	0	0	13	7	1	Gr	4	Au	Sw	CB	Wa	Sw	CB	Wa	Sw
5	6	7	8	4	0	7	d	7	1	14	8	2	Pa	5	Se	Nw	CP	Hu	Nw	CP	Hu	Nw
1	2	3	4	6	12	10	e	8	2	15	9	3	Al	6	Pe	De	Fr	It	De	Fr	It	Au
5	6	7	8	8+	Un	g	f	9	9	10	10	4	Un	10	01	Re	Bo	01	Re	Bo	01	Re

It is a reduced photograph of one of the cards, seventy-five millions of which, one for each resident of the United States, are now in use at the census office. In the card of which this is a reduction holes were punched at points indicated by black circles on its face. These holes are divided into two classes by the vertical line near the left-hand edge of the card. The first class, aided by the large numerals at the right-hand edge, identifies the person; the second gives the facts regarding him in the language of the tabulating machine. To interpret the first group first: The 2 in the upper left-hand corner means that this card relates to a resident of New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, or Maryland; the 4 below, that he lives in Pennsylvania outside of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh; the 1 below, that he lives in some one of certain-named cities in Pennsylvania; the 3,

that he lives in one of the first nineteen wards of Scranton; the 2, that he lives in ward 2, 3, or 4 of that city; and, finally, the 4 restricts his residence to enumeration district No. 54 in the third ward. The enumerator in this district sent in schedules, each having information about one hundred persons. The number 40, at the extreme right of the card, means that the answers regarding this person are on schedule 40, and the number 17, that they are on line 17 of that schedule. The system of symbols thus far explained makes it a simple and short matter to find among millions the enumerator's original entry, of which any card is a translation, and to decide whether the translation has been accurately made. In other words, it verifies a card. No other system of mechanical tabulation, I believe, possesses this enormous advantage.

The second class of holes on the card, that to the right of the vertical line, includes all of statistical value as distinguished from the holes required only for verification. These, also, may best be understood by taking the preceding cut as an illustration. The W means that this person is white; the M, that the person is a male; the 45, that he is between 45 and 50 years of age; the o, that his age is exactly 45; the M1, that he is married and has been married more than one year. The F means that he is of foreign birth, and the ^{Mas}Gr shows, for one thing, he was born in Germany. For each hole in this last field two symbols are given, the upper symbol to be used in case of native, the lower in case of foreign birth. In the present instance, if the N had been punched just above the F, the second hole remaining as it is, the ^{Mas}Gr would have represented a native of Massachusetts. The two fields immediately below indicate that the father and the mother were both born in Germany; the 10 at the left of these that the person has been in this country between 10 and 15 years; the Na that he has been naturalized; the 1 that his general occupation is that of an agriculturist in the widest sense; the next 1 that he is a farmer in the narrower sense as distinct from a farm laborer, cattle-drover, or lumberman; the α in the third field that he is a farmer in his own name rather than a foreman, superintendent, or a member of the farmer's family reported as a farmer; the o that he was not unemployed for any one of the twelve months preceding the day of the census; the OK that he is able to read and write; and, finally, the En that he speaks English. A seeming inconsistency between the place of residence and that of occupation is removed by noting on the map of Scranton that this part of the third ward extends out of the thickly settled district into a

region where farming is probably common. A similar card, *mutatis mutandis*, is now being made in the Census Office for each of the many million inhabitants of the United States.

After the transfer of information to the cards has been completed, the schedules from which the information is derived are filed among the Government records, and all the work of statistical tabulation is done with these cards. One notices that the clerks working on them cannot tell the names or addresses of the individuals for whom the cards stand, and that thus in the preparation of census tables the personal element is entirely lost.

When these cards are ready, they are placed, one at a time, in a press, and a set of two hundred and forty blunt pins are brought down upon them in such a way that a pin strikes the card at every place where a hole belonging to the second class might be found. Where holes are found the corresponding pin passing through completes an electric circuit in which is placed a counter. The current passing through the hole and corresponding counter tallies one on the latter; that is, it moves the longer hand forward one point. Each counter can tally ten thousand before returning to zero.

In the card just described the current entering the first field for race would have five possible paths. The routes diverge at the five points where holes in the cards might have been made. At a later point on each route a counter is inserted. Of these five routes four are closed by the surface of the card, and the current is compelled to go by the fifth where the hole has been made, and so is guided to the counter for whites. After passing through the counters these five routes reunite, and the current returning to the card passes through the field for sex at the hole marked M and to the counter for males, then through the field for age, and so on. Finally, it passes through an electric bell which rings each time the complex circuit is closed. If at any point the current is broken, as, for example, by the failure of the translating clerk to transfer a fact called for by the machine, the current, being interrupted, tallies no fact on the card, the bell fails to ring, and the card is thrown aside for comparison with the schedule. In this way many errors made by the translating clerk are automatically detected by the machine. Furthermore, the machine may be adjusted to reject any reported combination so unlikely to be true as to call for verification before it is tabulated. Such rejected cards can then be readily compared with the original schedules, in order to learn whether the doubtful facts were actually so reported

by the census enumerator. For example, in the census of Cuba just being finished, the machines were adjusted to reject all cards from which it appeared that persons under eighteen years of age were married. All such cases were then compared with the schedules, and only after this examination had verified the first translation was the combination tabulated. Similarly, the machines may be adjusted to reject all cases of female blacksmiths, or male dressmakers, or persons born abroad whose parents were reported as natives of the United States, etc. By these devices the chance of error in tabulation is reduced to a negligible quantity in comparison with that to which the enumerators themselves are exposed, and also to a ratio far less than that which existed under the system of hand tally.

In actual work the adjustments are more complex than those just described. For each census the machine is so used as to secure the efficient and economical combination of its resources with those of clerical labor. This involves putting each card through the tallying machine several times in order to get the cross classifications required. Thus, the eleventh census reports, for example, the number of persons in New York State who were male, between twenty-five and twenty-nine years of age, native white, born of native parents, and widowed. Cross classifications, of which the foregoing is an example, are usually those which give most aid to a student investigating problems to which they relate; and it is in work of this sort that present methods are most superior to those in use twenty years ago. The new method thus is not primarily for expediting the work and reducing expense, although it does both, but is an invention which widens the field of scientific investigation and analysis.

While in the mechanical aspects of its work, that is, the production of statistical tables by factory methods, the census office since 1880 has made rapid strides, and is now at least abreast of other countries, it must not be forgotten that the statistical table is not the finished product of the census office. A statistical table is a dumb and lifeless thing. In publishing it, the census office should interpret it and elucidate its meaning. The scientific aim of a census is to measure the social conditions investigated, and to learn their causes. One census is like another as one eclipse is like another; but accumulated experience, increased powers of measurement, growing definiteness of aim and delicacy of analysis, should make each census, like each eclipse, tell a somewhat fuller story. Each census should aim to probe some unsolved questions on which

such an inquiry may throw light, and also to raise new and important questions for similar examination in the future. In this aspect of its work, I doubt whether the progress of American census taking has kept pace with its mechanical improvement.

Public interest in sound statistical work has grown rapidly since 1880, and the demands of scholars upon the census are more imperative and exacting than ever. But these demands have sometimes been voiced without full knowledge of the diverse interests at stake, and of the difficulties incident to a temporary census office, organized at the latest possible date. They have sometimes been expressed in such a way as to arouse rather than to allay opposition. On the other hand, officials connected with the census office have sometimes taken criticism upon the results they have published as indicating a personal animus, where I believe there was none, and in defence have sought to justify their results by arguments that appeared to critics unsound.

How the literary and scientific standard of the census volumes may be kept on a level with the advancing excellence of American statistical tabulation is, then, a great problem. The natural way of solving it would seem to be this: Enlist aid from many statistical experts in preparing the explanatory text. The tables of age composition are of most interest and use to persons like the actuaries of life insurance companies, whose business it is to interpret age tables. The tables of race can be best understood by the small but increasing group of scholars who are devoting themselves to race relations in their statistical aspects. The tables regarding city population can be best interpreted in consultation with students who have given the census statistics of American and foreign cities years of special study. For the statistics of illiteracy, the aid of an educational expert is needed; for the statistics of occupations, that of a trained economist, familiar with the results of recent special censuses of industries and occupations in foreign countries. So, too, the best interpretation of vital statistics calls for medical as well as statistical experts, and the same holds true for the statistics of agriculture and the manufactures. Such coöperation of experts has already begun in the division of manufactures, and the course of development seems to point toward its extension in other branches of the census. WALTER F. WILLCOX.

MR. FREDERIC HARRISON'S NEW ESSAYS.¹

It would be idle to maintain that this paper has been devoted to Mr. Harrison's recent volume, because the latter, in modern parlance, is a "timely production" or a "book of the hour." It is "timely," in a true sense, because it both belongs to and deals with good literature; and it is a "book of the hour" because the few months that have elapsed since it was published form but an inappreciable period in the literary history of the world. But it is certainly not one of those books that are widely discussed or that become the subject of a craze or fad — a fact which, in the eyes of a few persons, at least, is a positive recommendation.

On the other hand, it is worthy of serious attention both because it is the latest work of one of the best critics and most distinguished writers of a great generation whose master-spirits are rapidly passing from the stage of their achievements, and because it attempts to give us "a series of systematic estimates of some leading influences on the thought of our time." Criticism with a large purpose and from the pen of an experienced student of books and affairs deserves more than a mere passing notice, especially in the pages of a periodical that has often had the benefit of the critic's coöperation.

Mr. Harrison does not himself employ the title "Essays," and he seems, by his use of chapter divisions, to seek to emphasize the unity of his book. But it would be hard to show that a short address on the unveiling of portraits of Lamb and Keats, a satirical dialogue between a "book-trotter" and a true student of literature, a delightful and serviceable discourse on "English Prose," and the two excellent papers on the new memoirs and the new letters of Gibbon contributed some time since to these pages, may, with any propriety, be considered integral portions of a volume, the chief purpose of which has been described above in words taken from its author's prefatory note.

¹"Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill and Other Literary Estimates." By Frederic Harrison, author of "The Choice of Books," etc., etc. New York, the Macmillan Company, 1900.

Viewed as essays, these five chapters are not merely deserving of republication in a permanent form, but also add a pleasing element of variety to the present collection; yet they hardly deepen the impression made by the combined chapters on Tennyson, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, John Addington Symonds, Froude, Freeman, and John Stuart Mill. Mr. Harrison's critical discussions of these eminent men — particularly when taken in connection with his former series of papers contributed to *THE FORUM* on such writers as George Eliot and Charles Kingsley — do indeed constitute a "series of systematic estimates of some leading influences upon the thought of our time," which is but to say that he has carried out well a purpose he has had in mind for several years. His five unrelated, or slightly related, chapters seem to be thrown in for good measure, and on such terms may be cordially accepted. They are grouped near the middle of the volume, perhaps in order the better to mark off the poets and critics from Mill and the two historians; but we shall find it advantageous to give them priority, although not equality, of treatment.

The discourse on "English Prose" was delivered before the Bodley Literary Society of Oxford, Mr. Harrison's own son being in the chair. It is naturally marked by the tone of admonition we expect from the elderly alumnus addressing undergraduates. Almost everything that is said is felicitously put; although, of course, much that is said is not new. The slow maturing of prose, the difficulty of mastering the secrets of its subtlest harmonies, the comparative paucity in every literature of really great prose writers — these familiar truths are brought out by Mr. Harrison in a way that proves that he has himself learned to employ the few practical hints or rules for writing good prose that he ventures to give. Plato is for him "the greatest master of prose in recorded history," but he has words of praise for Boccaccio, for Voltaire — whom he considers "perhaps the greatest master of prose in any modern language" — and for Swift and Goldsmith.

His tribute to the last-named writer is all the more welcome because of some inconsiderate criticisms that have of late been passed upon that fine classic "The Vicar of Wakefield," on account of the unrealistic character of its plot. Still more welcome are Mr. Harrison's remarks as to the general superiority of French prose to English; for scarcely a year passes that some popular magazine does not print an article the main purpose of which is to depreciate a literature adorned in one century with the names of Hugo, Balzac, Sainte Beuve, Renan, and Taine.

But perhaps the most important point made in an essay that would serve excellently as an introduction to a volume of prose specimens is one at which most teachers of the art of writing prose would gravely shake their heads. Mr. Harrison looks "with sorrow upon the habit," that has grown up at Oxford since his day, "of making a considerable part of the education of the place to turn on the art of serving up gobbets of prepared information in essays more or less smooth and correct—more or less successful imitations of the viands that are cooked for us daily in the press." He thinks rightly that to prepare seven essays in a week is "a task which would exhaust the fertility of a Swift." Some of us who have probably had more practical experience in teaching than Mr. Harrison are coming to share his opinion. The essay made up of pilferings from encyclopædias is a bane of modern teaching and a travesty on the dignified idea involved in the phrase "original work." It makes too frequently for slipshodness rather than culture, and Mr. Harrison is quite right in thinking that neither it nor the formal daily or weekly theme, however necessary the latter may be in the early stages of a student's career, will ever make for a true mastery of prose style. It is the height of absurdity to set a raw youth to writing essays on Petrarch and Dante, when—this is an actual, not an imaginary, case—he is in the habit of way-laying passers-by in order to learn the proper spelling of every-day words to be used in the letters he is required to write.

The dialogue entitled "The Book Trotter" is the slightest thing in the volume, but is not without its uses as a satire upon another fad of modern teaching and culture; to wit, the emphasis laid upon the desirability, nay the necessity, of keeping up with the times by skimming books and magazines much as one of Cook's "globe trotters" flits or stalks through picture galleries and historic ruins. Slight also, but full of suggestiveness, is the address on Lamb and Keats on the unveiling of their portraits at a free library at Edmonton. Most of us, doubtless, connect Edmonton with John Gilpin rather than with John Keats; but both the poet and the humorist—who have more lovers than Cowper—are sufficiently connected with the place to give it a fair share of celebrity. Mr. Harrison used his opportunity to insist that, whatever be our affection for Lamb and Keats, it is doing them no real service to claim for them the fame of writers of the first rank. Each has a unique, a noble place in his country's literature; but it is not with Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Chaucer, Fielding, and Scott—in all of whom "we find profound insight, mighty im-

agination, vast range of experience and sympathy, mass of work, world-wide, universal spell and influence."

In the above cited warning against the prevalent "hysterical enthusiasm in things of taste" we may discover evidence of many of Mr. Harrison's qualifications for the rôle of critic. He is eminently sane in his judgments; he has read widely and well; he is not afraid of his own conclusions, which he bases on more or less reasoned out principles. He is not one of those delicate literary tasters or appraisers who would be alarmed if they did not have a different opinion about the same poem on each successive day. He recognizes that quantity of work counts as well as quality, and that a cosmopolitan fame means more than a local or a national one. But while he bases his criticism upon principles, thus greatly increasing its helpfulness to others, he is not lacking in appreciation or in the power to bring into full relief delicate qualities of the writers and books he discusses. For example, close upon the paragraphs that deprecate unreasoning admiration of Lamb and Keats follow just and far from commonplace tributes to both, although it is perhaps open to admirers of Keats to claim that not enough is made of the almost Shakespearian qualities of his harmonious utterance, which suggests that "of the early gods" told of in his own "Hyperion." Be this as it may, Mr. Harrison's address is well worth reading, especially by Americans, who will be pleased by what he has to say about our great libraries, and of the way in which the public, unlike that of England, makes constant and fruitful use of them.

The two essays devoted to Gibbon require but slight comment. They give an interesting account of how the famous "Autobiography" was pieced together, and cull from the newly-printed letters many curious fragments that throw additional light upon Gibbon the man, the politician, the friend. Gibbon the scholar and historian does not often come into view; but Mr. Harrison's admiration for him in these capacities is well known, and, indeed, is clearly evidenced in this volume. Such admiration is inevitable to liberal readers, but it may be doubted whether most readers are fully aware of the immense and noble capacity for friendship which the normally unenthusiastic Gibbon possessed and displayed. Readers unaware of this trait of the historian's character will do well to consult these essays.

From the five more or less unrelated essays, which have, however, served to furnish us with some insight into our critic's chief qualities, we may now pass to the nine related essays which give the

volume its main value. The first, devoted to Tennyson, is in many respects the most important of the group, although it is doubtless the chapter that will evoke most dissent from Mr. Harrison's readers. It has apparently never been published before, and it seems to be a series of comments methodically arranged rather than a rounded essay. But whether or not it is entitled to rank among great or even good English essays, it is surely a most stimulating and wholesome piece of contemporary criticism. The predominance of the late laureate in the history of Victorian literature is acknowledged without cavil; the wonderful flawlessness, range, and sustained power of his art is praised in a way that ought to satisfy even enthusiastic admirers; the essential nobility of his consecrated life is freely admitted. Then the critic asserts the prerogatives of his own high office, asks searching questions as to the value of Tennyson's contribution to the world's thought on the high and deep things of life, applies standards approved by catholic students of European literature, and fearlessly draws his own conclusions.

The results are not so favorable to Tennyson as those reached in most of the monographs and studies called forth by his death. Yet they are in line with the thoughts of not a few persons who have lacked Mr. Harrison's courage and his gift of critical analysis. Such persons have felt with him that while it is grossly unfair to affirm that Browning was a thinker and Tennyson not—the reverse proposition might be more easily defended—yet the original qualities of Tennyson's thought, of his "criticism of life," may justly be called into question. After a careful, though brief, analysis of "In Memoriam," which he ranks highly as a poem, Mr. Harrison concludes that Tennyson, with his melodious transfiguration of a half-skeptical piety, gave the age a voice, but did not give it a faith. He possessed no "such creative influence over men" as Burns, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Byron had. He is not with these poets "who, with all their defects and all their limitations, did, by original ideas fresh from their own spirit and not at all adapted from contemporary thinkers, give a new impulse to the mind of their age."

Now it is quite obvious that neither Mr. Harrison, nor any other writer following in his steps, can prove to a reluctant Tennysonian, or even to an unprejudiced inquiring reader, the truth of the conclusions briefly given above. But this is a limitation common to all criticism based upon a use of standards. Only readers of comparatively wide culture can be reasonably sure of the authenticity of a

critic's standards, and of the accuracy of the use he makes of them. And if his results differ from our preconceptions, how easy it is to sneer at him and his standards, even to the extent of calling him "this wretched old man," as an urbane American seems to have denominated Mr. Harrison. But, sooner or later, if the critic's results are correct, they are acquiesced in by his fellow critics, and by broadly cultured readers, after which it is but a matter of time before the writer or book under discussion is finally "placed."

It follows that readers who are not hopeless partisans should give a careful hearing to what a writer like Mr. Harrison has to say in qualification of the fame even of a great poet such as Tennyson, and that, if they cannot yet agree with him, they should bear his judgments in mind, and test them later in the light of wider reading and of larger experience. Only thus can an original and courageous critic receive justice at the hands of readers; only thus can readers profit to the full from genuine criticism. It is needless to add that objur-gation and partisan wrath are futile, and have no legitimate part to play in such matters.

But "In Memoriam" is not the only one of Tennyson's longer poems that, from the point of view of substance, of content, fares less favorably at Mr. Harrison's hands than at those of "gushing curates and æsthetic young ladies." Readers of that admirable volume, "The Choice of Books," will remember what our critic had to say there about the "Idylls" as a boudoir epic. Such readers will not then be surprised at the tone of the remarks made upon these poems in the present essay. The chief point emphasized by Mr. Harrison, to wit, that Tennyson travestied the great romance of Mallory, has been often brought forward by others, and will probably be still more frequently emphasized in the future. Mr. Harrison's presentation of the charge is, however, notably trenchant and amusing:

"Lancelot of the Lake is transformed into a sort of Sir Charles Grandison in plate armor; King Arthur becomes a courtier's portrait of the late Prince Consort; Elaine is a new Virginia, without her Paul, and Queen Guinevere is a magnificent '*grande dame*' of Versailles, with a secret. It is all too much of a pageant or 'revival' in mediæval character, and suggests reminiscences of the Eglinton Tournament and the stage Shakespeare."

These will seem to be hard words to many sympathetic souls that can still glow with pleasure at the memory of the exquisite delight afforded them in the past by the wonderfully wrought "Idylls of the

King." Doubtless there is some exaggeration to be laid at Mr. Harrison's door; but it is still more certain that he could have made his criticism much more ruthless had he chosen to emphasize the harm done the poem by Tennyson's mawkishness in dealing with great passions, and by his introduction of the far from congruous element of allegory. We must, too, in compensation, remember the unstinted praise accorded by the essayist to the splendor of Tennyson's execution, and his high appreciation of the parting scene between the King and the guilty Queen and of the original *Morte d'Arthur*.

But we cannot linger over these comments on Tennyson, interesting though they be. Most readers will probably agree that Mr. Harrison's high estimate of "The Princess" as a medley is correct, nor will they seriously dissent from the mixture of praise and blame he assigns to "Maud." His low ranking of the dramas and the controversial poems will be generally accepted; and some readers at least will not be surprised that he finds no occasion to comment upon "Enoch Arden," but does see fit to single out for special praise "Rizpah" and the noble "Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington." He does full justice, too, to true idylls like "Ænone," although lovers of Moschus may object that they find in them no higher "dignity and thoughtfulness" than are contained in that poet's noble lament for his predecessor, Bion. In his apt praise of the lyrics, on which Mr. Harrison is sure Tennyson's "permanent fame must abide," our author is in substantial accord with one of the subtlest critics this age has produced, Edward FitzGerald, the friend of Tennyson and of Omar.

FitzGerald's dictum that the two volumes of 1842 represent the high-water mark of Tennyson's performance must be enlarged to include the splendid lyrics the laureate kept on producing, from the marvellous songs in "The Princess" to the equally wonderful lines "To Vergil" and "Crossing the Bar"; but a few of us think that his criticism was in the main correct, and that it will be a point of departure for much future discussion of Tennyson. Of course, it must not be taken too strictly, for it is hard to conceive how some of Tennyson's highest achievements in blank verse can ever fade from the world's memory. It seems, nevertheless, to be true that in certain forms of lyric work Tennyson is supreme in our poetry, while in blank verse, as Mr. Harrison shows in this essay, he is inferior to Milton. The splendid polysyllabic verses and the rolling periods of the blind old poet were not within his power or his choice; and Mr. Harrison is right in emphasizing this point in several pages of valuable metrical

analysis. Nor is the marked jingo element in Tennyson's work, which Mr. Harrison reprobates with a sly hit at Mr. Kipling that follows delightfully on a needed tribute to Byron, likely to help the laureate's admirers to set him as near to Milton as they have it in mind to do.

The chapter on Tennyson is followed by three chapters on the writer who, of all moderns, seems to be nearest Mr. Harrison's heart—that noble lover of art and of man whose death we have been recently called upon to deplore. The first of these chapters or essays, "Ruskin as Master of Prose," is distinctly more important than its companions, "Ruskin as Prophet" and "Ruskin's Eightieth Birthday"; yet all three are valuable, and taken together form one of the most adequate tributes that have yet been paid to a genius that has of late suffered the usual penalty that attaches to premature and unbounded popularity. The second chapter is a dialogue between an old professor, who is no other than Mr. Harrison himself, and a young artist full of latter-day theories and fads. Naturally the older man succeeds in driving the younger out of court. Ruskin's extravagances are freely admitted—it is one of Mr. Harrison's best points that he is too good an advocate to be a partisan—but his services as an awakener of the æsthetic sense of the modern public, as a prose writer of almost unrivalled power, and as a philanthropist of the purest if sometimes most impracticable purposes, are eloquently and convincingly presented.

The close of this second essay is marked by a most feeling and touching reference to the infirmity of Ruskin's last days. A feeling and touching tribute is what the third essay may be fairly denominated. Although in origin but a timely contribution to a daily newspaper, it is in perfect taste, and well deserves republication, since it is a model of a difficult class of writings. The first chapter is equally, in its way, a model of stylistic analysis. Mr. Harrison does not content himself with fine periods about Ruskin's finer ones, or with judiciously chosen illustrative extracts, of which he gives many; he condescends to technical analysis of the structure of Ruskin's sentences, and especially of the master's wonderful use of assonance, or, as Mr. Harrison prefers to term it, consonance.

The pages in which this analysis is given are as valuable to the student of style as the corresponding pages devoted to the analysis of Tennyson's blank verse. No one who reads them, and the essay itself, will be likely to dispute the high eulogiums passed upon Ruskin's

prose, in spite of its want of balance, and at times, of sanity—defects to which Mr. Harrison is not blind. Some of us may make a reservation in favor of the arch-angelical note—if the exaggeration may be pardoned—to be discovered in the noblest of Milton's passages; but, after all, the "old man eloquent," or rather, young man eloquent, for Ruskin's most magnificent writing was done before he was forty-three, holds us, as he does Mr. Harrison, with a spell comparable to that exercised by the Ancient Mariner.

But this paper is growing too long, and we must pass rapidly over the remaining essays, tempting though they are. With regard to Matthew Arnold, Mr. Harrison is by no means alone in considering the poems the surest basis of the former's fame, and in rating as of only temporary importance the theological and social criticism that gave, and still gives him, in some circles, midway between conservatism and advanced liberalism, his limited but genuine vogue.

Arnold's literary criticism is to his former opponent, whose entire freedom from rancor is delightful, but not surprising, the best the English language affords—an opinion which shall not be disputed here, although it would seem that our essayist does not bring out fully Arnold's very considerable obligations to Goethe, Heine, and Sainte-Beuve, to mention no others. As for the poems, if Mr. Harrison does not quite satisfy the Arnold enthusiast, he is never less than sympathetic and sane. Arnold is undoubtedly strongest as an elegiac and gnomic poet; he lacks fire, and he does suggest Theognis, although he is surely more of a singer than the latter rather pedestrian poet. Could Theognis have written "Requiescat" or "Apollo Musagetes," or that wonderful verse which curiously enough Mr. Harrison fails to cite—

"The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea"?

The essays on Froude and Freeman are naturally interesting, coming as they do from one whose own studies of history have been wide and thorough. Mr. Harrison does not attempt the impossible task of defending Froude's accuracy, but he has given us some noteworthy pages on the latter's permanent rank as a great master of English prose. Freeman is ably defended from the reproach, that he made little use of manuscripts, brought against him by palæontological experts; Mr. Harrison taking occasion to pass many salutary judgments on modern historical methods which too often degenerate into fads. But the great historian's flux of words finds no favor in his sight.

The essay on Symonds and that on Mill remain, and they are as interesting as any in the volume. While he is fully aware of Symonds's defective sympathies, and is not enamored of the luscious qualities of his earlier style, Mr. Harrison has nothing in common with the hypercritical detractors of a scholar whose brave fight for life of body, mind, and soul is one of the most pathetic and nobly inspiring facts recorded in the literary history of modern times. He likes the "Greek Poets," and has the courage to say so frankly; and he is, seemingly, one of the few critics who have had the acumen to discover the merits of the "Essays" of 1890. It is to be hoped that this excellent chapter will draw many a new reader to Symonds.

The same pious wish may be expressed with regard to the concluding essay on John Stuart Mill. Mr. Harrison's main object is to explain the causes of the vogue Mill once had as well as the causes of that decline of his reputation that has often been deplored by men who prefer the spirit of justice to that of jingoism. It would take us too far afield to follow closely our critic's analysis, which is mainly concerned with the essays or tractates on "Liberty," "Utilitarianism," and "The Subjection of Women." In the way of sympathetic, yet searching, criticism Mr. Harrison has done nothing better. He shows clearly the contradictions involved in the fact that "Mill, for all his apparent proof armor of dry logic, was continually moved by what has been called 'the logic of feeling.'" But the more acutely he probes, the more he inspires us with a wish to reread the essays that once thrilled us. We desire once more to be brought in contact with that noble man and citizen whose "bearing was always a combination of patience, justice, a lofty morality, and unflinching courage." In other words, we long to revert, in imagination, at least, to the great achievements in action and thought of that splendid generation of which Mill was so lofty an exemplar—a generation to which Mr. Harrison and his book practically belong—an age which had its failings, indeed, but which was not given up to thoughts of war, of empire, of crusading philanthropy and over-assertive virility.

W. P. TRENT.